State v. Herrera Clerk\u27s Record v. 1 Dckt. 41494 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-24-2014
State v. Herrera Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 41494
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation









STATE OF IDAHO 
Plainliff I Re pondenl 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA 
D ifendant I App //ant 
L RK ORDO PPEAL 
I 
ppea/edfron, /1,e Dl tri t Court of the Fir. I Judicial Di tricl 
of tl,e Stal of ldu/10 in and for the County of B~newah. 
Lawrence . Wasd n, 
ttom y eneraJ 
Allorn y for Re p ndent 
tat pp llat Public D fi nder 
Attorney for Appellant 
7 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 








SUPREME COURT NO. 41494 
Appealed from the First Judicial District, Benewah County, Idaho 
HONORABLE FRED M. GIBLER, presiding 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
State Appellate Public Defender, 3050 North Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 
VOLUME I 
I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No. 
TITLE PAGE ................................................................................. Vol. I - 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................... Vol. I 2 - 6 
INDEX ........................................................................................ Vol.1-7-11 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS - filed December 23, 2013............................... Vol. I 12 19a 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - filed December 27, 2011.......................... ... Vol. I - 20 - 21 
COURT MINUTES-dated December 27, 2011..................................... Vol. I - 22 
COMMITMENT ORDER-filed December 27, 2011............................... Vol. I - 23 
COURT MINUTES-dated January 6, 2012...... ............................... Vol. I - 24 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER- filed January 6, 2012...... Vol. I - 25 
COURT MINUTES-dated January 9, 2012...... ............................... Vol. I- 26 
MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION OR RELEASE ON OWN 
RECOGNIZANCE AND NOTICE OF HEARING-filed January 11, 2012 Vol. I-27 - 28 
MOTION TO CONTINUE PRELIMINARY HEARING - filed 
January 17, 2012 ..... ... . .. .. .. .. . ... .. . .. . ...... .. . .. . ... ... ... . .. ... .. . ... . .. .. . .. . .... Vol. 1-29- 30 
ORDER CONTINUING PRELIMINARY HEARING-filed January 18, 2012 Vol. I-31 - 32 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR INVESTIGATORS-filed March 21, 2012 ...... Vol. I-33 - 34 
COURT MINUTES-filed March 26, 2012...... ......... ........................... Vol. 1-35 - 39 
ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER TO DISTRICT COURT -
filed March 26, 2012. ...................................................................... Vol. I 40 - 41 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S INFORMATION -filed March 27, 2012. .... Vol. I- 42 - 43 
ORDER- filed March 30, 2012......... ... ............................................ Vol. 1-44 - 46 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR INVESTIGATORS AND FUNDS AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING-filed April 9, 2012 ........................................ Vol. I 47 - 48 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
p 
Page No. 
COURT MINUTES-dated April 13, 2012........................................ Vol. I - 49 
ORDER ENTERING PLEA OF NOT GUILTY -filed April 13, 2012........ Vol. 1-50 - 51 
MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING-
filed April 23, 2013.. ... .... .... .. ...... ... . ..... .. ....... ...... ..... . ... .. ..... ...... ... Vol. I- 52 - 53 
ORDER-filed May 1, 2012.... .. ... .. . ..... .. .. ... .. . ......... ... . .. . .. ... ... .. . .. ... Vol. I- 54 - 56 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT-filed May 3, 2012................. Vol. I- 57 - 58 
ORDER RE: EX PARTE MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT - filed 
May 4, 2012.. ... ...... ... . . .. . .. .. . .... .. ... ... ... .. .. .. ... . .. ... . .. .. . ... . ........ ....... Vol. I- 59 - 60 
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY 
RESPONSE AND PRETRIAL MOTIONS-filed May 18, 2012 ............ ... Vol. I- 61 - 63 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY RESPONSE 
AND PRETRIAL MOTIONS -filed May 18, 2012 .............................. Vol. I- 64 - 65 
WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST-filed June 13, 2012 ........................... Vol. I- 66 - 68 
MOTIONINLIMINE-filedJune13,2012 ....................................... Vol. I- 69 - 73 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE I.R.E. 803(24) AND 804(6) EVIDENCE -
filed June 13, 2012 .... .. .. ..... .. ... ... .. .......... ............ ... .. . ... ... .. ...... ..... Vol. I- 74 - 77 
SECOND NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE 404(b) EVIDENCE -
filed June 13, 2012 . .. . .. ............... ... .... .. .. ......... ....... ... .. ......... .... .. .. Vol. I- 78 - 82 
STATE'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE- filed June 13, 2012 ............... Vol. I 83 - 85 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR INVESTIGATOR FUNDS AND NOTICE OF 
HEARING-filed June 14, 2012 ..................................................... Vol. I- 86 - 87 
MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE-filed June 15, 2012 ......................... Vol. I 88 - 90 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR DISMISS - filed June 15, 2012 .................. Vol. 1-91 - 93 
NOTICE OF ELECTION TO PROCEED UNDER IDAHO CODE 9-420 -
Filed June 28, 2012 ................................. ..................... ................ Vol. I- 94 - 98 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No. 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORDS AS "NOT FOUND" filed June 28, 2012 Vol. I- 99 - 102 
STATE'S AMENDMENT TO NOTICES OF INTENT TO USE 404(b) AND 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE-filed June 28, 2012 ...................................... Vol. I 103 - 108 
STATE'S MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF ADMISSABILITY OF 
EVIDENCE-filed June 28, 2012 .. . . .. . .. ... .. ... .. .. ... ... .. ... . ... .. .. .. ....... ... Vol. I 109 - 114 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPORT OF ADMISSION OF VICTIM'S 
STATEMENTS AND 404(b) EVIDENCE-filed June 28, 2012 ................. Vol. I- 115 - 161 
FIRST AMENDMENT TO STATE'S WITNESS LIST-filed June 29, 2012. Vol. I- 162 - 163 
COURT MINUTES-dated July 13, 2012 ....................................... ..... Vol. I - 164- 172 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR DISMISS -
Filed July 20, 2012 ... .. ... .. . . ... .. . .. . . .. . . . ... ... ... .. . . .. . . . ... .. . .. . .. ..... ... .. ... .. . Vol. I- 173 - 174 
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION FOR DETERMINATIAON OF 
ADMISSABILITY OF EVIDENCE-filed July 24, 2012 ............ ...... ....... Vol. I 175 - 177 
SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE-filed July 24, 2012 ... Vol. 1-178 - 180 
MOTION TO CONTINUE JURY TRIAL filed July 26, 2012................... Vol. I- 181 - 182 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE-filed July 26, 2012 ... Vol. I- 183 - 185 
COURT MINUTES-dated August 1, 2012 .......................................... Vol. I-186 
ORDER CONTINUING JURY TRIAL-filed August 2, 2012 ......... ...... .... Vol. I- 187 - 188 
MOTION TO CONTINUE-filed November 20, 2012 ............................ Vol. I 189 - 191 
ORDER TO CONTINUE-filed November 21, 2012 ... .. . ... .. ... . .. .... ... .. . .. . Vol. I 192 - 193 
COURT MINUTES- dated February 22, 2013 ...................................... Vol. I- 194 
STATE'S SECOND AMENDED WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST-filed 
March 1, 2013 .. . . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. ... ..... .. . .. ... .. . ...... ... . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . ..... Vol. I- 195 199 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
VOLUME II 
Page No. 
TITLE PAGE ................................................................................. Vol. II - 200 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................... Vol. 11-201 - 205 
INDEX ........................................................................................ Vol. II - 206 - 210 
COURT MINUTES - dated March 12, 2013 ... ... . . ... . .. .. . . .. . . .. ... ... .. . . .. . .... Vol. II 211 - 212 
MOTION IN LIMINE- filed March 18, 2013 ............ ........................... Vol. II-213 - 215 
MOTION TO DISABLE FIREARM-filed March 19, 2013 ....................... Vol. 11-216 - 218 
ORDER APPROVING DISABLING OF FIREARM-filed March 19, 2013 .... Vol. II 219 - 220 
COURT MINUTES-dated March 22, 2013 .......................................... Vol. II-221 
ORDER SETTING TRIAL- filed April 4, 2013 .................................... Vol. II-222 
AMENDED PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S INFORMATION filed 
June 11, 2013 .. . .. . ... ... .. .. .. ... .. .. .. . . . ...... ... . . . ... . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . . .. ... . .. ... . .. ... Vol. II - 223 - 224 
COURT MINUTES-dated June 11, 2013 ........................... ................. Vol. II-225 - 226 
COURT MINUTES - dated June 11, 2013 ........................... ................. Vol. II-227 - 228 
COURT MINUTES - dated June 12, 2013 . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. . Vol. II - 229 - 240 
COURT MINUTES- dated June 18, 2013 .............................. .............. Vol. II-241 - 258 
COURT MINUTES-dated June 19, 2013 ......... ................................... Vol. II 259 
COURT MINUTES - dated June 19, 2013 ...... ... ... ............ ... ................. Vol. II -260 - 262 
VERDICT- filed June 19, 2013 . .. . . . .. . ... .. .. .. . .. . . . . .. .. ..... .. ... . .. ... .. . . .. . .. . .. Vol. II -263 - 264 
ORDER FOR EV ALUATION(S) AND SETTING SENTENCING - filed 
June 19, 2013 . ... ... .. . .. . .. . .. ... ... .. . . . .. . . .... .. .. . ... . ..... ... ... .... .. .. . ... ... ... . . .. Vol. II- 265 
ORDER ENTERING JURY VERDICT OF GUILTY AND FOR 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION -filed June 21, 2013... ....................... Vol. II- 266 - 268 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ORDER IN RE: DRESS CLOTHES - filed August 28, 2013 . . . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . .. Vol. II - 269 - 270 
COURT MINUTES-dated August 29, 2013 . ....................................... Vol. II 271 - 278 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE filed August 29, 2013........................... Vol. II-279 - 283 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL- filed September 18, 2013 .. .. .. Vol. II - 284 - 285 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-filed October 1, 2013...................................... Vol. II-286 - 290 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED-filed December 13, 2013 ............. Vol. II-290a 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED-filed December 13, 2013 ............. Vol. II-291 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED-filed December 13, 2013 ............. Vol. II -292 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS......................................................... Vol. II-293 - 296 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD......................................................... Vol. II -297 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE......................................................... Vol. II - 298 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INDEX 
Page No. 
AMENDED PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S INFORMATION -filed 
June 11, 2013 . . .. .. .. . ... ... .. . . . . ... ... ... .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. ......... ... ... . . .. .. . . . ... . . . ... Vol. II- 223 - 224 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS......................................................... Vol. II-293 - 296 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD......................................................... Vol. II - 297 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE......................................................... Vol. II - 298 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORDS AS "NOT FOUND" -fiied June 28, 2012 Vol. I 99 - 102 
COMMITMENT ORDER filed December 27, 2011............................... Vol. I - 23 
COURT MINUTES-dated January 6, 2012..................................... Vol. I - 24 
COURT MINUTES-dated December 27, 2011............ ......................... Vol. I - 22 
COURT MINUTES -dated January 9, 2012..................................... Vol. I-26 
COURT MINUTES- filed March 26, 2012... ....................................... Vol. I- 35 - 39 
COURT MINUTES dated April 13, 2012. .. . . . ... ... .. . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. .. ..... Vol. I - 49 
COURT MINUTES dated July 13, 2012 . . . . .. ... .. . ... . .. .. . ... . .. .. .. .. .. . ... ..... Vol. I - 164 172 
COURT MINUTES -dated August 1, 2012 .................................... ...... Vol. I- 186 
COURT MINUTES -dated February 22, 2013 .................. ............ ........ Vol. I- 194 
COURT MINUTES- dated March 12, 2013 .................................... ..... Vol. II-211 - 212 
COURT MINUTES-dated March 22, 2013 .......................................... Vol. II-221 
COURT MINUTES-dated June 11, 2013 ............................................ Vol. II-225 - 226 
COURT MINUTES -dated June 11, 2013 ............................................ Vol. II-227 - 228 
COURT MINUTES -dated June 12, 2013 ............................................ Vol. II-229 - 240 
COURT MINUTES dated June 18, 2013 . .. .... .. .. . .... .. ... . . . .. ... ....... ... ..... Vol. II 241 258 
COURT MINUTES dated June 19, 2013 ........................ .................... Vol. II-259 
INDEX 
Page No. 
COURT MINUTES-dated June 19, 2013 ............................................ Vol. II-260 - 262 
COURT MINUTES -dated August 29, 2013 ......................................... Vol. II-271 - 278 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT- filed December 27, 2011............................. Vol. I-20 - 21 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR INVESTIGATORS -filed March 21, 2012 ...... Vol. I 33 - 34 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR INVESTIGATORS AND FUNDS AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING-filed April 9, 2012 ........................................ Vol. I-47 - 48 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR INVESTIGATOR FlJNDS AND NOTICE OF 
HEARING - filed June 14, 2012 . .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Vol. I - 86 - 87 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT- filed May 3, 2012................. Vol. 1-57 - 58 
FIRST AMENDMENT TO STATE'S WITNESS LIST-filed June 29, 2012. Vol. I- 162 - 163 
INDEX........................................................................................ Vol. I - 7 - 11 
INDEX ........................................................................................ Vol. II-206 - 210 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE - filed August 29, 2013........................ ... Vol. II - 279 - 283 
MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION OR RELEASE ON OWN 
RECOGNIZANCE AND NOTICE OF HEARING-filed January 11, 2012 Vol. I-27 - 28 
MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING-
filed April 23, 2013............................................. ......................... Vol. I- 52 - 53 
MOTION IN LIMINE- filed June 13, 2012 ............... ........................ Vol. I-69- 73 
MOTION IN LIMINE- filed March 18, 2013 ............... ........................ Vol. II 213 - 215 
MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE- filed June 15, 2012 ......................... Vol. I-88 - 90 
MOTION TO CONTINUE- filed November 20, 2012 . . . . ... .. . .. .. . .. . . .. ... . ... Vol. I- 189 - 191 
MOTION TO CONTINUE JURY TRIAL-filed July 26, 2012................... Vol. I 181 182 
MOTION TO CONTINUE PRELIMINARY HEARING- filed 
January 17, 2012 .. . ... ... ....... .. .. . ...... ... .. . . .... .... ... ... ... . ... ... .. ... .. . .. . .. .. Vol. I- 29- 30 
MOTION TO DISABLE FIREARM- filed March 19, 2013 .. . . .. .. . .. . . . .. . .. .... Vol. II -216 - 218 
INDEX 
Page No. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR DISMISS-filed June 15, 2012 ............ ...... Vol. I-91 - 93 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE - filed June 28, 2012 . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. Vol. I - 103 - 108 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-filed October 1, 2013...................................... Vol. 11-286 - 290 
NOTICE OF ELECTION TO PROCEED UNDER IDAHO CODE 9-420 
Filed June 28, 2012.... ... .. .... . .... .. ......... ...... .... .. .. .. ...... ... ... . ..... ....... Vol. I- 94 - 98 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE I.R.E. 803(24) AND 804(6) EVIDENCE -
filed June 13, 2012.. .... .. ............ ............. .... .. .. .... .. .. .. ...... ... .... .. . ... Vol. I- 74 - 77 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED- filed December 13, 2013 ... . .. ... . ... Vol. II -290a 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED-filed December 13, 2013 ............. Vol. II -291 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED-filed December 13, 2013 ............. Vol. 11-292 
ORDER- filed May 1, 2012.. .... . ..... ... ... ...... ... .... .... .... . .. ... ...... ..... ... Vol. I - 54 - 56 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER- filed January 6, 2012...... Vol. I - 25 
ORDER APPROVING DISABLING OF FIREARM-filed March 19, 2013 .... Vol. 11-219 - 220 
ORDER CONTINUING JURY TRIAL- filed August 2, 2012 ................... Vol. I- 187 - 188 
ORDER CONTINUING PRELIMINARY HEARING-filed January 18, 2012 Vol. I-31 - 32 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR DISMISS -
Filed July 20, 2012 ... ... ... .. .. .. ... ...... .. .. ... .. .. .... .... .. ...... .......... .... .. ... .. Vol. I - 173 - 174 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE - filed July 26, 2012 . . . Vol. I - 183 - 185 
ORDER ENTERING JURY VERDICT OF GUILTY AND FOR 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION - filed June 21, 2013.......................... Vol. 11-266 - 268 
ORDER ENTERING PLEA OF NOT GUILTY -filed April 13, 2012........ Vol. I- 50 - 51 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL- filed September 18, 2013 ...... Vol. 11-284 - 285 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY RESPONSE 





ORDER FOR EV ALUA TION(S) AND SETTING SENTENCING - filed 
June 19, 2013 ......... ................. ................. .................................. Vol. II-265 
ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER TO DISTRICT COURT -
filed March 26, 2012.... ... ... ...... ... .. . .. .. . . . ....... ...... ... . ... .. . .. ... .. . ... ........ Vol. I- 40 - 41 
ORDER IN RE: DRESS CLOTHES-filed August 28, 2013 ....................... Vol. II 269 - 270 
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION FOR DETERMINATIAON OF 
ADMISSABILITY OF EVIDENCE- filed July 24, 2012 .... ...... .......... ... .. Vol. I- 175 - 177 
ORDER RE: EX P ARTE MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT - filed 
May 4, 2012.. ..... .. .. . .. . ......... ... .. . .. . .... .. ... ... ... .. . ... . .. .. ... . ......... ....... Vol. I- 59 - 60 
ORDER TO CONTINUE-filed November 21, 2012 ..... .. ..... ... ...... .. . ... ... Vol. I- 192 - 193 
ORDER SETTING TRIAL-filed April 4, 2013 .................. .................. Vol. II-222 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPORT OF ADMISSION OF VICTIM'S 
STATEMENTS AND 404(b) EVIDENCE-filed June 28, 2012 ................. Vol. 1-115 -161 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S INFORMATION -filed March 27, 2012..... Vol. 1-42 - 43 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS - filed December 23, 2013............................... Vol. 1-12- 19a 
SECOND NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE 404(b) EVIDENCE 
filed June 13, 2012..... .... .. ..... .. .... .. ..... . ... .. .... .. .. .. .. . .. .... . ..... ..... ..... Vol. I 78 - 82 
STATE'S AMENDMENT TO NOTICES OF INTENT TO USE 404(b) AND 
STATE'S MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF ADMISSABILITY OF 
EVIDENCE- filed June 28, 2012 .. . ...... ... ... . . . ... ... . .. ... .. .... ... .. . ... ... .. .. Vol. I- 109 - 114 
STATE'S SECOND AMENDED WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST-filed 
March 1, 2013 .. .... ... ... ... . .. ... .. . .. . .. . ... ... . .. . . . . .. ... . ... ... .. .. . ... . ... .. . .. . . ... Vol. I- 195 - 199 
STATE'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE-filed June 13, 2012 ............... Vol. I 83 - 85 
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY 
RESPONSE AND PRETRIAL MOTIONS-filed May 18, 2012 ............... Vol. 1-61 - 63 
SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE filed July 24, 2012 . .. Vol. I- 178 - 180 




TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................... Vol. II-201 - 205 
TITLE PAGE ................................................................................. Vol. I - 1 
TITLE PAGE ................................................................................. Vol. II - 200 
VERDICT- filed June 19, 2013 .. .. .. ... ... ... .. . ... .. .. . . ... .. .. .... . ... ... ... ......... Vol. II 263 - 264 




Time: 09:27 AM 
Page 1 of 9 
Fir icial District Court - Benewah Count User: CAROL 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2011-0002053 Current Judge: Fred M. Gibler 
Defendant: Herrera, Joseph Duane 










New Case Filed - Felony 
Prosecutor assigned Douglas P Payne 
Criminal Complaint 
Arraignment / First Appearance 
Felony 
Court Minutes for Probable Cause Hearing 
Commitment - Heid To Answer $200.000.00 
Document sealed 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 01/09/2012 01 :30 PM) 2nd Murder 
Notice Of Hearing 
Court Minutes 
Subpoena Issued Officer Bob Loe, Chief Margaret Lehmbacher, Dr Clyde 
Hason, S.A. Paul Berger ISP, Derek Barden, Deputy Michael Richardson, 
Raymond Roy, Katlyn Comack, Suzie Camack, Eunice McEwen, Ron 
Hodge 
Judge 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Subpoena Returned Kaytlin Comack, Derek Barden, Raymond Roy, Susan Patrick R. McFadden 
Camack Clyde Hanson, Margaret Lehmbecker, Ron Hodge, Robert Loe 
Defendant: Herrera, Joseph Duane Order Appointing Public Defender 
Public defender William Butler 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Court Minutes 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Preliminary 
Hearing date: 1/9/2012 
Time: 9:09 am 
Courtroom: District Courtroom 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Stacy Bradbury 
Tape Number: 
Defense Attorney: William Butler 
Prosecutor: Douglas Payne 
Continued (Preliminary 01/23/2012 01:30 PM) 2nd Murder 
Notice Of Hearing 
First Supplemental Response to Discovery 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Motion For Bond Reduction or Release on Own Recognizance and Notice Patrick R. McFadden 
of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/23/2012 01 :30 PM) Motion for Bond Patrick R. McFadden 
Reduction 
Subpoena Issued Subpoena Issued Officer Bob Loe, Chief Margaret Patrick R. McFadden 
Lehmbacher, Dr Clyde Hason, S.A. Paul Berger ISP, Derek Barden, Deputy 
Michael Richardson, Raymond Roy, Katlyn Comack, Suzie Camack, 
Eunice McEwen, Ron Hodge 
Notice of intent to Use 404 (b) Evidence Patrick R. McFadden 
Subpoena Returned Chief Margaret Lehmbecker, Michael Richardson, 
Clyde Hanson, Ron Hodge, Robert Loe+-
Patrick R. McFadden 
u 
Date: 12/23/2013 
Time: 09:27 AM 
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Firs icial District Court - Benewah County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2011-0002053 Current Judge: Fred M. Gibler 
Defendant: Herrera, Joseph Duane 
User: CAROL 
















Motion to Continue Preliminary Hearing 
Subpoena Returned Raymond Roy Susan Comack, Kaytlin Comack 
Order to Continue Preliminary Hearing 
Continued (Preliminary 03/26/2012 01 :30 PM) 2nd Murder 
Notice Of Hearing 
Subpoena Returned Michael Richardson, Derek Barden 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 01/23/2012 01 :30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated Motion for Bond Reduction 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Carissa Receipt number: 0000531 Dated: 
2/28/2012 Amount: $8.00 (Credit card) 
Judge 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Carissa Receipt Patrick R. McFadden 
number: 0000531 Dated: 2/28/2012 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
Subpoena Issued Officer BOb Loe, Ronnie Dickerson, Jerrilyn Herrera, Patrick R. McFadden 
Jesse Herrera, Cheif Margaret Lehmbecker, Dr Clyde Hansen, Ron Hodge, 
Officer Scott Castles 
Subpoena Returned Officer BOb Loe, Ronnie Dickerson, Jerrilyn Herrera, Patrick R. McFadden 
Jesse Herrera, Chief Margaret Lehmbecker, Dr Clyde Hansen, Ron Hodge, 
Officer Scott Castles 
Ex-parte Motion for Investigators Patrick R. McFadden 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Preliminary 
Hearing date: 3/26/2012 
Time: 9:35 am 
Courtroom: District Courtroom 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Stacy Bradbury 
Tape Number: 
Defense Attorney: William Butler 
Prosecutor: Douglas Payne 
Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on 03/26/2012 01 :30 PM: 
Preliminary Hearing Held 2nd Murder 
Order Holding Defendant To Answer To District Court 
Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on 03/26/2012 01 :30 PM: 
Hearing Held 2nd Murder 
Prosecuting Attorney's Information 
Notice Of Hearing of Arraignment 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 04/13/2012 09:30 AM) Murder in 2nd 
Degree 
Order (Bond Reduction to $100,000.00) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/13/2012 09:30 AM) Motion for 
Investigators (Butler) 
Ex-Parte Motion for Investigators and Funds and Notice of Hearing 
Request for Cameras in the Courtroom (Mary Orr) 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Patrick R. McFadden 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Date: 12/23/2013 
Time: 09:27 AM 
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Firs icial District Court - Benewah County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2011-0002053 Current Judge: Fred M. Gibler 
Defendant: Herrera, Joseph Duane 















Request for Cameras in the Courtroom (Dylan Wohlenhaus 
Court Authorization 
Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 04/13/2012 09:30 AM: 
Hearing Held Murder in 2nd Degree 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 04/13/2012 09:30 AM: Hearing 
Vacated Motion for Investigators and Funds (Butler} 
Order Entering Plea of Not Guilty 
A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (118-4001-11 Murder II) 
Court Minutes 
Order for Investigators (to be filed under seal) 
Document sealed 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/14/2012 09:30 AM) 
Motion for Transcript of Preliminary Hearing 
Notice Of Trial 
Judge 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Order Fred M. Gibler 
Ex-parte Motion for Transcript Fred M. Gibler 
Order RE: Ex-parte Motion for Transcript Fred M. Gibler 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Fred M. Gibler 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: James Thomson Receipt number: 0001285 
Dated: 5/9/2012 Amount: $2.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: James Thomson Fred M. Gibler 
Receipt number: 0001285 Dated: 5/9/2012 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
Transcript Filed-Transcript of Preliminary Hearing - copies to PA, Butler Fred M. Gibler 
Stipulation for Extension of Time to File Discovery Response and Pretrial Fred M. Gibler 
Motions 
Order for Extension of Time to File Discovery Response and Pretrial Fred M. Gibler 
Motions 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Fred M. Gibler 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Law Office of Staci L Anderson, PLLC Receipt 
number: 0001397 Dated: 5/21/2012 Amount: $123.00 (Check) 
Voided Receipt (Receipt# 1397 dated 5/21/2012) Fred M. Gibler 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Fred M. Gibler 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Saetrum Law Offices Receipt number: 0001419 
Dated: 5/23/2012 Amount: $67.00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Registered Mail Fee Paid by: Saetrum Law 
Offices Receipt number: 0001419 Dated: 5/23/2012 Amount: $3.00 
(Check) 
Second Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
Witness and Exhibit List 
Motion in Limine 
Notice of Intent to Use I.RE. 803(24) and 804(6) Evidence 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
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Second Notice of Intent to Use 404(b) Evidence 
State's Second Motion in Limine 
Judge 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Ex-parte Motion for Investigator Funds and Notice of Hearing Fred M. Gibler 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/15/2012 09:30 AM) Ex-Parte Motion for Fred M. Gibler 
Investigator Funds 
Motion to Change Venue Fred M. Gibler 
Motion to Suppress or Dismiss Fred M. Gibler 
Registered Agent Return of Service - Subpoena Duces Tecum - Benewah Fred M. Gibler 
Community Hospital 
Notice Of Hearing Fred M. Gibler 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/15/2012 09:30 AM: Hearing Fred M. Gibler 
Vacated Ex-Parte Motion for Investigator Funds 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine 07/13/2012 01 :00 PM) State's Fred M. Gibler 
Motion and 2nd Motion in Limine 
Order for Investigator Funds 
Document sealed 
Defendant's Supplemental Request For Discovery 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Response To Defendant's Supplemental Request For Discovery 
Notice of Election to Proceed Under Idaho Code 9-420 
Certification of Records as "Not Found" 
State's Amendment to Notices of Intent to Use 404(b) and Hearsay 
Evidence 
State's Motion for Determination of Admissability of Evidence 
Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Admission of Victim's Statement and 404(b) 
Evidence 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Subpoena Issued - James Comack, Suzie Comack, Jack Comack, Katlyn Fred M. Gibler 
Comack, Eunice McEwen, Kianna Appell, Kim Smith, Bobbie Riddle, 
Tiffany Reeves, Roger Hossfeld, Eunice McEwen 
First Amendment to State's Witness List Fred M. Gibler 
Subpoena Returned - Kimberly Anna Smith, Tiffany Ann Reeves, Kiani Fred M. Gibler 
Rayelle Appell, Bobbie Joe Riddle, James Eric Comack, Jennifer Lynn 
Yumi Hickson 
Subpoena Returned - Rodger Harold Hossfeld, Jr. Fred M. Gibler 
Notice Of Hearing Fred M. Gibler 
Subpoena Returned - Eunice Marie McEwen Fred M. Gibler 
Subpoena Issued - Officer Scott Castles, Chief Margaret Lehmbecker, Det. Fred M. Gibler 
Paul Berger 
Subpoena Returned - Scott Charles Castles, Jr., Margaret Ann 
Lehmbecker 
Fred M. Gibler 
User: CAROL 
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Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on 07/13/2012 01 :00 PM: 
Hearing Held State's Motion and 2nd Motion in Limine 
Defense Motion to Change Venue and Motions to Suppress 
New folder No. 2 
Action Agency Billing - $2500.00 
Document sealed 
Request for Cameras in the Courtroom and 
Court Authorization 
Court Minutes 
Subpoena Returned - Caytlin Comack 
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress or Dismiss 
Subpoena Issued - Ron Hodge, Det. Paul Berger, Det. Michael Van 
Leuven, Det. Charles Greear, Officer Robert W. Loe, Chief Margaret 
Lehmbecker, Jesse Herrera, Jerilyn Herrera, Dr. Clyde Hansen, Derek 
Bsarden, Raymond Roy, James Comack, Suzie Comack, Katlyn Comack, 
Danny Ducommun, Jana Hanson, Vincent Hanson, Stuart Jacobsen, 
Officer Scott Castles, Ronnie Dickerson, Trp. Glenn Bakken, Dr. Sally 
Aiken, Deputy Michael Richardson, Deputy Robert Rogers, Deputy Rodney 
B. Dickenson, Bobbie Riddle, Janelle Buell, Dr. Paul F. Paschall 
Order on State's Motion for Determination of Admissability of Evidence 
Supplement to Motion to Change Venue 
Subpoena Returned - Margaret Ann Lehmbecker, Rodney Bryan 
Dickenson, Derek Barden 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/01/2012 02:00 PM) Defense Motion to 
Continue Jury Trial 
Motion to Continue Jury Trial 
Order Denying Motion to Change Venue 
Subpoena Returned - Jerilynn Ronda Herrera, Susan Comack, Dan 
Ducommen, Vincent Hanson, Jana Hanson, Zachary Paul Sifford, Robert 
E. Rogers, Scott C. Castles, Raymond Roy, Robert W. Loe, Sr., Clyde 
Hansen, Bobbie Joe Riddle, Michael J. Richardson, Ronald Lee Hodge, 
Janelle Marie Buell 
Notice Of Hearing 
Subpoena Returned - Susan Comack 
Subpoena Returned - Ronald Dickerson, Jesse Herrera 
Subpoena Returned - Jack Henry Comack, James Eric Comack, Kaytlin 
Comack 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 08/01/2012 02:00 PM: Hearing 
Held Defense Motion to Continue Jury Trial 
Motion Granted 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 08/14/2012 09:30 AM: 
Continued 2nd Degree Murder 
Request for Cameras in the Courtroom and Court Authorization Granted 
Judge 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
User: CAROL 
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Court Minutes Fred M. Gibler 
Order Continuing Jury Trial Fred M. Gibler 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/11/2012 09:30 AM) 2nd Degree Murder Fred M. Gibler 
Notice Of Trial Fred M. Gibler 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Fred M. Gibler 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: James Thomson Receipt number: 0002173 
Dated: 8/6/2012 Amount: $9.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: James Thomson Fred M. Gibler 
Receipt number: 0002173 Dated: 8/6/2012 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel 
Defendant: Herrera, Joseph Duane Appearance James E Siebe 
Request For Discovery 
Motion to Continue 
Order to Continue 
Continued (Jury Trial 03/12/2013 09:00 AM) 2nd Degree Murder 
Request For Discovery and Alibi Demand 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/22/2013 09:30 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 02/22/2013 09:30 AM: Hearing 
Held 
Court Minutes 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Subpoena Issued - Det. Michael Van Leuven, Officer Robert W. Loe, Chief Fred M. Gibler 
Margaret Lehmbecker, Jesse Herrera, Jerilyn Herrera, Dr. Clyde Hansen, 
Derek Barden, Raymond Roy, James Camack, Susie Comack, Katlyn 
Camack, Eunice McEwen, Jana Hanson, Vincsent Hanson, Det. Paul 
Berger, Stuart Jacobsen, Deputy Scott Castles, Ronnie Dickerson, Trp. 
Glenn Bakken, Det. Charles Greear, Sally Aiken, Deputy Michael 
Richardson,Robby Rogers, Deputy Rodney B. Dickenson, Bobbie Riddle, 
Janelle Buell, Dr. Paul F. Paschall 
Subpoena Returned - Dr. Clyde Hansen Fred M. Gibler 
Subpoena Returned - Susan Ann Comack, Ronald Lee Dickerson, Bobbie Fred M. Gibler 
Joe Riddle, Jana Lee Hanson, Jana Lee Hanson, Vincent Leon Hanson, 
Raymond Albert Roy, Rodney Bryan Dickenson, Kaytlin Jacklin Marie 
Comack, Derek Daniel Barden, Margaret Ann Lehmbecker 
Subpoena Returned - Michael John Richardson, Scott Charles Castles, Jr., Fred M. Gibler 
Jerilynn Ronda Herrera, Jesse Warren Herrera, Janelle Marie Buell, James 
Eric Comack, Robert Ear! Rogers 
Subpoena Returned - Robert William Loe, Sr. 
State's Second Amended Witness and Exhibit List 
Personal/Recalled Return of Service - Eunice McEwen 
Proposed Jury Instructions/defendant 
Request for Cameras in the Courtroom - Gazette Record 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
User: CAROL 
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Request for Cameras in the Courtroom - KHQ News 
Request for Jury Instructions 
Request for Cameras in the Courtroom 
Request for Cameras in the Courtroom 
Court Authorization 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 03/12/2013 09:00 AM: Jury 
Trial Started 2nd Degree Murder 
March 12-15 and 19-20, 2013 
Judge 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 03/12/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Fred M. Gibler 
Vacated 2nd Degree Murder 
March 12-15 and 19-20, 2013 
Court Minutes 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 03/22/2013 09:30 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Court Authorization 
Motion in Limine 
Motion to Disable Firearm 
Order Approving Disabling of Firearm 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 03/22/2013 09:30 AM: Hearing 
Held 
Court Minutes 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/11/2013 09:30 AM) Trial dates June Fred M. Gibler 
11-14, 18-19 in Kooteanai County 
2nd Degree Murder 
Notice Of Trial Fred M. Gibler 
Subpoena Issued - Det. Michael Van Leuven, Officer Robert W. Loe, Chief Fred M. Gibler 
Margaret Lehmbecker, Jesse Herrera, Jerilyn Herrera, Dr. Clyde Hansen, 
Derek Barden, Raymond Roy, James Comack, Susie Comack, Katlyn 
Comack, Eunice McEwen, Jana Hanson, Vincsent Hanson, Det. Paul 
Berger, Stuart Jacobsen, Deputy Scott Castles, Ronnie Dickerson, Trp. 
Glenn Bakken, Det. Charles Greear, Sally Aiken, Deputy Michael 
Richardson.Robby Rogers, Deputy Rodney B. Dickenson, Bobbie Riddle, 
Janelle Buell, Dr. Paul F. Paschall 
Order Setting Trial Fred M. Gibler 
Subpoena Returned - Raymond Albert Roy, Jesse Warren Herrera, Robert Fred M. Gibler 
William Loe, Sr., Susan Ann Comack, Margaret Ann Lehmbecker, James 
Eric Comack, Rodney Bryan Dickenson, Michael John Richardson, Scott 
Charles Castles, Jr., Bobbie Joe Riddle, Dr. Clyde Hansen, Jerilynn Ronda 
Herrera, Ronald LOee Dickerson, Kaytlin Jacklin Marie Camack, Janelle 
Marie Buell 
Subpoena Returned - Derek Daniel Barden Fred M. Gibler 
Notice of Additional Witness Fred M. Gibler 
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Court Minutes Fred M. Gibler 
Court Minutes Fred M. Gibler 
Amended Prosecuting Attorney's Information Fred M. Gibler 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 06/11/2013 09:30 AM: Hearing Fred M. Gibler 
Held Trial dates June 11-14, 18-19 
2nd Degree Murder 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 06/11/2013 09:30 AM: Jury 
Trial Started Trial dates June 11-14, 18-19 
2nd Degree Murder 
Court Minutes 
Court Minutes 






Pre-Sentence Investigation Evaluation Ordered 
Order Entering Jury Verdict of Guilty and for Presentence Investigation 
Found Guilty After Trial (118-4001-11 Murder II) 
Court Accepts Guilty Plea (118-4001-11 Murder II) 
STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 08/29/2013 03:00 PM) 2nd Degree 
Murder 
Notice Of Hearing 
Presentence Report 
Document sealed 
Order in RE: Dress Clothes 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 08/29/2013 03:00 PM: 
Hearing Held 2nd Degree Murder 
Judgment and Sentence 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-4001-11 Murder II) Confinement terms: 
Credited time: 640 days. Penitentiary determinate: 22 years. 
Other Sentencing Information: Indeterminate Life sentence. 
Court Minutes 
Sentenced To Pay Fine 240.50 charge: 118-4001-11 Murder II 
Order for Appointment of Idaho State Appellate Public Defender for 
Purposes of Appeal 
Notice Of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
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ST A TUS CHANGED: Inactive 
Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal - Byrl Cinnamon 
Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal - Anita Self 
Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal - Valerie Nunemacher 
Judge 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
Fred M. Gibler 
User: CAROL 
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245-2564 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE  
  
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
 











Case No. CRll-~ 
CRIMINAL 
COMPLAINT 
Personally appeared before me this day of 
2011, DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE, who, being first 
duly sworn on oath, complains and says: That the crime of MURDER 
IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code 
Sections 18-4001, 18-4002 and 18-4003 has been committed by the 
said defendant as follows, to-wit: that the said JOSEPH DUANE 
HERRERA on or about the 25th day of December, 2011, in the 
County of Benewah, State of Idaho, did willfully, unlawfully, 
deliberately, and with malice aforethought, but without 
premeditation, kill and murder Stephanie Comack, a human being, 
by placing a 380 handgun against her head and pulling the 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT Page - 1 -
gger, from which s d, all of which is contrary to the 
form of the statute in such case made and provided and against 
the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
WHEREFORE, complainant prays that the said defendant be 
dealt with according to law. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of 
I~ ee..o1,JJ-<A , 2 o 11 . 
Magistrate 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, Page - 2 
1st Appearance e 3B-COURTROOM 1 
12:06:44 PM:Judge Patrick iJudge Calls Court. In Custody. Prosecuting Attorney Doug Payne. 
iMcFadden. iDeputy Tyler Morrise 
iClerk I 
'Bradbury . 
T2 :·a,f4°Ef'Fi'Mlcrf1·~·:z"os3 ...... .. ... fst'at'e .. \is .. J'os·e·i:ih .. b': .. ·He·;:;:e·;:·ii': .. "Juc:i'iie ... R.eacis .. frie ... crfrriTn.a'i"c'ci'in.pi'iarif" 
: jMurder in the 2nd Degree. Judge reads Felony Rights. Defendant 






i understands rights. Def does not want a Public Defender. Judge 
/orders Prelim Hearing set with 14 to 21 days . 
f PA Doug Payne address the court with Def Crimi.na'f"H.istory ..... Gu·n .... 
jwas placed directly on the victims head when trigger pulled 
isuggests Bail 200,000.00 
f Judge orders Bail set 200,000.00 adhere to the conditions of your 
!release. Sign Waiver of Extraditions before your release from 
jCustody. 
f PA recommends No Contact with the Camack or any witness in 
)he case 
/Judge orders No Contact with James or Susie Camack or their ......... .. 
jFamily members 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
Joseph Duane Herrera 
319 14th Street 




West College Avenue, Suite 203 













) Case No: CR-2011-0002053 
) 






TO THE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH: 
AN ORDER having been made on Tuesday, December 27, 2011 that the defendant be held to answer 
to the misdemeanor/felony charge(s) of AIIChargeStart 118-4001-11 Murder II, a Felony committed in 
Benewah County on or about 12/25/2011 . 
YOU THE SAID SHERIFF, are commanded to receive the said defendant into your custody and detain 
him/her until he/she is legally discharged. 
The defendant is admitted to jail with bail set in the amount of subject to the 




Defendant will attend all required court appearances. 
Defondant will c~mmit no law violation~:,rpore serious than a tra(fic infractJAn. 5 Ci 1',V(1. fl:' 1 0"7 f ~4-S.<;,;, "'1::""I c,,,:A/\ 
l ' L ' ;;_,J,., f\.b Cc;,~( -.:'-Cl 
DATED Tuesday, December 27, 
Copies Tuesday, December 27, 2011 to: 
A Prosecutor 
( ). Attorney for Defendant 
j6 Defendant 
PATRICK R. MCFADDEN- 367 
DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATE 
j)(Bcso Dispatch/Jail 
( ) Juvenile Probation Office 
() _____ _ 
d 
Deputy Clerk 
State Vs Joseph Herrera Hearing 





1 Prosecuting Attorney Doug Payne 
jBradbury , 
38-COURTROOM1 
10:25:10 AMJCr11-2053 !Judge Calls Court. Prelim Hearing Set Monday Jan 9th, 2011. Def 
/State Vs !would like a Public Defender. Judge orders the appointment of 
!Joseph ! Public Defender. Clerk to Notify the Public Defender after court . 
!Herrera ! 
1/6/2012 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Joseph Duane Herrera 
319 14th Street 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
Defendant. 
  
   
West College 














Case No: CR-2011-0002053 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER 
The Court being fully advised as to the application of Joseph Duane Herrera, and it appearing to be a proper 
case, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the: 
Public Defender's Office 
William Butler 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries ID 83861 
(208) 245-2521 
Public Defender for the County of Benewah, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is 
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Joseph Duane Herrera, in all proceedings in the above entitled 
case. 
The Defendant is further advised that he/she may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost 









State of Idaho vs. Joseph Duane Herrera 
Hearing type: Preliminary 
Hearing date: 1/9/2012 
Time: 9:09 am 
Judge: Patrick R. McFadden 
Courtroom: District Courtroom 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Stacy Bradbury 
Tape Number: 
Defense Attorney: William Butler 
Prosecutor: Douglas Payne 
1121 Judge Calls Case Defendant not present. Public Defender William Butler and 
Prosecuting Attorney Douglas Payne present. 
1121 Public Defender William Butler would like more time since he was just appointment. 
Mr Herrera would like to waive time for Prelim. 
1122 No Objection for Prosecuting Attorney Douglas Payne 
1122 Judge Orders the Prelim Hearing set within 14 days 
WILLIAM BUTLER 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail ll@smgazette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case NO. CR 11-002053 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION OR 
vs. ) RELEASE ON OWN RECOGNIZANCE 
) AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
TO: DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE, BENEWAH COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
COMES NOW, WILLIAM BUTLER, attorney for the defendant, and 
hereby moves s Honorable Court for entry of its Order 
releasing the defendant on defendant's own recognizance or 
reducing bail. 
THIS MOTION is made on the grounds that the offense with 
which Defendant is charged is a bailable offense; that bail now 
set is excessive; and that bail is unnecessary in that the 
defendant can be safely released on defendant's own recognizance. 
MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION OR RELEASE ON 
OWN RECOGNIZANCE AND NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
THIS MOTION is based on s Notice and on the pleadings, 
papers, records and files in the above-entitled action. 
NOTICE OF HEARING: NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that attorney for 
defendant will bring on for hearing the above Motion before the 
above-entitled Court on January 23, 2012, at the hour of 1:30 
o'clock p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the within Motion was delivered to the office of 
the Benewah County Prosecuting Attorney, by placing a copy in his 
basket in the Clerk's Office, Benewah County Courthouse, 701 
College, St. Maries, Idaho, by US Mail or by facsimile, (208) 
245-1915, this date. 
DATED this day of January, 2012. 
Attorney at 
MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION OR RELEASE ON 
OWN RECOGNIZANCE AND NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
WILLIAM BUTLER 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CR 2011-2053 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
The undersigned attorney for defendant in the above-
entitled cause hereby moves the Court for an Order continuing 
the Preliminary Hearing set for January 23, 2012, at 
1:30 P.M., for a period of not less than sixty (60) days. This 
Motion is made on the grounds that the parties need more time 
and opportunity to investigate the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the charges in 




Defendant waives the time constraints on preliminary 
hearings to the extent necessary to allow the Court to grant 
this motion. 
DATED this !}: day of January, 2012. 
WILLIAMLER 
Attorney for Defendant 
I have read the foregoing Motion and have no objection 
thereto. 
DATED this 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
(7? day of January, 2012. 
I 




Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245 2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CR 11 002053 
) 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER CONTINUING 
) PRELIMINARY HEARING 
vs. ) 
) 




Defendant's Motion having come before the Court, 
Prosecuting Attorney having no objection, and good cause 
appearing, 
the 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Preliminary Hearing 
scheduled in the above case for January 23, 2012, is continued, 
and the Clerk of the Court shall reschedule the same upon the 
Court's calendar after a period of not less than sixty (60) 
days. 
DATED this 
ORDER TO CONTINUE 
JURY TRIAL 
day of January, 2012. 
Judge 
-1-
.:::;<_ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I hereby certify that on this 
[J.._) day of January, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument to be served by the method indicated 
and addressed to the fol 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
720 W. College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Facsimile: ( 2 08) 2 45-394 8 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
701 College Avenue, Suite 201 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Facsimile: ( 208) 24 5-3 915 














WILLIAM BUTLER, #4188 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile: (208) 245-3948 
e-mail: will@smgazette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, N AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
* * * 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No. CR 2011-002053 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR 
INVESTIGATORS 
COMES NOW, the defendant, Michael Duane Herrera, by and 
through s Attorney of Record, lliam Butler, and hereby moves 
this Court for its Order allowing the defendant to retain 
investigative services to locate and interview potential 
witnesses and to assist in the preparation for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this "J. day of March, 2012. 
EX-PARTE MOTION 
FOR INVESTIGATORS -
am But er 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the within Motion was del 
the Benewah County Prosecuting Attorney, 
red to the o 
acing a copy 
ce of 
s basket the Clerk's Office, Benewah County Courthouse, 701 
College, St. Maries, Idaho, by US Mail or by f acsirnile, ( 2 08) 
245-1915, this date. 
DATED this;{}_ day of March, 2012. 
EX-PARTE MOTION 
FOR INVESTIGATORS 2 
'l 
e . 
Prelim Hearing 3B-COURTROOM1 
Time Speaker Note 
1 :26:30 PM )Judge Patrick/ State Vs Joseph Herrara. Prosecuting Attorney Doug Payne and 
/McFadden . !Public Defender Will Butler. Def is Present and In Custody 
!Clerk 1 
!Bradbury I 
..  ;.• ~}~: .. :~·! Cr·1··1·-2053 - f ~~d!:~;1:~~~:~onta11· other Prelim .. Heari~: ;::: ~ :;;:;: ••• : 
! !Break Find out what going out with Kevin Waite Prelim. Judge 
!Orders Other Prelim Reset 
...... ................................ ..... i ... ...... .. ........... ....... ....... .......... J, ............... .... ...... ......... .. .. ......................................................................... .. .. .... .. ................ ... ..... ... ... .................................. ...... .. ................. . 
1 :46:09 PM : : Back on the Record 
1 :46: 17 PM f cr1 1-2053 f Pd would like to move Exclude all Witnesses. Waives the reading 
l lof the Criminal Compliant 
1 :47:03 PM j jPA Stip to the Admission of 1 Documenf .. Lf··wiin.ei;iises6Hk:er Loe, 
j jChief Lembaucher, Dr Hanson and Jerry Herrera 
...... ........................ .... .... ............................................ .......................... 
1 :48:01 PM I !Judge grants the Exclusion of Witnesses except for Officer Loe 
i ~~ ~~ :~ j PA i~:t~:::i~e!~;:~~~~:::i;ri~~:~1::~~;;£i;!;F~treated at -
3/26/2012 
I peast 20 Gun Shot wounds. Stellic laceration Entance wound when 
j ja gun is close to the head it makes a star shape. I recall treating 
: /Stephanie Camack for gun shot wound to the head on Christmas 
!day.I treated her for Gun shot wound to the head. I was the first 
: Phys to see her. I was working in the emergency room in 
! Benewah Community Hospital. She was transported by 
!Ambulance. It was charicter of contact gun shot wound . Conact 
!wounds there is no place for the gases to escape. 
Icross X-Am. I have treated 20 ER gun shot wounds. At least 20. 
: Most of them where to the head about 80 percent were to the 
/head. 9 or 10 were to the forehead . Non-sucide postition gun shot 
!wound to the head. I am Emergency Room Doctor. Almost all my 
!career has been in the emergency room . I did not take any 
I Pictures at the hospital. It was a contact wound. Some gas goes 
!through . I write down when I go in the room and nurse writes 
ldown when I leave. I called Med-Star. No sure how lond it took 
lMed-Star, I do not remember using adrenaline it would be in my 
/notes. When Stephanie arrived at the hospital she was moaning 
!when she breathed. There was spontanious resperation. I could 
'not tell you how long I was with Stephanie. 
Prelim Hearing 3B-COURTROOM1 
Time Speaker Note 
1 :59:47 PM. '·,,,··,,,.1,.'PA I Re-direct. The entrance wound on right forehead and exit wound jpost terrier and blood going out of the right ear. I did not see her 
!very long before she was Med-Star out.I tried to get her out as 
[quickly as possible I did some things to keep her alive. The 
, !prognosis was very Bad. 
2:01 :18 PM f PD fcross I did not see any gun powder on the head. THe wound was 
......................... 1 .................... ................. .. .. . l se pe rated .. very_?~?. . .i~ .. ':'v..~ ~ .. ?..'?.':'v..~ ... ?..~t.:.. ....... .......................... ...... ............ ........ . .......................... . 
. 2:0.1 ..:.37 .. PM .. /Judge .......... /Excuses .. Dr .. Hanson .. ............. ...... ............ ..... ....... .................... ........ ...... ................... ......................... . 
2:02:07 PM !PA :state Calls Officer Robert Loe St. Maries Police Department. I 
3/26/2012 
! !was off Duty on Christman day last year. I was going to Plummer 
' /for Christmas. 11 :43 Am I got a call there was accidental gun shot 
!wound 319 s. 14th street. I saw Mr Herrera sitting on the bricks 
/next to the house, he screaming and was incoherient. "Bob I 
!accidentally shot my girl friend please help me. !"Jessie his Dad 
/showed me the Stair case was. I saw Stephanie was laying 
[against the wall raspy breathing and lots of blood. Jerry Herrera 
I Had Stephanie Head wrapped in a towel asking her to hang on . I 
[saw 380 Mag on the floor next to Stephanie feet. I asked where 
:the gun was. Ms Herrera said she had taken the gun and put it on 
/the window ceil. I checked the gun make sure not loaded there 
!was no Magazine and nothing in the chamber. I dropped the gun 
!into my shirt.I thought I heard the Ambulance so I went back down 
/stairs. Mr Herrera was out by the side walk.He said I Pulled gun 
! out of the drawer and Pulled the slid open and the gun 
/accidentally went off. He acted like he pulled the slide back on the 
/gun and it just went off. He was screaming histarically so I did not 
lask any more questions. I went back with the ambulance crew. 
! Roy Dickson found shell caseing I put the 380 shell casing in my 
!shirt with the gun. Ronnie Dickenson and Officer Richardson We 
!carried Stephanie out to the ambulance. Officer Scott Castles and 
j I went up stairs in stand next to the bed and found anther clip for 
/380 MAG FOR 25 AUTO FILM canister with Marj and pipe. In the 
! Evening I was heloning Mike Vanluven Recover Evidence There 
!was cubby hole with a water bong Meth Pipe. Jerry Herrera said 
!they were getting ready for Christmas day. JOe was standing at 
lthe end of the bed putting the gun to his head and screaming 
! hystarically she heard gun shot and saw she yelled and he 
]dropped the gun so she picked up the gun and put it on the 
/Window Ceil. 
Prelim Hearing 38-COURTROOM·J 
Time Speaker Note 
2:13:43 PM !PD :X-am I took the gun and put it in my shirt between my outershirt 
!and the T-shirt. I was in my private car and was with my wife . Most 
lof the time I carry a pager or my Radio. I was not on Duty. I was 
!on Main in front of the Heyburn school and stopped put my gun 
land Badge on . I was still in my private car. I drove up to 14 th 
!Street right across from the Middle school West side of the Middle 
!School. When I pulled up I knew it was the Herrera Risence. I 
!parked a little bit above. I got out of my car and went down to his 
!house and he ran up to me. Help Me please help me I 
!Accidentally shot my girl friend. His dad took me inot the house 
!where Stephanie was. I was the first officer on scene. Upstairs 
!was Jerry Herrera and the Neighbor Vince Hansen. The clip was 
ion the floor next to Stephanie Legs. I went back and picked up the 
!gun and put it in my shirt. I picked up the gun with Bare Hand. I 
!checked ot see if it was unloaded . I stayed there a little longer till I 
l heard the ambulance. I believe I was upstairs about 10 minutes. 
!Deputy Richardson came up stairs when I was there. I talked to 
!Joe when I came back out side . Joe told me pulled the slide back 
ito check to see if it was loaded and the gun went off. The 
!ambulance crew went back up stairs . I helped carry Stephanie 
!down the stairs and help load it into the ambulance. Donnie 
i Dickerson handed me a shell off the bed. When he set his bag 
!down he saw the casing move and handed it to me. I went up 
!stairs after they had marked all there evidence. I helped 
l Detectives bag stuff. They pulled a bullet out of the wall and 
rutting out of the carpet. They were taking photos. 
2:28:48 PM 1Judge !Excuses Officer Loe 
2:29:02 PM /PA !State Calls Chief Margaret LehmbeckerSt maries Police 
: !Department sworn in by Clerk. I was called in on Christmas day. I 
!talked with Joseph Herrera . 17 48 in the Evening he came into the 
j police station with Raymond Roy. I merandized him 
. . ......................... 
2:31 :19 PM /Pd !This interview was conducted in the police station. I merandized 
· :him and he signed the card . I told him the door was open and he 
!was free to leave at anytime and he did not have to talk with me. 
!Mr Berger and I continued the interview with Mr Herrera. At the 
lend of ther interview Mr Herrera was arrested . . Objection to any 
!more testimony of what Mr Herrera said bsed upon he was 
!advised he was free to leave and then he was not free to leave. 
.. .................. ........ : : ........................ .................. , ....... ...... .................... .......................... ...................................... .................. ..... .................. . 
2:32:46 PM j !Judge overruled the Objection will not supress at this t ime 
~ ~~~ -·-J 
3/26/2012 3 of 5 
f Q fyL ~ I 
Prelim Hearing 
Time Speaker Note 
2:33:08 PM rA 
,, .................... .. 
2:36:12 PM (D 
jCont with Margaret Lehmbecker. Mr Herrera said he and 
!Stephanie were bickering and he was pissed he did not want to 
!Susan Camack for Christmas. Stephanie was Gathering her stuff 
land was going to leave. He said he was going to put the gun 
jbetween the Mattress on the bed because his dad did not know he 
[had the gun.He dropped the Magazine and slid the slide back and 
)he gun accidently went off hitting Stephaie in the head. She bent 
!over gathering her stuff to leave and he said he dropped the 
jMagazine out of the gun and slid the slide back and the gun went 
joff. He said he had not been Stephanie very long and and he did 
............  r:1 want togototheinl::sho~s: .. ................................................... . 
[Cross X-am i visted with Joe prior to Mr Berger Getting there 
/started 17 48 I have a digital recording of the interview. Det. Mr 
[Berger came into the room about 6pm. Joseph had said that 
/Stephanie was bent over gathering her stuff. Mr Herrera said he 
/was pulling the slid back and the gun went off. He has not said 
/anything difffrent to me. I did not take picture of the scene. It is 
jjust an audio recording of Mr Herrera. I read him his rights he 
pntialed the card and agreed to talk with me. He was free to go at 
, /any time . 
. ~;;g;;: .. ~~J~~dge ............... ..... J~:~~s~~i~::~o~e;:~~.k~:aw··a··bullet .. hole.to .. the .. left .. side .. o(the··········· 
I jbed. about 30 inches from the floor. 
2:41 :41 PM i PD i Cross Exam The bullet hole was on the Left hand side of the 
i !Bed.The Bullet hole was about 30 inches from the floor. I was told 
I jthat was were the bullet was. I was told there was another gun 
l /found in the room. 
·· ~.:}~~ ·:~ !Judge······················ I ~:~:•;.~::~u~~:ubmitted·································· ········································································ 
... ~;;~;~~ .. ~~J~~ .. ..... .. .. .... .. ........... ..J~:~:: .. ;~~~:::~~ .. There .. m.ust.he .. malious ... The .. Evidence .. has··been ... 
1 jpresented as an accidient. involinary Manslaughter that is what 
/has been presented. There has been no evidence to 2nd Degree 
........................................... · .............................................. !m.urder ........................................................................... .................................................................................................................... . 
2:45:39 PM !PA \egal Agruement.COntact gun shot wound. The gun was place 
i /against someone head is not accidental even if he did not know 
........................................... 1 ............................................. !there .. was .. cartiage .. in .. the. gun ............................... ......................................................................... . 
2:46:48 PM !PD fThere has been no evidence that the gun was place against he 
i /head 
2:47:15 PM fJudge fThere was an arguement, a handling of fire arm and contact 
i iwound to Stephanie. State has met it Burden of Proof. Mr Herrera 
I !will be bound over to answer to the District court in charge of 2nd 
' I Degree Murder 
3/26/2012 4 of 5 
~3 <P 
• Preiim Hearing 3B-COURTR00ivi·1 
Time Speaker Note 
2:49:39 PM iPD /Address the court with Motion for Bond Reduction. He has 
jsignificant ties to St. Maries. His parents will make sure he makes 
/it to all hearing. Would like to lower bond so he can bound out. He 
ns not a flight risk. Would like bond reduced to 50,000. 
2:53:17 PM f PA f Rule 46This 2nd Degree murder charge. He is flight risk. The 
! /family has the right to make sure the Def will show up to face the 
'charge. Potential Flight is high 200,000 Bail 
2:56:41···PM __ :,,_i',,_:.PD Jamily ties to the community. He did not flee the scene and was 
[being threatened by family member and then showed up at the 
l Police Department. 
2: s 7: 35 PM ! Judge ....... j.saff'was ... s.et".af';ioo", .. 66'6 .. p.er .. PA: .. Ji:i'eige··o·raeii.Efo\fset"T06-;-i566 ............ ! 
:adhere to the conditions of your release No contact with any ,. 
!member of the Camack Family. 
[Not Possess any Fire Arms Leave the State of ldah_?.............. ! __ 2:59:35 .. PM_j_PA ........... .. 
2:59:58 PM jJudge /PA to Prepare order Reducing Bond 
3/26/2012 
Judicial District State of Idaho 
and the County of Benewah 
West College Avenue, Suite 203 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Joseph Duane Herrera 
319 14th Street 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
Defendant. 
 





Robert W Loe 
















ORDER' NG DEFENDANT 
TO ANSWER TO THE 
DISTRICT COURT 
Citation No: 
Case No: CR-2011-0002053 
Preliminary hearing having been held in this case on Monday, March 26, 2012 
with Douglas P Payne, Prosecuting Attorney, present and defendant present being 
represented by William Butler, now therefore, pursuant to I.C.R. 5.1; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant herein be, and he/she is hereby held to 
answer in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Benewah, to the charge(s) of 118-4001-II Murder II a Felony as charged 
in the criminal complaint and that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe that 
defendant committed such offense. 
Defendant's custody status: 
Defendant is remanded to th~ custody of the Benewah County Sheriff with 
Bail set in the amount of$ / t!J Q n - . 
[ ] Defendant's release is continued on the bail bond posted in the amount of 
$ ________ _ 
[ ] Defendant is released on his/her own recognizance. 
Conditions of release are as follows: 
I. Defendant must attend all required court appearances. 
2. Defendant must not commit any law violations more serious than a traffic 
infraction. JL n t 
3. ?ther: aJ ':6 ~uHLM,o ~ -<M :t:;c~ 
~ t-e JJe..- 1NJu~ O'h_ S-e/cuU-e._e · r-
DATED Monday, March 26, 2012 
~~ fff\~ 
District Court Magistrate 
I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing were mailed postage pre-paid or by 
inter-office mail on Monday, March 26, 2012 to: 
Douglas P Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, ID, 83861 
William Butler 
720 West College A venue 
St. Maries, ID, 83861 
Benewah County Sheriffs Office 
Courthouse Box 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208 245-2564 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 
  
Defendant. 
Case No. 1-2053 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S 
INFORMATION 
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE, Prosecuting Attorney and for 
Benewah County, State of Idaho, who, in the name and the 
authority of said State prosecutes in its behalf, proper 
person comes o said Dist ct Court in the County of Benewah, 
State of Idaho, on the day of 2012, and 
gives the Court to understand and be informed that JOSEPH DUANE 
HERRERA is accused by is Information of the crime of MURDER IN 
THE SECOND DEGREE, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code Section 
18-4001, which has been committed by the sa defendant as 
follows, to-wit: that the said JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA on or about 
the 25th day of December, 2011, the County of Benewah, State 
of Idaho, did willful 
malice aforethought, but 
unlawfully, deliberately, th 
thout premeditation, kill and murder 
S ephanie Comack, a human be by placing a 380 handgun 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S INFORMAT ON, - 1 
aga t he and trigger, from which she ed. 
All of which is contrary to the statute in such case made and 
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of 
Idaho. 
I hereby ce 
2 day of 
t 
2012, 
Prosecuting gttG rn e :;------. 
a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was delivered/mailed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Maries, Idaho 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY' NFORMATION, 
WILLIAM BUTLER, #4188 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Ma es, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile: ( 208) 24 5-3 94 8 
e-mail: ll@smgazette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 













Case No. CR 2011-002053 
ORDER 
Court having before it the Motion for Bond Reduction, and 
good cause appearing, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's bond in the above-
entitled cause is reduced to the sum of $100,000.00. The 
following terms and conditions shall apply to defendant's 
release: 
1. Defendant shall appear at such times and places as the 
Court may order. 
2. Defendant shall commit no law violations more serious 
than a traffic infraction while on re se from j l. 
-1-
ORDER 
3. Prior to release, defendant shall sign a Waiver of 
Extradition. 
4. Defendant shall agree to have no contact th James or 
Susan Comack, nor members of their family. 
5. Defendant shall not possess any firearms. 
6. Defendant shall not leave the State of Idaho. 
DATED this day of March, 2012. 
-2-
ORDER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
tfJ_ I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this sc:.:, D of March, 2012, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the within Order to be served 
by the method indicated and addressed to the following: 
ORDER 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Facsimiles: (208) 245-1915 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
720 W. College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Facsimiles: (208) 245-3948 
Benewah County Sheriff 
Benewah County Jail 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
-3-
U.S. Mail 












WILLIAM BUTLER, #4188 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile : ( 2 0 8 ) 2 4 5 - 3 9 4 8 
e-mail: will@smgazette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
Otl 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
* * * 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 













Case No. CR 2011-002053 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR 
INVESTIGATORS AND FUNDS 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
COMES NOW, the defendant, Joseph Duane Herrera, by and 
through his Attorney of Record, William Butler, and hereby moves 
this Court for s Order all the defendant to retain 
investigat services to locate and interview potential 
witnesses and to assist in the preparation for trial and further 
moves that funds be allocated for such se ces. 
NOTICE OF HEARING: NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that attorney 
for defendant will bring on for hearing the above Motion before 
the above-entitled Court on April 13, 2012, at the hour of 9:30 
o'clock a.m., or as soon therea 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR INVESTIGATORS 
AND FUNDS AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
r as counsel may be heard. 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the wi Motion was delivered to the office of 
the Benewah County Prosecuting Attorney, by placing a copy 
his basket in the Clerk 1 s Office, Benewah County Courthouse, 701 
College, St. Maries, Idaho, by US Mail or by facs 
245-1915, this date. 
le, (208) 
Respectfully submitted this 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR INVESTIGATORS 
AND FUNDS AND NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
q day of April, 2012. 
William Butler 
Attorney for Defendant 
Arraignment/ Motion Herrera 
8:29:04 AM [Judge Gibler, 
[Clerk Bradbury 
,_._, .. .. 
9:42:57 AM! 
'""' " '· "· ···· ·· .. ····· 
_9:43_:32 _AM.JPD 
9:43:45 AM !PA 
9:43:53 AM !Judge 
4/13/2012 
(Cr11-2053 State Vs Joseph Herrera Def is Present and In 
!Custody Prosecuting Attorney Doug Payne, Public Defender 
.. J:ill .. ~~~1-~r. Court ~~~~.:~.~ ~-~-~' .. ~i~~-8.=~~--. 
_ _JJudge __ Calls _Case __ Charge_of_M_urder in 2nd Degree ......................... . 
. JEnters Plea on Not GUilty Jury Trial 
... i.1 __ Week······ ···· ·················· ·· 
!Set for Jury Excused 
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecut Att 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Ma es, daho 83861 
Te ephone: 208-245-2564 
12 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
aintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
· Case No. CRll-2053 
ORDER ENTERING PLEA 
OF NOT GUILTY 
The above entitled mat er, came on regularly to be heard 
before the Honorable Fred M. Gibler, one of the Judges of the 
above entitled Court, on the 13th day of April, 2012; the State 
was represented Douglas Pau Payne, Prosecuting Attorney for 
Benewah County, State of Idaho; the defendant was personally 
present and was represented by 
Ma es; 
lliam Butler, attorney of St. 
WHEREUPON, the nformation heretofore filed in s matter 
was read and the defendant acknowledged receipt of a copy 
thereof. The defendant was advised of his/her right to a delay 
between the time of arraignment and the time for enter 
his/her plea to the criminal charges stated in the Information, 
and the defendant waived such right. 
WHEREUPON, the defendant entered his/her plea as follows: 
NOT GUILTY to MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a felony, in 
ORDER ENTERING PLEA OF NOT GUILTY, Page -
olation of I 
Information on fie herein. 
Sect 8-4001 as cha 
WHEREUPON, the Court, having accepted said 
enter its Order as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
in the 
ea, did then 
1) The Clerk of the above-entitled Court enter of record 
the above-stated plea of the defendant; 
2) This matter sha l be set for jury t al and the Clerk 
shall notify the parties hereto of the said date; 
3) All pre trial motions shall be filed within thirty-five 
days; and 
4) Bond shall be continued as set. 
DATED the day of 
Fred M. Gibler 
District 
I hereby certify that a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
was delivered/mailed, postage 
pa;;d, _on the /') ""' day of 
J. Lg 1 2012, tO: 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Maries, Idaho 
ORDER ENTERING PLEA OF NOT GU LTY, - 2 -
WILLIAM BUTLER 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
12 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CR 2011-002053 
MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT 
OF PRELIMINARY HEARING 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, by and through 
his attorney for record, William Butler, and hereby moves the 
Court for an Order for the preparation of the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing held on March 26, 2012, before the Honorable 
Patrick M. McFadden. 
DATED this~ day of April, 2012. 
MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT OF 
PRELIMINARY HEARING - Page 1 
William~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the within Request for Transcript was delivered 
to the office of the Benewah County Prosecuting Attorney, by 
placing a copy in his basket in the Clerk's Office, Benewah 
County Courthouse, 701 College Avenue, St. Maries, Idaho, by US 
Mail or by facsimile, 
Dated this d5 
(208) 245-1915, this date. 
day of April, 2012. 
MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT OF 
PRELIMINARY HEARING - Page 2 
MAY. 1.2012 1:37PM ''DGE GiBLER 
WILLIAM BOTLER 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
NO. 943 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
- THK STATE- OF_ IDA..B:0,-- lN AND FO.R .COUMT;(_ QF BENEWAH_ 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CR 2011-002053 
ORDER 
The Court having read the defendant's Motion 
requesting the preparation of a transcript of the 
Preliminary Hearing held on March 26, 2012, before the 
Honorable Patrick R. McFadden in the above-entitled matter 
and good cause having been found; 
P. 4 
IT IS ORDERED AND THIS DOES HEREBY ORDER that the Clerk 
of the Court is to prepare a transcript of the Preliminary 
Hearing held on March 26, 2012, before the Honorable Patrick 
M. McFadden. Such transcript is to be prepared on or before 
May 25, 2012, and copies delivered to: 
ORDER - Page 1 
-- j 
y 
MAY. 1.2012 1:37PM '' 10GE GIBLER 
Douglas P. Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
720 W. College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
DATED this / ~day of ,t:;J., 2012. 
ORDER - Page 2 
Fred M. Gibler 
District Judge 




MAY. 1.2012 1:37PM 'OGE GIBLER NO. 94 3 P. 6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this s:r P1cJLy 
day of ,,.?;1..pa:;:il, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within Order for Transcript to be served by the 
method indicated and addressed to the following: 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Tacsim1"1e:· -(2"08) 245-;;.I91-S-
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
720 W. College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Facsimile: (208) 245-3948 
QQ_ '. 
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Rodney R. Saetnun, ISBN: 2921 
Karyn Whychell, ISBN: 5482 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
Post Office Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant 
l ~ ,L 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO} IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintift: 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA 
Defendant 
Case No. CR 2011-0002053 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR 
TRANSCRIPT 
COME NOW, Jenilynn and Jesse Herrera, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Saetrum Law Offices and hereby move this Court for its Order for a typewritten transcript of the 
record of the March 26, 2012 preliminary hearing in the above-referenced matter. 
Attached is a proposed order-
DATED this 3RD day of May, 2012. 
SAElRUM LAW OFFICES 
EX-PARTEMOTIONFOR TRANSCRIPT- I 
i') 
r~103/2012 14:38 20 '448 SAETRUM LAI/.! -TCES PAGE 03/0'3 
CERTIFICATE OF :MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of May, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Douglas P. Payne 
Benewah County Prosecuting Attorney 
701 College Avenue 
St Maries, Idaho 83861 
Will Butler 
Attorney at Law 
720 W. College Avenue 
St. Maries; Idaho 83861 
EXBPARTE MOTION FOR TRA-'N"SCRIPT - 2 
v U.S.Mail ---







'iMAY. 4. 2012:112: 13PM12' "1DGE GIBLER 
,;, . .05/04/2012 10!21 J3G0448 
Rodney R. Saettum, ISBN: 2Sl;Zl 
Karyn Whychell, ISBN: 54~2 
SA.ET.RUM LAW OFFICES 
Po.st Office Bo,i: 7425 
Bofae, Idaho 8:3707 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
.Attorneys for Defend.ant 
DISTRICT CO 
SAETRUM LAW .iCES 
NO. 990 P. 1E 03104 
r'At;;I::. 02/09 , 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, m ANP FOR nm COUNTY CF BENEWAH 
STATE Ol?' IDAHO 
vs. 
JOSEl?H DUANE HERRERA 
Def end31'J.t" 
case No. CR 20l 1 ·0002053 
ORDERRE'. BXPART.SMOTION 
FOR TR.ANSCRJPT 
THIS MA ITEK~ having come before the Court on the He:r.reras' '.6~ ;£),arte Motion For 
!nm.script, and good cause appearing therefor; 
IT ;rs HBRBBY ORDER.ED; that the Herreras' motior.1 for transcript is granted. 
PATED this _::j:._ day of~ 2012, 
/[~lh~· 
HONORABLE Fred Gibler 
District Judge 
ORDER.RE: EX PAR.TE MOTION FOR l'R.Af\fSClUPT- 1 
, r 
A . . -
~MAY. 4. 2012212: 13PM 1 'DGE GIBLER 
2083360448 
DISTRICT C 
SAETRUM LA!i/ UfFICfS 
NO. 990 P. 
PAGI:: 02/09 
~R'llFtC~E OF MAJ.UNG 
I HEREBY CERTIFY tl'lat on this :t.:::.. day of May, 2012, 1 oausoo'. a 1:nf.~ !l:ud cottevt copy 
of the foregoiIJg to be deposited in ihe Uruted States mail, post~ge prepaid., enclosed in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Dougl~ P. Payno 
Beti.ew~ Cowty }'x'o:;;ecnting Attom.ey 
701 CollegeAvenue 
St. Maries. Idaho 83861 
Will Butler 
Atta.."1ley at Law 
720 W. College Avl!illuo 
St. Maries, IdM.o 83861 
ORDE.RKE; EXP ARTE MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT- 2 
___ u.s. Mail 
v Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail ---Facs:imile -~-
--.--U.S. Mail 
v' H.i.nd. Delivery 
___ Over.night Mail 
---Facsimile 
WILLIAM BUTLER 
Attorney at Law 
L I,\ 11 t. 720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 I :_..::,.C_· °)..._· ..,_,K--· DEPUT' 
e-mail will@ zette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CR 2011-002053 
) 
aintiff, ) STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF 
) TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY 
vs. ) RESPONSE AND PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
) 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, the defendant Joseph Duane Herrera, by and 
through his attorney of record, William Butler, and the Benewah 
County Prosecuting Attorney, Douglas Paul Payne, and do hereby 
stipulate and agree that an extension of time to any and 
all discovery response and pre-trial motions be extended to June 
15, 2012. This stipulation is made and based upon the court 
file, records, and the following grounds and reasons: 
1. Based upon the Court's Order, Herrera's pre-trial 
motions are due on or before May 18, 2012. 
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY 
RESPONSE AND PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS 
2. That due to time constraints is impossible for 
defense counsel to review and/or listen and/or view all of the 
suspected evidence referenced by the State discovery response 
prior to the deadline for filing pre-trial motions. 
The Parties respectfully request the Court to extend the 
discovery response cutoff and pre-trial motions deadline. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of May, 2012. 
William Butler 
Attorney for Defendant 
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY 
RESPONSE AND PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I hereby certify that on this 18h 
day of May, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument to be served by method indicated and 
addressed to the following: 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
701 College Avenue, Suite 201 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Facsimile: (208) 245-3915 
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY 







Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 













* * * 
Case No. CR 2011-002053 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY 
RESPONSE AND PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
The Stipulation of the Parties having come before the 
Court; and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that time to le any and all discovery 
response and pre-trial motions be extended to June 15, 2012. 
DATED this /8 day of May, 2012. 
1n 
Fred Jv1. Gibler 
st ct Judge 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY 
RESPONSE AND PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS 1 
j:j_ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I hereby certify that on this 
18" day of May, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument to be served by the method indicated and 
addressed to fol owing: 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
701 College Avenue, Suite 201 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Facsimi (208) 245-3915 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
720 W. College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 











ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE DISCOVERY ~ ' 
RESPONSE AND PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS 2 
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecut Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Ma es, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245-2564 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
Plainti ) Case No. CRll-2053 
) 
vs. ) WITNESS AND 
) EXHIBIT LIST 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE, Prosecuting Attorney for 
Benewah County, State of Idaho, and hereby submits to the Court 
the following witness and exhibit lists: 
WITNESSES: 
1. Officer Robert W. Loe, S.M.P.D., St. Maries, Idaho 
2. Chief Margaret Lehmbecker, S.M.P.D., St. Maries, Idaho 
3. Jesse Herrera, 319 S. 14th Str., St. Maries, Idaho 
4. Jerilyn Herrera, 319 S. 14th Str., St. Maries, Idaho 
5. Dr. Clyde Hansen, Benewah ty Hospital, St. 
Maries, Idaho 
6. Derek Barden, 94 Gracie Lane, St. Ma es, Idaho 
7. Raymond Roy, 520 Mueller-Skinner Lane, St. Maries, ID 
8. James Comack, 77091 S Hwy 3, St. Maries, Idaho 
9. Susie Comack, 2120 W. Idaho Ave., St. Maries, Idaho 
10. Katlyn Comack, 2120 W. Idaho Ave., St. Maries, Idaho 
11. Jack Comack, Post Falls, Idaho 
12. Eunice McEwen, 699 Finn Creek Rd, P.O. Box 371, 
Fernwood, ID 
13. Danny Ducommun, 401 N. 21st Str., St. Ma es, Idaho 
14. Jana Hanson, 345 14th Str., St. Ma es, Idaho 
15. Hanson, 345 14th Str., St. Maries, Idaho 
16. chael Van Leuven, I.S.P. Investigations, Coeur 
d'Alene, ID 
WITNESS AND EXH BT ST Page - 1 
17. Det. Pau , I.S.P. Investigations, Coeur d'Alene, 
Idaho 
18. Stuart Jacobsen, I.S.P. Forensic , Coeur d'Alene, ID 
19. Of cer Scott Castles, S.M.P.D., St. Maries, ID 
20. Ronnie Dickerson, EMT, 30 Ponderosa Ln, St. Maries, ID 
21. Trp. Glenn Bakken, I.S.P., Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
22. Det. Charles Greear, I.S.P. Investigations, Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho 
23. Sally ken, Spokane County Medical Examiner, 5901 N. 
Lidgerwood, Suite 248, Spokane, WA 99208 
24. Deputy chael Richardson, B.C.S.O., St. Maries, ID 
25. Officer Robby Rogers, S.M.P.D., St. Maries, Idaho 
26. Deputy Rodney B. Dickenson, B.C.S.O., St. Maries, ID 
27. Kim Smith, 58300 S. Hwy 3, St. Maries, Idaho 
28. Tiffany Reeves, 1163 2nd Str., St. Maries, ID 
29. Bobbie Riddle, 58 S. Spring Str., Fernwood, ID 
30. Janelle Buell, EMT, 204 14th Str., St. Ma s, ID 
31. Kianna Appell, 450 Reeds Creek Rd, St. Maries, ID 
32. Dr. Paul F. Paschall, Kootenai Medical Center, Coeur 
d'Alene, ID 
EXHIBITS: 
The State ends to offer the fol ng exhibits: 
1. A .380 pistol and .380 shel casing. 
2. A .380 maga ine found on the floor. 
3. Death Certi cate. 
4. A recording of the interview of defendant by Chief 
Lehmbecker. 
5. A recording of the int ew of defendant by Det. Paul 
Berger 
6. Diagrams of crime scene by Det. Bakken. 
7. A controlled substance analysis report. 
8. Various paraphernalia found in the room, including a 
roach clip, Zig Zag papers, a metal pipe and meth 
waterbong. 
9. Photos of the crime scene. 
10. Defendant's and victim's personal effects found in the 
room. 
11. A .25 pistol found under mattress. 
12. A bullet removed from the wall. 
13. Marijuana r ghtstand, and marijuana th 
joints found in pill bottle. 
14. 11 bottle th defendant's name on it with 
WITNESS AND EXH BIT IST 
juana seeds it. 
15. The Autopsy Report of Sal Aiken and attached 
toxicology report. 
16. Autopsy photos. 
17. A video made at the scene by Dep. Rodney B. Dickenson. 
18. A video made at the scene by Dep. Mike Richardson. 
DATED this /5' day of _
7
_a~. ~=/ ~-+------' 2 o 12. 
oot"glasPa Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
I hereby ~rtify that on the 
day of ('~ , 2012, a true 
and corFect copy of the foregoing 
was delivered/mailed, postage prepaid to: 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Ma es, Idaho 
WITNESS AND EXH BT L ST, Page - 3 -
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecut Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208 245-2564 
' ( ~-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plainti ) Case No. CRll-2053 
) 
vs. ) 
) MOTION IN LIMINE 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE, Prosecut Attorney for 
Benewah County, State of Idaho, and moves this Court for a pre-
trial order determining the admissibility of the testimony of 
certain witnesses containing the hearsay statements of declarant 
Stephanie Comack. s motion is pursuant to I.R.L 803 (24), 
804 (b) (5) and (6) and I.R.E. 404 (b) on the grounds that the 
declarant is unavailable under I.R.E. 804(a) (4) that the 
defendant shot the declarant the head on December 25, 2011, 
and lled her; and on the grounds that witnesses, James Camack, 
Katlyn Coma ck, Susie Camack, Kim Smith, Kianna Appell, Bobbie 
Riddle, Tiffany Reeves and Eunice McEwen will testify that 
Stephanie Camack made statements to them that indicate the 
defendant was engaged in a pattern of controlling, threatening, 
menacing and violent conduct to prevent declarant from being 
MOTION IN IMINE, 1 
available as a witness aga the defendant for wrongs 
of the defendant and further that such evidence is admissible 
pursuant to I.R.E. 404 (b) as it is indicative of defendant's 
rnoti ve, intent, common scheme or plan and absence mistake or 
accident when defendant pointed the pistol at the victim's head 
on December 25, 2011. 
Speci cally including testimony as follows: 
1) Testimony of Eunice McEwen that on December 10, 2011, she 
went to get Stephanie Camack at Susie Comack' s home. Stephanie 
Camack was upset and angry at Joseph Herrera. Stephanie Camack 
then told ce McEwen that her head hurt, that on that day 
Joseph Herrera hit her, choked her, hit her head on the car 
shifter and pointed a gun at her head and said, "shut up." 
Stephanie Camack told Eunice McEwen not to tell anyone while 
Stephanie Comack was pointing her finger at her own temple; and 
that on or about December 10, 2011, Eunice McEwen was on the 
phone with Stephanie Comack and could hear Joseph Herrera the 
room when Stephanie Camack old Eunice McEwen that Camack has to 
go and then Eunice McEwen heard the phone breaking and that a 
few days later Stephanie Comack told her Joseph Herrera had 
broken her phone. 
2) Testimony of James Comack, 
loaned s cell phone to Stephanie 
Stephanie's father, that he 
November and December 2011 
and that when she returned there were several texts by Joseph 
Herrera to Stephanie, which threatened violence or suicide, 
including one which said, "I'm serious this time, I'm going to 
do it this t just remember I love you," and that about 
December 21, 2011, four days fore Stephanie was s Stephanie 
came to James Camack' s e see ng a place to stay James 
MOTION IN LIMINE, - 2 -
told her he would he 
night the defendant 
James intervened she 
psycho." 
her get on her feet, but 11:00 P.M. 
arrived and Stephanie went with him, 




3) Testimony of Susie Camack, Stephanie's mother, that 
Stephanie Camack told her that on December 10, 2011, Joseph 
Herrera broke Stephanie Comack's phone in half because Stephanie 
wanted to call Susie Camack for a ride; that on December 17, 
2011, Susie Camack saw bruises on Stephanie Camack and asked her 
if Joseph Herrera did it and Stephanie Camack would not answer; 
that on December 24, 2011, Susie Camack gave Stephanie Camack a 
new phone and told Stephanie to tell Joseph Herrera that Susie 
would break his hands if he touched Stephanie's phone again. 
Sus Camack told Stephanie Camack that, "This is not normal, 
you don't have to live like this," and Stephanie replied, "You 
don't understand Mom, he's psycho;" and that around December 1 -
10, 2011, Stephanie Camack asked Susie Camack for the car to go 
see Jos Herrera because he said he was going to kill himself. 
4) Testimony of Jack Camack that on December 17, 2011, 
Stephanie Camack said she left Joseph Herrera and felt safe 
the Comacks; that le at Comacks' home Stephanie Camack had 
ses on her arms and when asked if Joseph Herrera did it 
Stephanie Camack would not rep ; that Jack Camack told 
Stephanie Camack, "You know if he hurts you, you can tell us." 
Stephanie Camack said nothing. 
5) Testimony of Katlyn Camack that on or about December 10, 
2011, Stephanie Camack said Joseph Herrera broke her phone in 
half because she was t to call her parents; hat about 
December 17, 201 Katlyn Camack saw ises on S ie 
MOTION IN LIMINE, - 3 - 1/ 
Comack's arm St 
Joseph Herrera did • .L. lL. 
ie Comack would not answer when asked if 
Stephanie Comack told Katlyn Comack that 
she felt safe at Susie Comack' s home, but then went back to 
Joseph Herrera; and that on December 23, 2011, Katlyn Comack 
asked Stephanie Comack to come live with Katlyn, but Stephanie 
Comack responded that she hated Joseph Herrera too much to care, 
but that Katlyn did not understand that Joseph Herrera was 
"crazy" and that Joseph Herrera knew where Katlyn lived. 
6) Testimony of Kim Smith that she dated Joseph Herrera from 
2005 through July 2006, that he was controlling, jealous and 
abusive. Kim Smith said Joseph Herrera would take her cell 
phone away from her if he was suspicious of her. 
7) Testimony of Kianna Appell that she dated Joseph Herrera 
November 2009. That on November 25, 2009, she tried to leave 
Joseph Herrera, he stopped her, and took her cell phone, she 
fought him to get it back, but failed to do so. 
8) Testimony of Bobbie Riddle that in December 2011 Stephanie 
Coma ck told Bobbie Riddle that Joseph Herrera would "slap her 
(Stephanie) around," that they often argued and that Stephanie 
Comack said she couldn't leave Joseph Herrera because he 
threatened to 11 himself if she did so. 
9) Testimony of Tiffany Reeves that about December 17, 2011, 
she saw Stephanie Comack with bruises on her arms and that 
Tiffany asked Stephanie if Joseph Herrera hurt her and Stephanie 
did not answer. 
10) Bobbie ddle' s, Eunice McEwen' s, James Camack' s, Susie 
Comack' s and Katlyn Comack' s testimonies that in December 2011 
Stephanie Camack told each of them that St ie was afraid to 
MOTION IN IMINE, - 4 
leave Jos Herrera because Jos said he would 1 elf 
if she did. 
WHEREFORE the State moves this Court for an order that the 
testimony of the above-named witnesses is admissible pursuant to 
I.R.E. 404 (b), 803 (24) 
DATED this /3 
and 804(b)a and (6). 
day of ~ I 2012. 
2/ 
Prosecut 
I herebyf;,tify that on the !_3 
day of ~ , 2012, a true 
and corr~ Zc;py of the foregoing 
was delivered/mailed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mai 
St. Maries, Idaho 
MOTION IN LIM NE Page - 5 
Payne 
Attorney 
DOUGL~S PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecuting Att 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245 2564 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CRll-2053 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE 
I.R.E. 803(24) and 804(6) 
EVIDENCE 
s 
COMES NOW DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE, Prosecuting Attorney for 
Benewah County, State of Idaho, and HEREBY gives notice the 
State intends to offer hearsay evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 
803(24) and 804(6) spe fically including testimony as follows: 
1) Testimony of Eunice McEwen that on December 10, 2 011, she 
went to get Stephanie Camack at Susie Comack's home. Stephanie 
Camack was upset and angry at Joseph Herrera. Stephanie Camack 
then told Eunice McEwen that her head hurt, that on that day 
Joseph Herrera hit her, choked her, hit her head on the car 
shifter and pointed a gun at her head and said, "shut up." 
Stephanie Comack told Eunice McEwen not to tell anyone whi 
Stephanie Comack was pointing her finger at her own temple; and 
that on or about December 10, 2011, Eunice McEwen was on the 
phone with Stephanie Camack and could hear Joseph Herrera in the 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE I.R.E. 803(24) AND 804(6) EVIDENCE 
- 1 - </ 
room when St e Comack told Eunice McEwen that Comack has to 
go and then Eunice McEwen heard the phone breaking and that a 
few days later Stephanie Coma ck told her Joseph Herrera had 
broken her phone. 
2) Testimony of James Comack, Stephanie's father, that he 
loaned his cell phone to Stephanie in November and December 2011 
and that when she returned it there were several texts by Joseph 
Herrera to Stephanie, which threatened violence or suicide, 
including one which said, "I'm serious this time, I'm going to 
do it this time, just remember I love you," and that about 
December 21, 2011, four days before Stephanie was shot Stephanie 
came to James Comack's house seeking a ace to stay and James 
told her he would help her get on her feet, but 11:00 P.M. that 
night the defendant arrived and Stephanie went with him, when 
James ervened she said, "Don't. You don't know him, he is 
" 
3) Test of Susie Comack, Stephanie's mother, that 
St e Comack told r that on 
Herrera broke Stephanie Comack's phone 
r 10, 2011, Jos 
half because Stephanie 
wanted to call Susie Comack for a ride; that on December 17, 
2011, Susie Comack saw ses on Stephanie Comack and asked her 
if Joseph Herrera d it and Stephanie Comack would not answer; 
that on December 24, 2011, Susie Comack gave Stephanie Comack a 
new phone told Stephanie to tell Joseph Herrera that Susie 
would break his hands if he touched Stephanie's phone aga 
Sus Coma ck told Stephanie Comack that, "This is not normal, 
you don't have to live like this," and Stephanie replied, "You 
don't understand 's psycho;" and that around December 1 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE I.R.E. 803(24) AND 804(6) EVI 
2 ? 
10, 20 1, St ie Camack asked Susie Camack for the car to go 
see Joseph Herrera because he said he was going to kill elf. 
4) Testimony of Jack Camack that on December 17, 2011, 
Stephanie Camack said she left Joseph Herrera and felt safe 
the Comacks; that while at Comacks' home Stephanie Camack had 
bruises on her arms and when asked if Joseph Herrera did it 
Stephanie Comack would not reply; that Jack Comack told 
Stephanie Camack, "You know if he hurts you, you can tell us." 
Stephanie Comack said nothing. 
5) Testimony of Katlyn Camack that on or about December 10, 
2011, Stephanie Coma ck said Joseph Herrera broke her phone in 
half because she was trying to call her parents; that about 
December 17, 2011, Kat Camack saw bruises on Stephanie 
Comack's arm and Stephanie Comack would not answer when asked if 
Joseph Herrera it. Stephanie Comack told Katlyn Comack that 
she felt safe at Susie Comack' s home, but then went back to 
Joseph Herrera; and that on December 23, 2011, Kat Camack 
as Stephanie Camack to come live th Katlyn, St e 
Comack responded that she ed Joseph Herrera too much to care, 
but that Katlyn did not understand that Jos 
"crazy" and that Joseph Herrera knew where Kat 
Herrera was 
lived. 
6) Test of Smith that she dated Joseph Herrera 
2005 through y 2006, that he was controlling, ealous a 
abusive. Kim Smith s d Joseph Herrera would take her cell 
phone away from her if he was suspi ous of her. 
7) Test of Kianna Appe that dated Jos Herrera 
November 2009. That on November 25, 2009, she ried to leave 
Joseph Herrera, he stopped her, and took her cell phone, she 
h 0 it back, but failed to do so. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE I.R.E. 803(24) AND 804(6) EVIDENCE 
- 3 -
8) Test of e ddle tha in 2011 St e 
Comack told Bobbie Riddle that Jos Herrera d "slap her 
(Stephanie) around," that they often argued and that Stephanie 
Comack s 
threatened to 
she couldn't leave Joseph Herrera because he 
11 himself if she did so. 
9) Testimony of Tiffany Reeves that about December 17, 2011, 
she saw Stephanie Comack with bruises on her arms and that 
ffany asked Stephanie if Joseph Herrera hurt her and Stephanie 
did not answer. 
10) Bobbie Riddle's, Eunice McEwen' s, James Coma ck' s, Susie 
Comack' s and Katlyn Comack' s test es that in December 2011 
Stephanie Comack told each of them that Stephanie was afraid to 
leave Joseph Herrera because Joseph sa 
f she 
DATED this of 
I hereby yE:1rtify that on 
day of (,./~ , 2012, a true 
and cor~ct copy of the foregoing 
was delivered/mailed, stage 
prepa , to: 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. s, Idaho 
he would 11 himself 
2012. 
NOT CE OF INTENT TO USE I.R.E. 803(24) AND 804(6) EVIDENCE 
- 4 -
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecut Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245 2564 
; l 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 





Case No. CRll-2053 
SECOND NOTICE OF INTENT 
TO USE 404(b) EVIDENCE 





State of Idaho, and ves notice that the State 
roduce evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) as 
of Eunice McEwen that on 10, 2011, she 
went to get Stephanie Comack at Susie Comack's home. Stephanie 
Camack was upset and angry at Joseph Herrera. Stephanie Camack 
then told Eunice McEwen that her head hurt, that on that 
Joseph Herrera hit her, cho her, hit her head on car 
shifter and po ed a gun at her head and said, "shut up." 
e Cornack told Eunice McEwen not to te l anyone while 
St Comack was pointi her at r own temple; and 
that on or December 10, 2011, ce McEwen was on the 
th St e Cornack and d hear Jos Herrera in the 
SECOND NOTI OF INTENT TO USE 404(b) 
room when St e Cornack told Eunice McEwen Cornack has to 
go and then Eunice McEwen heard the phone breaking and that a 
few days later Stephanie Comack told her Joseph Herrera had 
broken her phone. 
2) Testimony of James Comack, Stephanie's father, that he 
loaned his cell phone to Stephanie November and December 2011 
and that when she returned it there were several texts by Joseph 
Herrera to Stephanie, which threatened violence or suicide, 
including one which said, "I'm serious this time, I'm going to 
do it this t just remember I love ff and that about 
December 21, 201, four days before Stephanie was shot Stephanie 
came to James Comack's house seeking a 
told her he would help her get on her feet, 
to stay and James 
11:00 P.M. that 
night the defendant a ved and Stephanie went with him, 
James intervened she said, "Don't. You don't know him, he is 
ps If 
3) Test of Susie Comack, Stephanie's mother, that 
s ie Coma k told her that on Decembe 10, 011, Jos 
Herrera bro Stephanie Comack's phone half because Stephanie 
on December 1 7, wanted to call Susie Camack for a ride; 
2011, Susie Comack saw bruises on Stephanie Comack and asked her 
if Joseph Herrera it and Stephanie Cornack would not answer; 
that on December 24, 20 1, Susie Cornack gave Stephanie Comack a 
new phone and t d Stephanie to tell Joseph Herrera that Susie 
would break his hands if he touched Stephanie's phone again. 
Susie Camack told St ie Corna ck that, "This is not normal, 
you don't have to live like is," and Stephanie replied, "You 
don't rs Morn, he's psycho;" that around December 1 
SECOND NOTICE OF NTENT TO USE 404(b) 2 
0, 2011, St e Comack asked Susi Comack for the car to go 
see Joseph Herrera because said he was going to kill himse f. 
4) Testimony of Jack Comack that on December 17, 2011, 
Stephanie Comack said she left Joseph Herrera and felt safe with 
the Comacks; that while at Comacks' home Stephanie Coma ck had 
bruises on her arms and when asked if Joseph Herrera did it 
Stephanie Comack would not reply; that Jack Comack told 
Stephanie Comack, "You know if he hurts you, you can tell us." 
Stephanie Comack said nothing. 
5) Testimony of Katlyn Comack that on or about December 10, 
2011, Stephanie Comack said Jos Herrera broke her phone in 
half because she was trying to call her parents; that about 
December 17, 2011, Katlyn Comack saw bruises on Stephanie 
Comack's arm Stephanie Comack would not answer when asked if 
Joseph Herrera did it. Stephanie Comack told Katlyn Comack that 
she felt safe at Susie Comack' s home, but then went back to 
Joseph Herrera; and that on December 23, 011, Katlyn Comack 
sked St i Comack to come l ve Kat but e 
Comack responded hat she hated Joseph Herrera too much to care, 
but that Kat did not understand Joseph Herrera was 
"crazy" and that Joseph Herrera where Katlyn lived. 
6) Test of Kim Smith that she dated Jos Herrera 
2005 through July 2006, that he was controll , jealous and 
i ve. Kim Smith said Joseph Herrera would ta her ce l 
phone away from her if he was suspicious of 
7) Test of anna Appel that she dated Joseph Herrera 
in November 2009. That on November 25, 2009, she t ed to leave 
Joseph Herrera, he stopped her, and took her cell phone, she 
h to it ck, failed to do so. 
ECOND NOT CE OF INTENT TO U 404(b) DENCE, 3 
8) Test of Bobbe e that in December 011 St 
Comack told Bobbie Riddle that Joseph Herrera would "slap her 
(Stephanie) around," that they often argued and that Stephanie 
Comack said she couldn't leave Joseph Herrera because he 
threatened to kill himself if she did so. 
9) 
she 
Testimony of Tiffany Reeves that about 





Tiffany asked Stephanie if Joseph Herrera hurt her and Stephanie 
did not answer. 
10) dence that Joseph Herrera had Stephanie Comack' s cell 
phone when he shot Stephanie Comack. 
11) Bobbie Riddle's, Eunice McEwen' s, James Comack' s, Susie 
Comack' s and Kat Comack' s test es that in December 2011 
Stephanie Comack told each of them that Stephanie was afraid to 
leave Joseph Herrera because Jos 
if she did. 
DATED this day of 
said he would kill himself 
Prosecuting Attorney 
SECOND NOT CE OF NTENT USE 404(b) ge I 
I that on he 
day , 2012, a true 
and cor ect copy of the foregoing 
was delivered/mailed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Ma es, Idaho 
SECOND NOT TO US 40 (b) 
j 
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245-2564 
Q_5).R_ .OEPUT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 













Case No. CRll-2053 
STATE'S SECOND MOTION 
IN LIMINE 
COMES NOW DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE, Prosecuting Attorney for 
Benewah County, State of Idaho, and moves this Court for a pre-
tria 
certa 
order pursuant to I.R.E. 803(3) on the grounds that 
hearsay statements of declarant, Stephanie Comack, were 
statements about her then exist mental, physical or emotiona 
conditions and are admiss 
defendant's mot intent, 
e thereas, and are relevant as to 
common scheme or plans and/or 
absence of stake or accident when he inted a gun at 
St e Comack's ad on December 25, 2011, are 
therefore admissible under I.R.E. 404(b). 
2011; 
ude as follows: These statements 
1) The test of Eunice McEwen that 
ECON MOTION IN L NE - 1 
mid- r 
a) St e Comack old ce McEwen that Stephanie 
was upset and angry at Joseph Herrera and that Stephanie's head 
hurt and that Stephanie told Eunice not to tell anyone about 
this, while Stephanie point 
temple; and 
r own index r at her own 
b) That while talking on the phone with Stephanie, 
Eunice heard Joseph in the background and heard Stephanie say, 
" have to go" and then heard the phone breaking. 
2) James Comack's testimony that on December 21, 2011, 
James offered to let Stephanie 'get on her feet' at James' s 
home, but Joseph Herrera arrived and Stephanie declined to stay 
saying, "You don't know him (Joseph Herrera), he is ps II 
3) Susie Comack's testimony that on December 24, 2011, 
Susie told Stephanie regarding Joseph Herrera, "You don't have 
to live like this," to ch Stephanie responded, "You don't 
understand, he's ps II 
4) Katlyn Comack's test that on December 24, 2011, 
Katlyn told St e that Stephanie could live with Kat 
' 
but 
Stephanie told Kaylyn that Stephanie could not live Katlyn 
because Joseph Herrera was "crazy" and knew where Katlyn lived. 
5) Bobbie Riddle's, ce McEwen's, James Comack's, Susie 
Camack' s and Katlyn Camack' s test es that in December 2011 
Stephanie Comack told each of them that Stephanie was afraid to 
leave Joseph Herrera because Joseph said he would kil 
if she did. 
s MOT ON IN IMINE 
himself 
WHEREFORE the State moves this Court for a pre-trial order 




Ii day of {14::,.....( , 2012. -;r-r.r~~~~---
Dougfc;s~ne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
that on the /3 
day of , 2012, a true 
and cor ct copy of the fo 
was delivered/mailed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Maries Idaho 
SECOND MOT ON IMI 
WILLIAM BUTLER, #4188 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: (208) 245 521 
Facsimile: ( 208) 2 4 5 394 8 
e-mail: will@smgazette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
Ll i z 14 II:, o 
BY: C 9: K ,OEFiJP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
* * * 
Case No. CR 2011-002053 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR 
INVESTIGATOR FUNDS 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
COMES NOW, the defendant, Joseph Duane Herrera, by and 
through his Attorney of Record, William Butler, and hereby moves 
this Court for s Order allowing the defendant to retain 
investigative services to locate and interview potential 
witnesses and to assist in the preparation for trial and further 
moves that funds be allocated for such services. 
NOT CE OF HEARING: NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that attorney 
for defendant will bring on for hearing the above Motion before 
the above-ent led Court on June 15, 2012, at the hour of 9:30 
o'clock a.m., or as soon therea 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR INVESTIGATOR 
FUNDS AND NOTICE OF HP.ARIN~ 
as counsel may be heard. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the within Motion was delivered to the office of 
the Benewah County Prosecut Attorney, by placing a copy in 
his basket in the Clerk's Of ce, Benewah County Courthouse, 701 
College, St. Maries, Idaho, by US Mail or by facsimile, ( 208) 
245-1915, this date. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of June, 2012. 
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR INVESTIGATOR 
FUNDS AND NOT OF 
But er 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile: (208) 245 3948 
e-mail: will@smgazette.com 
WILLIAM BUTLER 
Attorney at Law II: 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Idaho State Bar 4188 
e?::~ .. DEPUT I : _ ___:::=s:,.,!,.L.~C:.,,,.::,,,.....-
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
* * * 
Case No. CR 2011-002053 
MOTION TO CHANGE 
VENUE 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Joseph Duane Herrera, by and 
through his Attorney of Record, William Butler, and hereby moves 
this Honorable Court for an Order pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rules 12 and 47 to change the venue of the trial to a county 
other than Benewah because of prejudicial pretrial publicity. 
Without the relief sought in this Motion, numerous statutory 
and constitutional rights of the Accused will be violated, 
including but not 1 ted to: the right to ef ive assistance 
of counsel as guaranteed by Sixth Amendment of the U.S. 
-1-
MOTION TO CHANGE 
Constitution as well as Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Const ion; the rights of due process of law and equal 
protection, and the protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as 
Article 1, §§ 6, 7, 8, and 17 of the Idaho Constitution; the 
right to confront witnesses guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution; the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution; 
and, the right to compulsory process guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution, and Idaho Code§ 19-1801. 
A hearing is requested at which time evidence, testimony, 
and oral argument may be presented. The Defendant reserves the 
to present the Court with additional authorit sand 
briefing in support of this Motion. 
DATED s 1 
MOTION TO 
day of June, 2012. 
-2-
r 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Idaho State Bar 4188 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the within Motion to Change Venue was delivered 
to the office of Benewah County Prosecuting Attorney, by 
placing a copy in his basket in the Clerk's Office, Benewah 
County Courthouse, 701 College, St. Maries, Idaho, by US Mail or 
by facsimile, (208) 245 1915, this date. 
DATED this 15th day of June, 2012. 
-3-
MOTION TO CHANGE 
11 
1 WILLIAM BUTLER 
Attorney at Law 
2 720 West College 
St. Ma es, Idaho 83861 
3 Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
4 e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Idaho State Bar Number 4188 
5 
Attorney for Defendant 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
***DISTRICT COURT*** 
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19 COMES NOW, the defendant, Joseph Duane Herrera (Herrera), by 
20 and through s attorney of record, William Butler, and 
21 respectfully moves this Court for an Order suppressing any and 
22 all evidence either oral or tangible obtained directly or 
23 indirectly from the stop, seizure, arrest, detention and 
24 interrogation of the defendant and search of defendant's living 
25 space. Such stop, seizure, arrest, detention, interrogation and 
26 search of the defendant and his property are in violation of the 
27 Defendant's cons itut 1 rights r the First, Fourth, fth 
28 and Sixth Amendments to United States and Idaho Constitutions 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR DISMISS - Page 1 
I 
1 and Statutes and therefore all evidence and statements should be 
2 suppressed and the government precluded from using the same at 
3 t 
4 In the alternative the defendant respectfully requests this 
5 Court to dismiss the charges. 
6 This motion is brought pursuant to the files and records in 
7 this case, and any and all matters that may be brought to the 
8 Court's attention prior to and at the time of hearing on these 
9 matters or trial. 
10 FACTS 
11 On December 25, 2011 Officers of the St. Maries Police 
12 Department, Benewah County Sheriff's Office, Idaho State Police 
13 and other agencies were investigating an leged homicide at 319 
14 South 14th Street, St. Maries, Idaho. Officers allegedly 
15 obtained a consent to search from the defendant's parents Jesse 
16 Herrera and Jerilyn Herrera for the house including defendant's 
17 room ocated at 319 South 14th Street, St. Maries, Idaho. Items 
18 of possible evidentiary value were seized from defendant's 
19 private room. 
20 On December 25, 2011 Officers of the St. Maries Police 
21 Department and the Idaho State Police interrogated Herrera and 
22 while so doing violated the principles set forth in Miranda v. 
23 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and its progeny. 
24 This motion to suppress seeks to suppress evidence obtained 
25 on or about December 25, 2011 as a result of the stop, seizure, 
26 arrest, detention, interrogation and search of the defendant 
27 and/or defendant's property. It is the defendant's position 
28 that interrogat on and se was improper and any all 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR DISMISS - Page 2 
I' 
1 evidence obtained should be suppressed and the government 
2 precluded from introducing the evidence at trial. 
3 reliefs in s mot numerous statutory 
4 and const utional rights of the defendant will be violated 
5 including but not limited to: the right to effective assistance 
6 of counsel; the rights of due process of law and equal protection 
7 and the protection against cruel and unusual punishment; the 
8 right to confront witnesses; the right to be free from 
9 unreasonable searches and seizures; and the right to compulsory 
10 process. All these ghts are guaranteed by the United States 
11 and Idaho Constitutions. 
12 A hearing is requested at which time evidence, testimony and 
13 oral argument may be presented. The defendant reserves the right 
14 to present the Court with additional authorities and briefing in 
15 support of these motions. 
16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
17 correct copy of the within Motion was delivered to the office of 
18 the Benewah County Prosecut Attorney, by acing a copy 
19 basket in the Clerk's Office, Benewah County Courthouse, 701 
20 College, St. Maries, Idaho, by US Mail or by facsimile, (208) 








Respectfully submitted this 1 day of June, 2011. 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Idaho State Bar Number 4188 
s 
NANCY A. WOLFF 
MORRIS AND WOLFF, P.A. 
722 Main A venue 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
Telephone: (208) 245-2523 
Facsimile: (208) 245-4392 
Idaho State Bar #2930 
') 
l. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE IF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 
) Case No. CRll-2053 
) 
) NOTICE OF ELECTION TO 
) PROCEED UNDER IDAHO 




______ D_e_fe_n_d_an_t_. ______ ) 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE COURT, BENEWAH COUNTY 
AND TO: THE HONORABLE FRED M. GIBLER 
AND TO: DOUGLAS P. PAYNE 
AND TO: 
Benewah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
701 W. College Avenue, Suite 201 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
WILLIAM BUTLER, Attorney for Joseph Herrera 
720 W. College A venue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
BENEWAH COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, a County-owned hospital, having been 
duly served with a Subpoena Duces Tecum issued in the above-entitled matter on or 
about the 15th of June, 2012, a copy of which is attached to this Notice as Exhibit "A," 
does hereby elect to comply with the Subpoena Duces Tecum pursuant to Idaho Code 9-
420. 
NOTICE PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 9-420 - I 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that certified copies of five (5) resolutions of 
the governing board, Board of Trustees of Benewah Community Hospital, have been 
placed on file with the Clerk of the Court for Benewah County, Idaho, in accordance with 
Idaho Code 9-420, and that the undersigned is a duly appointed custodian of the records. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that Benewah Community Hospital, by and 
through the designated custodian of the records, Kathyleen Y. Tweedy, has inspected 
certain medical records of Benewah Community Hospital and has looked for "any 
treatment notes or summaries for any evaluation or treatment of any injuries to Stephanie 
Comack from June 1, 2011, through December 24, 2011" and she has found NONE as 
specified in the Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by the Clerk of the Court for Benewah 
County, Idaho. 
DATED this day of June, 2012. 
NOTICE PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 9-420 - 2 





NAiN C~ WOLF.F, A#tf~ey for 
Benewalveommumty H0Vp1tal 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of June, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
DOUGLAS P. PAYNE 
Benewah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
701 W. College Avenue, Suite 201 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
William Butler, 
Attorney for Joseph Duane Herrera 
720 W. College A venue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
NOTICE PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 9-420 - 3 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Courthouse Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Courthouse Mail 
Jun. 18. 2012 3:05PM ,cwah Community Hospital 
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecu~ing Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245-2564 
No. 9197 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 






JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
TO: Benewah Community Hospital 
229 S. 7th Street 
St. Maries, Idaho 
Case No. CRll-2053 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
P. 2 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to produce the following books, 
papers, documents or things: 
Any treatment notes or summaries for any 
evaluation or treatment of any injuries to 
Stephanie Camack from June 1, 2011, through 
December 24, 2011; 
at the Benewah County Prosecutor's Office, Benewah County 
Courthouse, St. Maries, Idaho, on or before the 29th day of 
June, 2011, at 5:00 o'clock, p.m. 
Jun. 18. 2012 3:05PM 
DATED this 
\ '' :,, : 
· .. 
.. I 
. ,, ~. 
,, \, : 
,',,: 
Be11cwah Community Hospital No. 9197 P. 3 
day of June, 2012. 
MICHELE McDANIELS 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
9 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORDS 
AS "NOT FOUND" 1 J t.. 
Q 7' 8--
I, KATHYLEEN Y. TWEEDY, being duly sworn upon oath, do)J,vreby certify that tam 
.) • . 'uEPUn 
an employee of Benewah Community Hospital and that pursuant to Idaho Code 9-420, I have 
been duly charged and empowered by the governing Board of Trustees as the custodian of 
medical and patient records for Benewah Community Hospital. 
In response to the attached Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by the Benewah County Clerk 
of Court and which has been served upon me, as custodian of the records for Benewah 
Community Hospital, I hereby certify that upon inspection of any treatment notes or summaries 
for any evaluation or treatment of any injuries to Stephanie Camack from June 1, 2011, through 
December 24, 2011" I have found NO RECORDS as described in the Subpoena Duces Tecum a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Benewah ) 
KA THYLEEN Y. TWEEDY, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
That I have read the foregoing Certification of Records as "Not Found" and that I know 
the contents thereof; that the same is true to the best of my knowledge and belief; and that I have 
executed the same. 
B 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Benewah ) 
On this J8f±,, day of June, 2012, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
the State of Idaho, personally appeared KATHYLEEN Y. TWEEDY, known or identified to me 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORDS - I 
to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me 
that she executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORDS 2 I 
Jun, 18. 2012 3:05PM Be11c1vah Community Hospital 
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecu~ing Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245-2564 
No. 9197 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 






JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
TO: Benewah Community Hospital 
229 S. 7th Street 
St. Maries, Idaho 
Case No. CRll-2053 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
P. 2 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to produce the following books, 
papers, documents or things: 
Any treatment notes or summaries for any 
evaluation or treatment of any injuries to 
Stephanie Camack from June 1, 2011, through 
December 24, 2011; 
at the Benewah· County Prosecutor's Office, Benewah County 
Courthouse, St. Maries, Idaho, on or before the 29th day of 
June, 2011, at 5:00 o'clock, p.m. 
I 
, Jun. 18. 2012 3:05PM Btrrcwah Community Hospital No. 9197 P. 3 
DATED this le::;;:- day of June, 2012. 
''' :! \ 
',. 
"I 
~ ' ' 
,,,!, 




CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
I 
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245-2564 
-- C3:1?:--_. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
aintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CRll-2053 
STATE'S AMENDMENT TO 
NOTICES OF INTENT TO USE 
404(b) AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
The State's Second Notice of Intent to Use 404(b) Evidence 
and Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 803(24) and 804(6) are hereby 
amended as follows: 
The State gives notice that pursuant to I.R.E. 404 (b) and 
803 (24) and 804 (b) (6) that it 11 seek the ion under 
said rules of the foll evidence: 
1) Testimony of Eunice McEwen that Eunice had heard Joseph 
Herrera insult and verbally abuse Stephanie; that on December 
10, 2011, she went to Stephanie Comack at Susie Comack's 
home. Stephanie Comack was upset and angry at Jos Herrera. 
Stephanie Comack then told ce McEwen that r head hurt 
because Joseph Herrera had that on day Joseph 
Herrera hit 
' 
choked her, hi her on the car shifter and 
pointed a at her head and said, \\ up. ff Stephanie Comack 
AMENDMENT TO NOT CES OF INTENT TO USE 404(b) AND HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE Pa I 
UT; 
told ce McEwen not to tell anyone about this while St e 
Comack was pointing her nger at her own temple; and that on or 
about December 10, 2011, Eunice McEwen was on the phone with 
Stephanie Comack and could hear Joseph Herrera in the room when 
Stephanie Comack told Eunice McEwen that Comack has to go and 
then Eunice McEwen heard the phone breaking and that a few days 
later Stephanie Comack told her Joseph Herrera had broken her 
phone. 
2) Testimony of James Comack, Stephanie's father, that the 
defendant would not allow Stephanie to have a job or spend time 
with ends or fami That James loaned his cell phone to 
Stephanie in November and December 2011 and that when she 
returned it 
Stephanie, 
re were several texts Joseph Herrera to 
ch threatened violence or suicide, including one 
which said, "I'm serious s time, I'm going to do it this 
time, just remember love you," and December 21, 
2011, four days before Stephanie was shot Stephanie came o 
James Comack's 
he would he 
e see a ace o s and James told her 
her on her feet, but 11:00 P.M. that night 
defendant arrived and S e went th him, when James 
intervened she said, "Don't. You don't know him, he is psycho." 
3) Testimony of Susie Comack, Stephanie's 
Stephanie Comack told her that the defendant not et r 
have a job or spend t th ends or ly and that on 
December 10, 2011, Joseph Herrera bro Stephanie Comack's 
in lf because Stephanie wanted to ca 1 Susie Comack for a 
ride; that on December 17, 2011, Susie Comack saw bruises 
Stephanie Comack as her if Jos Herrera 
Comack wou not answer; that on De r 24, 
AMENDMENT TO NOTICES OF INTENT TO USE 404(b) AND HEARSAY 







Susie Comack gave 
Stephanie to tell Jos 
e Comack a new 
Herrera that Sus 
hands if he touched Stephanie's phone again. 
and told 
would break his 
Susie Comack told 
Stephanie Comack that, "This is not normal, you don't have to 
live like this," and Stephanie replied, "You don't understand 
Mom, he's psycho;" and that around December 1 10, 2011, 
Stephanie Comack asked Susie Comack for the car to go see Joseph 
Herrera because he said he was going to kill himself. 
4) Testimony of Jack Comack that on December 17, 2011, 
Stephanie Comack said she left Joseph Herrera and felt safe with 
the Comacks; that while at Comacks' home Stephanie Coma ck had 
bruises on her arms and 
Stephanie Comack would not 
asked if Joseph Herrera did it 
reply; that Jack Comack told 
Stephanie Comack, "You know if he hurts you, you can tell us." 
Stephanie Comack sa nothing. 
5) Testimony of Katlyn Comack that the defendant was 
controlling of Stephanie and would call repeatedly or otherwise 
cause he to keep away from others and that on or about Decembe 
10, 2011, Stephanie Comack said Joseph Herrera ke Stephanie's 
phone in ha f because Stephanie was trying to call her parents; 
that about December 17, 2011, Katlyn Comack saw bruises on 
Stephanie Comack' s arm and Stephanie Comack 
when asked if Joseph Herrera did it and tha 
not answer 
Stephanie Comack 
told Katlyn Comack she felt safe at Susie Comack' s home, 
but then went back to Joseph Herrera; and that about December 
2 3, 2011, Kat Comack asked Stephanie Comack to come live th 
Katlyn to escape Stephanie's abuse by defendant but Stephanie 
Comack re that Stephanie could not move in th Katlyn 
e Jos Herrera was raz Jos Herrera knew 
AMENDMENT TO NOTICES OF INTENT TO USE 404(b) AND HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE - 3 I 
Kat l and that December 23 St e e-
mailed Katlyn, "I'm starting to rGalize he (the defendant) 
doesn't care. are people so mean ... I'm starting to realize 
he real doesn't care. I thought I'd be a lot more sad about 
it, but I think I might hate him too much to be sad." 
6) Testimony of Smith that she dated Joseph Herrera from 
2005 through July 2006, that he was cont ling, jealous and 
abusive. Kim Smith said Joseph Herrera would take her cell 
phone away from her if he was suspicious of who she might call. 
7) Testimony of Kianna Appell that she dated Joseph Herrera 
in November 2009. That on November 25, 2009, she tried to leave 
Joseph Herrera, he stopped her, and took her cell phone, she 
fought him to get it back, but failed to do so, then she escaped 
without it. 
8) Test of Bobbie ddle that in December 2011 Stephanie 
Camack told Bobbie ddle that Joseph Herrera "slap her 
(Stephanie) around," that they often argued and that Stephanie 
omack said she couldn't leave Jos Herrera se he 
threat to kill elf if she so. 
9) Test of Tiffany Reeves that about December 17, 2011, 
she saw St e Camack with ses on her arms and that 
Tiffany asked Stephanie if Joseph Herrera hurt her Stephanie 





his control and not al her to spend time 
that Jos Herrera had St 
he shot Stephanie Comack and when 
arres ed. 
AMENDMENT TO NOTICES OF INTENT TO USE 404(b) AND 
EVIDENCE - 4 
ck' s eel 
was later 
11) Bobbie e's, ce McEwen' s, James Comack' s, Susie 
Comack' s and Katlyn Comack' s testimonies that in December 2011 
Stephanie Comack told each of them that Stephanie was afraid to 
leave Joseph Herrera because Joseph said he would kill himself 
if she did. 
12) Jennifer Hickson' s testimony that heard the defendant 
verbally insult and abuse Stephanie Comack in public around 
December 11, 2011. 
13) Testimony of Roger Hossfeld, Jr. that on December 1, 2011, 
he drove Stephanie back to St. s after she was stranded at 
the casino in Worley by the defendant with whom she'd had an 
argument, that Stephanie said she was leaving defendant, but 
that they texted back and forth, she changed her mind and Mr. 




AMENDMENT TO NOTICES OF INTENT TO USE 404(b) AND 
EVIDENCE 
2012. 
I he on the 
day of , 2012, a true 
and corr ct copy of the foregoing 
was delivered/mailed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Maries, Idaho 
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Case No. CRll-2053 
STATE'S MOTION FOR 
DETERMINATION OF 
ADMISSABILITY OF EVIDENCE 
-----------------
COMES NOW DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE, Prosecuting Attorney for 
Benewah County, State of Idaho, and hereby moves this Court for 
a pre-trial order determining the ssibility of certain 
dence. This motion is intended to amend the previously filed 
State's First and Second Motion In L ne, to consolidate them, 
to simplify them. s motion is made pursuant to I. R. E. 
401 (c), 403, 404 (b), 803 (3), 803 (24) 804 (b) (5 and 6). This 
mot is made on the State's brief 
filed concurrently herewith and 
as stated in 
evidence and a to be 
submitted upon hearing. s motion concerns the evidence 
previously listed in the State's Mot ons In Limine and Notices 
of Intent consol ed and supp emented as follows: 
l) Testimony of Eunice McEwen that ce heard Jos 
Herrera insult and verbally abuse St e; on December 
STATE'S MOTION FOR DETERMINAT ON OF ADMISSABIL TY OF EVIDENCE, 
10, 201 , went o get St ie Comack at Susie Comack' s 
home. Stephanie Comack was upset and at Joseph Herrera. 
Stephanie Comack then told Eunice McEwen that her head hurt 
because Joseph Herrera had hurt her, on that day Joseph 
Herrera hit her, choked her, r head on the car shifter and 
pointed a gun at her head and said, "shut up." Stephanie Comack 
told Eunice McEwen not to tell anyone about s while Stephanie 
Comack was pointing her finger at her own temple; and that on or 
about December 10, 2011, Eunice McEwen was on the phone with 
Stephanie Comack and could hear Joseph Herrera in the room when 
Stephanie 
then 
Comack told Eunice McEwen that Comack has to go and 
ce McEwen heard the phone breaking and that a few days 
later Stephanie Comack told her Joseph Herrera had broken her 
phone. 
2) Testimony of James Comack, Stephanie's father, that the 
defendant would not allow St to have a job or spend time 
with ends or family. That James loaned his cell phone to 
Stephanie and December 2011 that when she 
it t re were several texts by Joseph Herrera to 
Stephanie, 
which s d, 
time, just 
which threatened violence or s cide, inc one 
"I'm se ous s t I'm go 
that 
shot 
to do this 
2011, four 
remember I love you," 







James Comack's house seeking a place to stay and James o her 
he would help her get on her feet, but 11:00 P.M. night the 
de t arr and St ie went th when James 
intervened she said, "Don't. You don't know he is ps fl 
3) Test of Susie Coma ck, Stephanie's r, 
Comack to t t the de not et r 
STATE'S MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF ADMISSAB ITY OF EVI 
I 
have a job or time th ends or fami and on 
December 10, 2011, Joseph Herrera broke Stephanie Comack's phone 
in half because Stephanie wanted to call Susie Camack for a 
de; that on December 17, 2011, Susie Comack saw bruises on 
Stephanie Comack and asked her if Joseph Herrera did it and 
Stephanie Comack would not answer; that on December 24, 2011, 
Susie Comack gave Stephanie Comack a new phone and told 
Stephanie to tell Joseph Herrera that Susie would break his 
hands if he touched Stephanie's phone again. Susie Comack told 
Stephanie Comack that, "This is not normal, you don't have to 
live like this," and Stephanie replied, "You don't understand 
Mom, he's psycho;" and that around December 1 10, 2011, 
Stephanie Comack asked Susie Comack for the car to go see Joseph 
Herrera because he said he was going to kill himself. 
4) Testimony of Jack Comack that on December 17, 2011, 
Stephanie Comack sa 
the Comacks; that 
she left Joseph Herrera and felt safe 
e at Comacks' home St Comack had 
bruises on her arms and when asked if Jos Herrera it 
Stephanie Comack would not reply; 
Stephanie Comack, "You know if he 
Stephanie Comack said 
Jack Comack told 
s you, you can tell us." 
5) Test of Katlyn Camack that the defendant was 
controlling of Stephanie and would ca edly or othe se 
cause her to keep away from others and that on or December 
10, 2011, Stephanie Comack sa Joseph Herrera broke St e's 
in ha f because e was to cal her s; 
that about December 17, 2011, Katlyn Comack saw bruises on 
Stephanie Comack's arm Stephanie Comack not answer 
when asked f Jos Herrera d St i Corna ck 
STATE'S MOT ON FOR DETERMINATION OF ADMISSABILITY OF EVI 
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old Katlyn Comack that she felt safe at Susie Comack s 
but then went back to Jos Herrera; and that about December 
23, 2011, Katlyn Comack asked Stephanie Comack to come live with 
Katlyn to escape Stephanie's abuse defendant but Stephanie 
Comack responded that Stephanie could not move in with Katlyn 
because Joseph Herrera was "crazy" and that Joseph Herrera knew 
where Katlyn lived, and t about December 23 Stephanie e-
mailed Katlyn, "I'm starting to realize he (the defendant) 
doesn't care. Why are people so mean ... I'm starting to realize 
he really doesn't care. I thought I'd be a lot more sad about 
it, but I think I mi hate him too much to be sad." 
6) Testimony of Kim Smith that she dated Joseph Herrera from 
2005 through July 2006, that he was controlling, jealous and 
abus Kim Smith said Joseph Herrera would take her cell 
phone away from her if he was suspicious of who she mi ca l. 
7) Test 
in November 2009. 
of Kianna Appell that she dated Joseph Herrera 
That on November 25, 2009, she tried to leave 
Joseph Herrera, he st 
fought him to get it back, 
thout 
her, and took her cell 
failed to do so, 
she 
she escaped 
8) Test of Bobbie Riddle that in December 2011 Stephanie 
Comack told Bobbie Riddle Joseph Herrera would "slap her 
(Stephanie) around," that they often argued and that Stephanie 
Comack said she 't Joseph Herrera because he 
threatened to kill himse f if she did so. 
9) Test f Ti Re s that De r 
she saw Stephanie Comack bruises on her arms 
Tiffany as St ie if Jos Herrera her 
not answer, and that Jos Herrera att 
STATE'S MOT ON FOR DETERMINATION OF ADMISSAB L TY OF 
4 
and 
17, 201 , 
e 
to 
St e unde his control and not a low her to time th 
others. 
10) Evidence that Joseph Herrera had Stephanie Comack' s cell 
phone when he shot Stephanie Comack and when he was later 
arrested. 
11) Bobbie Riddle's, Eunice McEwen' s, James Camack' s, Susie 
Camack' s and Katlyn Comack' s testimonies that December 2011 
Stephanie Comack told each of them that Stephanie was afraid to 
leave Joseph Herrera because Joseph said he would kill himself 
if she did. 
12) Jennifer Hickson' s testimony that she heard the defendant 
verbally sult and abuse Stephanie Comack in public around 
December 11, 2011. 
13) Testimony of Roger Hossfeld, Jr. that on December 1, 2011, 
he drove Stephanie back to St. Mar s after she was stranded at 
the cas in Wo by the defendant with whom she'd had an 
argument, that Stephanie said she was leaving defendant, but 
texted back and forth, she 
Hossfeld left Stephanie 
DATED this 
th the defendant. 
day of -~-~---~-
STATE'S MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF ADMISSAB 
- 5 





day 2012, a true 
and copy of the foregoing 
was delivered/mailed, postage 
prepa , to: 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Maries, Idaho 
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DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecut Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245-2564 
Q ~ R .DEPUT~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
aintiff, ) 
) Case No. CRll-2053 
vs. ) 
) PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, ) SUPPORT OF ADMISSION 
) OF VICTIM'S STATEMENTS 
Defendant. ) AND 404(b) EVIDENCE 
COMES NOW DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE, Benewah County Prosecuting 
Attorney, representing the State of Idaho, and offers this ef 
in support of the admissibility of statements by the deceased 
vict Stephanie Comack. 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
The State has previously filed pre-trial motions requesting 
this Court enter a pre-trial order determining the admissibility 
of testimony of several witnesses as to statements made by 
Stephanie Comack December 201 
ir bedroom with the de 
contact gunshot wound to 
2011, res t in present case. 
pleaded to numerous bystanders, incl 
s the gun accidentally. 
Stephanie, le alone in 
,Joseph Herrera, suffered a 
died on December 2 5, 
The defendant a e 
police officers, that 
In the room was a 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ADMISS ON OF VICTIM'S s 
I and 404(b) EVIDENCE, 1 -
pistol, shell cas marijuana and a tamine pipe. A 
few hours ater the defendant was interviewed two of cers 
and the defendant told them he discharged the gun accidentally 
while he was checking to make sure it was unloaded. The 
defendant told the officers that just before the shooting he had 
smoked marijuana and that he and the victim had argued because 
it was Christmas Day and the victim wanted to spend time with 
her family. (The victim and defendant were in a bedroom in the 
defendant's parent's house where they had been staying.) The 
defendant minimized the extent of the argument and said the 
couple had a good relationship and did not have disputes beyond 
that of any average 
E.R. ician and coroner will testi that the wound 
that killed Stephanie Comack was a contact wound that was caused 
by a gun the muzzle of which was in contact with her forehead 
when it discharged. 
s brief concerns several tnesses who would testi if 
all , that t e Camack in the month before her death 
made statements to them about her troubled relationship with 
Jos 
mi 
Herrera during that time, and 
do and other non-hearsay 
r fears about what he 
dence of acts of the 
defendant. 
2. EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS AT ISSUE: 
Mult e witnesses would testify about 
of Stephanie Camack that would bear on 
time and her perception of her 
Joseph Herrera, and s credibility. 
s evidence falls into three main cat 
a) Statements Stephanie Comack 
de were repeatedly ng serious 
tha 
s statements 
state at the 
the defendant, 
ies, including: 
she and the 
icts or 
PLAINTIFF'S BRlEF IN SUPPORT OF ADMISSION OF V CTIM'S 
404 ( ) DENCE 
statements Stephanie Comack that the fendant was 
controlling her abi y to leave or talk to others about her 
relationship with the defendant, including: telling Eunice 
le pointing McEwen not tote about the defendant's violence 
her finger at her own head, telling Eunice McEwen, her parents 
and others that the defendant had broken her cellphone, and 
while Eunice is talking to Stephanie by phone and when Eunice 
can hear the defendant the background, Stephanie then telling 
Eunice McEwen, 'I have to go,' just before Eunice hears a sound 
like the cellphone breaking, statements by Stephanie Comack to 
several witnesses that she was afraid to leave Joseph Herrera 
because he repeatedly tened to kill himself if she did, and 
statements by Stephanie Comack to her parents and her sister, 
Katlyn Comack, that she would not leave de or stay with 
her family because the defendant was 'crazy' or 'psycho' or 
words to that effect, and in the case of Katlyn Comack because 
"he's crazy" and "he s where you live." 
b) The second category of statements Stephanie Comack 
are those 
defendant ta 
spe c vi ent acts of defendant, including 
Stephanie's cell phone from her, the defendant 
intentional y breaking her cell phone, point a gun at her 
head, banging her head on a car shifter, 
her or 'sapping her 
c) The 
I.R.E. 404 (b) 
is ars 
defendant was abus 





victim, including witnesses who will testify they saw texts on 
Stephanie's phone where the de threatened to 11 
himself, saw bruises on Stephanie's arms, heard the defendant 
verbally abuse St e in lie, obs le the 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ADMISSION OF VICTIM'S STATEMENTS 
and 404 (b) EVIDENCE, Pa / / ~ 
defendant would call St ie repeatedly in close repetition if 
Stephanie was away from defendant until she returned to him. 
3. ALL STATE?l1ENTS BY STEPHANIE CO:MACK ABOUT HER RELATIONSHIP 
WITH THE DEFENDANT ARE ADMISSABLE BECAUSE THEY ARE RELEVANT NON-
HEARSAY. 
a) Rel ----~-
Before any test is admissible it must be relevant by 
having a tendency o make the existence of any "fact that is of 
consequence" more or less probable. State v. 129 Idaho 
784 (Ct. App. 1997), cit 
App. 1989). 
State v. Hocher 115 Idaho 544 (Ct. 
The timate fact of consequence at issue here is whether, 
when the defendant caused a pistol muzzle to be placed against 
Stephanie Comack's forehead, 
quest 
he did so 
upon 
intentionally or 
accidentally. The hinges the defendant's 
credibility when he immediately and repeatedly claimed it was an 
accident and that he loved Stephanie and had a 
with her 
The evidence of defendant's C aim the 




been raised the defendant at the scene. I is so 
inext cab ertwined th the facts of this case the j 
cannot fairly de de the case wi dence. It 
is not an issue or defense remote y relevant i 
the defendant raises i . "A Jury is entitled to a full and 
complete description of the events s ng the ss of 
a crime 
fendant in 
ess of whether 
commission of 
v. Wallmuller 125 Idaho 196 (Ct. 
checks ss from oyer, 






ssible as part 
PLAINTI 'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ADMISSION OF VICTIM'S 
404(b) EVIDENCE, 4 
of e scheme by which defendant fo 
State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 105(1978) 
four checks) citing 
(large amounts of 
money found in possession of defendant admissible to prove 
murder.) 
Certai y someone who loves anothe and has a good 
relationship with them is less likely to intentional put a gun 
to their head, whether to terrorize them, or for any other 
reason. 
defendant 
Convincing others of such seems the very reason the 
d say such things. 
motive and intent, or the lack 
This case revolves around 
reof, something that was 
ately apparent even to the defendant. 
It cannot be credibly argued that the relationship between 
Stephanie Comack and the defendant, or her perception of it, 
does not bear on any fact of consequence in this case. The 
critical inquiry is whether defendant possessed any motive or 
intent to a to St e's head and thus the defendant's 
credibil y in claiming he lacked any such motive or intent, 
buttressed by his statement, ir a 
her and they had a good relationship. 
b) The Statements Are Not Hears 
Stephanie Comack's statements about 
was minor, loved 
lings toward, 
and relations with, the f endant are not hearsay because 
they do not depend upon their truth (her 
What matters is that she sa them. 
when she 
The fact said them. 
said these ings indicates her feelings about her relationship 
are very troubled. A relationship has at least two s or it 
is not, by def i tion, a relationship. 
relationship repeatedly makes s atements 
Where one party to a 
l Stephanie's, that 
relat has serious ems, the nature and extent of 
ch are wi n of the jury as is de , s 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF N SUPPORT OF ADMISSION OF VICTIM' 
404(b) EV DENCE 
lity cla otherwise and that ing a gun to the 
head of the declarant was an accident. 
On the facts of this case the victim's statements bearing 
negatively on her perception of her relationship th the 
defendant are admissible because they are relevant without 
regard to their truth, but in the fact that she said them at 
all. They should be admitted for the purpose of impeaching t 
defendant's prior statements and to establish motive and intent. 
They are non-hearsay for that limited purpose under I.R.E. 
801 (c). 
4. EVIDENCE OF STEPHANIE'S MENTAL STATE IS ADMISSABLE AS NON-
HEARSAY WHERE SUCH STATMENTS MAY PROVIDE MOTIVE. 
A im' s state of mind may also be a motive in itself. 
For example, if a declarant were to tell a witness, "the 
defendant knows saw him commit a rape," this statement would 
be relevant because it explains the defendant would have 
later 1 ed the declarant. See U.S. v. Tokars 
1 35 (11th i 19 9 6) and U. S. v. DeN ome, 9 5 4 
95 F. 3d 1520 
d 839, 846( nd 
r. 1993) (Statements by victim about suspicions about 
defendant's business relevant to show motive to kill victim.) 
Statements 
assert may be 
ssible to prove the truth of what they 
tted if the fact of the assertion 
made is in itself relevant irrespective of its truth. 
been 
State v. 
Ort 95 I 39 (1973). 
In the instant case t declarant's words and actions 
suggested to several people she wanted to leave fendant, 
was afraid cause defendant was 'ps 
bea ng upon Stephanie 
of her fears of de 





leaving, s dence of defendant's mot to continue to 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SU PORT OF ADMISSION OF VICTIM'S 
40 (b) - 6 
te ze the vict o not leaving. See U.S. v. 878 
F.2d 735, 738(3d Cir. 98 9) ( Statements that victim intended to 
leave defendant admissible as to motive to kill victim.) This 
sort of evidence is particularly relevant where there is no 
issue of identity, but only of defendant's ive and when there 
is evidence, as here, that after an argument, and as victim was 
prepa ng to leave, a gun in defendant's hand discharged while 
touching victim's forehead. 
Statements may be non-hearsay under 801(c) because they are 
not offered for their truth, but to show mental state of the 
victim in repeated efforts to leave defendant, coupled with fear 
of defendant, which ded motive for defendant to terro ze 
the victim. See, Tokars d., 93 F.2d at 1535-1536. Desire to 
scare the victim 
defendant to have 
o staying provides a motive for the 
entiona ly pointed a gun at Stephanie 
Comack. This is espec ally true where the defendant obviously 
knew the victim wanted to leave him as is shown by the 
defendant's threats if she did, including s de 
Even if deemed hearsay for other purposes, Stephanie 
Comack's out of court statements showing Stephanie contemplating 
leaving defendant, or temporarily leaving defendant, or 
returning to defendant out of fear or of sdeeds of the 
defendant, are not hearsay at all because they do not depend on 
Stephanie's credibili y for their probat value. are 
probative because show a mind contemplating leaving 
defendant, but being prevented fear of defendant. They show 
her mental state and her mental state provided a motive for 
defendant to ent onal a gun to her head to cont to 
scare her into not l or spea to others 
If assertion itself is re statement is admissible-
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ADMISSION OF VICTIM'S 
404(b) EVIDENCE Pa 7 - I 
irrespective of its truth. If the probative va comes not 
from credibility of the de a rant, but rather the fact the 
declarant said it, then it is not hearsay. See State v. Brooks, 
103 Idaho 892 (App. 1982). These statements are therefore 
admissible under 80l(c) as non-hearsay proof of motive. 
5. STATEMENTS SHOWING STEPHANIE COMA.CK' S FEAR OF THE DEFENDANT 
ARE ALSO ADMISSABLE HEARSAY UNDER I.R.E. 803(3). 
The general rule in Idaho about the admissibility of a 
victim's hearsay statements of fear is summarized in I.R.E. 
803 (3) and in State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 125, (Ct. App. 
1986). "A victim's out-of-court expression of fear may be used 
to show his or her state of mind, but not to prove the 
underlying facts upon which the fear is based. Those underl ng 
facts must be established 
128. 
other non-hearsay evidence." Id. at 
Certa ly the analysis does not end there. evidence 
must be relevant to be admitted. I.R.E. 402. An expression of 
fear that has no bearing on any fact of consequence in the 
action is therefore irrelevant and ssible under I.R.E. 
401. The Idaho Courts have clearly taken the position that a 
ctim's fear is relevant and ss e to prove motive, rebut 
a cla of accident, or a claim that the defendant and vict 
a good relat ship. State v. 129 Idaho 784, (Ct. 
App. 1997). Each of se issues of proof s present in s 
case and evidence bearing on them is relevant. 
To the extent 
statements are hears 
court concludes Stephanie Comack's 
are ssible ess under 
I.R.E. 803(3) where they bear her then existing metal 
In State v. Charboneau, 116 I 129 (1989) state. 
the court, au, accused of shooting his 
PLAINTIFF'S BR EF N SUPPORT OF ADMISS ON OF VICTIM' 
404(b) DENCE, - 8 
ed 
to 
death at her ranch, cla he did so in self-defense. The 
court ruled her statement, that she was a id because she did 
not know where defendant was, to be admissible stating 
summarily, "That testimony was admissible under I. R. E. 803, as 
evidence of her existing state of mind. Id., 116 Idaho at 143. 
Such evidence can only be admitted for a permissible 
purpose. In Rosencrantz the victim's sister testi ed that the 
vict "acted fearful of Rosencrantz-looking nervously at the 
street if a vehicle approached the house, acing a blanket over 
curtains on the front window, locking the door, avoiding people, 
and parking her car 'in different aces so it would not be so 
obvious.' Based on these observations the sister said Cathy was 
'afraid' of Rosencrantz." Ronsencrantz, Id., 110 Idaho at 127. 
Court relied upon two Idaho Cases for its reasoning in 
finding the evidence admissible. State v. 93 Idaho 
727 (1970), (evidence of fear admissible) and State v. Goodrich, 
97 Idaho 472 (1976), (evidence of fear not admissible a 
limit instruction. ) The stinction between those two cases 
is a imi ting instruction. "Goodrich s larly involved out-of-
court declarations made by a vict to an eventual witness. The 
victim expressed apprehension about the defendant, referring to 
several hosti e acts. The trial court admitted testimony 
concerning these statements, but gave no instruction rming 
the jury that the evidence be considered only to show the 
declarant' s state of mind, not the occurrence of hostile acts. 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new t 
directing that such an instruction be ven." Ronsencrantz, Id, 
110 Idaho at 127. 
dence was i 
of acts of the de 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
and 40 (b) DENCE 
The Ronsencrantz court 




but that s res a 
SUPPORT OF ADMISSION OF VICTIM'S 
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l ing instruction. Thus even the test of ce McEwen 
about the defendant putting a gun to the head of the vict 
mid-December is admissible to show that Stephanie Comack having 
said such shows her fear of the defendant, and her perception of 
their dysfunctional relationship, even though it is not 
admissible to prove defendant actual 
Stephanie's head at that time under 803(3). 
did put a gun to 
The Ronsencrantz court went on to succinctly describe the 
state of the law in Idaho, "The rules now treat testimony 
regarding a victim's expression of fear as hearsay, but they 
grant it l ted admissibility under an exception for "existing 
mental, emotiona, or physical condit " so long as tis not 
offered 'to prove the fact remembered or believed' by the 
declarant." Ronsencrantz Id at 128, citing .R.E. 803(3). 
Two Idaho cases note that the admissibility of such 
evidence must be analyzed in relation to the issues apparent in 
the case and while such dence is particularly troubling in 
cases where the identity of the kille is at issue, see U.S. v. 
290 U.S. 96(1933), a statement of fear a deceased 
victim is particularly relevant and admissible where it involves 
a defense of accident; 
477 (1976) Fn. 7, citing 
State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 
e v. Lew 44 P2d 942(1968 Cal.) and 
State v. 29 Idaho 784, 795 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing United 
States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 767(D.C. Cir. 1973)) or to dispe 
the assertion that the victim and accused had a good 
95 relationship, cit United States v. Tokars 
F.3d 1520, 1535 (11th Cir. 1996). 
In the Brown case Judge authored one of the more 
discussions of ss l ty of ay statements 
of fear in de cases. (A copy of wh ch is attached for 
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convenience of the court and counsel.) Despite being generally 
critical of the admission of such evidence he wrote, "The courts 
have developed three rather well-defined categories in 
need for such statements overcomes almost any 
ch the 
possible 
prejudice. The most common oft se involves defendant's claim 
of self-defense ... that the deceased committed s cide ... [ or J a 
claim of accidental death ... In such cases the deceased' s 
statement of ar ... of defendant ... are relevant that they 
tend to rebut this defense." Brown, Supra, 490 F.2d at 767. "n 
each instance, the state of mind of the ctim was integral in 
understanding a significant issue in the case." Gray, Id. 129 
Idaho at 795. 
Judge McKinnon, however, cites v. U.S. 290 U.S. 96 
(1933) to stand for the proposition that hearsay statements of a 
homicide ctim may be too unfai prejudicial for admission 
even where poss le suicide is raised as a defense. Brown, 450 
F.2d at 767, fn 35. rd is a watershed case about the 
admissibility of a victim's statements homicide cases. But 
rd is strictly a dying declaration case conce --~--
victim's statement that 'my husband poisoned me.' Justice 
Cardozo made it pa lly clear to the government in that case 
that the reason their evidence was incompetent was because the 
government offered it as a dying declaration (which it turned 
out it was not) "to be weighed as if a like statement been 
made upon the stand ... " and did not of fer it as evidence of 
mental condition th an appropriate limiting truction. 
Shepard 290 U.S., 96, 103. 
rd s also noteworthy because it revolves around the -~----
identity of the 
mot or claim of 
ller who soned Mrs. Shepard) not the 
the court's analysis hinges on 
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that fact. The issues in the present case do not include who 
shot Stephanie, but only mot intent, and absence of mistake 
or accident; exactly the kind of case for which admiss li of 
the subject evidence is prescribed not only by Cardozo, but also 
by I.R.E. 803(3) and 404(b) and the Idaho Supreme Court. 
6. ALL OF STEPHANIE COMACK'S STATEMENTS SHOWING FEAR OF 
DEFENDANT ARE ADMISSABLE HEARSAY FOR ALL PURPOSES PURSUANT TO 
I.R.E. 803(24) and 804(6). 
The State has previously given notice of its intent to seek 
the introduction of all the subject hearsay statements of 
Stephanie Camack under the catch-all exceptions I. R. E. 803 ( 24) 
and 804 ( 6) . Since the two cat rules are functional 
equivalents in this case they will be addressed as one. 
Such evidence is admissible if, thin the scretion of 
the court, it is found to have equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness to be material, to be more 
probative on the point than any other evidence reasonably 
available, and if the general purposes of the rules of evidence 
interest of justice are st served 
803(24) and 804(6), and see, State v. Horsl 
ssion. I.R.E. 
117 Idaho 920, 
927 (1991). s court has broad discretion or net to 
allow the introduction of hearsay evidence, State v. Slater, 136 
2 93, ( Ct. App. 2 00 ) , which discretion will not 
dis 
145 I 
on appeal absent a 
925 (2008). 
of se, State v. Mubita, 
The trustworthiness analysis required for admission of 
hearsay statements requires that t court look at other 
evidence to e whether circums ances tend to 
statements. State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 I 
a) Materialit . 
908 (2003). 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF N SUPPORT OF ADMISS ON OF VICTIM'S 
404(b) EVIDENCE, Page - 12 -
e 
On the facts and for the reasons scussed above, it is 
material whether or not a victim has been physically, verbally 
and mentally abused, or expresses fear of, dislike of, or desire 
to leave the defendant, where defendant claims he accidentally 
shot the victim as she was preparing to leave after they argued. 
b) The Statement Is More Probative Than Other Available 
Evidence. 
The victim's relationship the defendant was imate 
and secretive. The State is unaware of other witnesses to the 
facts or feelings which Stephanie Comack described to the 
friends and fami members who would testi about the nature of 
Stephanie and the defendant's relationship. Even to these 
sses she gave only very limited statements about it. 
The only direct witnesses to the quality of this 
relationship are the defendant, who has claimed it was typical, 
the victim who is unavai able because was the 
and Jennifer Hickson, a neighbor who heard the 
verbally abuse Stephane Comack in ic. 





the de ch the ctirn told two 
The subject witnesses, who would tell the jury 
what Stephanie Comack told them, are more probative on whether 
Stephanie was in fact s ected to ical abuse and rect 
other s of being kil the defendant 
reasonably available evidence. 
c) The Evidence Has Circumstantial Guarantees Of 
Trustworthiness Sufficient For Admission. 
I.R.E. 803 (24) and 804 (6) are also ical 
circumstantia s 
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justice be se These requirements are so closely 
intertwined as to be considered together. 
In Idaho v. Wri 497 U.S. 805 (1990), the Supreme Court 
concluded that cause the catch-all exceptions were not "firmly 
rooted" that evidence admitted 









violative of the Sixth A.rnendment right to con£ ront witnesses. 
s effective modified the catch-all exception requirement of 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to rticularized 
guarantees. The Wright court noted these guarantees may 
include, spontaneity, consistent repetition, mental state of 
declarant, and ack of motive to fabricate, but stated this ist 
is not exclusive. Wri Id, 497 U.S. at 821-822. 
Such statements should be admitted only upon a showing of 
absolute necessity, where there lS a high degree of 
trustworthiness and an absence of motive to falsi State v. 
McQuay, 127 Idaho 54(1995). The court need look at 
corroborative evidence to determine reliability. State V. 
Giles, 115 Idaho 984 ( 989) Cat all hearsay is admiss e 
where the circumstances imply a high degree of veracity, State 
v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 I 908 (2003). 
The evidence to be offered upon hearing 
include that Stephanie Comack had repeatedly s 
olent and ional relati 





told father, mother and sister she not 
s with them 
defendant was 'ps 
Katlyn, that the 
asked them not to intervene because the 
' or 'crazy' and in the case of her sister, 
fendant is crazy and "knows where you live." 
Eunice McEwen 11 be y tness to whom 
confided C c details of ical se, but 
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e Camack 
11 testify 
that Stephanie asked ce not to tell anyone and gestured that 
defendant would shoot Stephanie if ce did. Jennifer Hickson 
will testify that she was present when the defendant cursed at, 
insulted and degraded Stephanie Comack in public. 
James, Susie, Katlyn, Jack Comack and f fany Reeves saw 
bruises on Stephanie Comack' s arms and each will testi she 
would not answer when asked if defendant did it. Six witnesses 
will testify that Stephanie sa to them she was afra to leave 
defendant because he repeatedly said he would kill himself if 
she did, and at least two of them saw messages on the victim's 
cell phone, from defendant, where defendant said he would kill 
himse f if she left. 
Upon these facts it will be evident that the declarant had 
no reason to fabricate the subject statements, but that she in 
fact demonstrated great secrecy, zation of defendant's 
sdeeds and desire that no one take act 
relationship with defendant out of fear of him, 
to end r 
though Katlyn 
Comack will testify that in mid-December Stephanie Comack stated 
that Stephanie hated the defendant" oo much to care anymore." 
The statements are remarkably consistent and demonstrate a 
steady rn of domestic abuse, threats and manipulative 
behavior by the defendant. All of the statements and behavior 
of the defendant are consistent th a motive by the defendant 
to Stephanie with h and not ell others their 
relationship. 
The statements were so spontaneous that when asked speci c 
quest s defendant's abuse of her, Stephanie Cornack 
not answer at all. s further demonstrates reliabili 
cate. Stephanie 
of 
asked declarants lack of motive to 
others not to reveal her secrets or ervene, showing a lack of 
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motive to fabricate. The evidence shows the victim not taking 
opportunities to embellish or 'tel on' the defendant even when 
questioned. Certainly if the declarant was looking for 
opportunity to make up bad stories about the defendant, being 
asked "did he do that to you" was such an opportunity. Yet 
Stephanie would not respond to such queries. The fact that she 
only specifically confided in her close friend, Eunice McEwen 
(who had 1 tle power to intervene) and asked Eunice not tote l 
anyone, is further indication that the statements are 
spontaneous and trustworthy; a secret disclosure to a trusted 
confidant, made spontaneously while the victim's head still hurt 
from a blow from defendant. 
d) The Statements Are Admissable For Their Truth. 
All the subject hearsay statements 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 
demonstrate 
They bear the 
ring of truth in the circumstances of their making, their 
consistency, the reluctance of the speaker and the lack of 
motive to fabricate. They should all be admitted not just to 
show the mental state of Stephanie Comack, but as proof of the 
defendant's past conduct relating to the defendant's 
relationship with Stephanie, and are thus relevant to why the 
defendant pointed a gun at Stephanie's head. 
The statements at issue are spontaneous, genuine, 
consistent with each other and the rcumstances. Stephanie can 
be heard in court by no other means than through witnesses and 
what she said is critical and essential for a jury to give 
context to, and to weigh the veracity of, the portrayal of their 
relationship by the defendant and the truth of his immediate 
claim that he shot her by accident. 
without limitation. 
They should be admitted 
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7. THE SUBJECT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSABLE PURSUANT TO I.R.E. 404(b). 
Much of the subject evidence, particularly testimony 
tending to show the defendant threatened suicide, pointed a gun 
at the victim's head, hit her head on a car shifter, choked r, 
hit her, broke her cell phone, verbally abused r in public and 
took the cell phone of other girlfriends, is evidence of bad 
acts or crimes not charged herein. 
In addition to Stephanie Comack's statements above the 
State offers other non-hearsay evidence under 404 (b) including 
the testimony of Jennifer Hickson that she heard the defendant 
verbally abuse Stephanie in public a few days before Stephanie 
was killed, and several witnesses who saw defendant's texts to 
the victim where defendant said he would kill himself if she 
left him. The State will also offer the testimony of Kim Smith 
and Kianna Appell that when they wanted to leave defendant he 
was suspicious of them and would take their cell phones away 
from them or keep them against their will from leaving. 
I.R.E. 404 (b) nonetheless permits the introduction of such 
evidence not for purposes of showing a defendant had a related 
propensity, but to prove certain states of mind that are 
prominent questions in this case. Those proper purposes are: 
presence of an intent or motive for defendant to put a gun to 
Stephanie Comack's head; to rebut any claim, inference or 
supposition defendant pointed the gun at Stephanie by 
accident; and the presence of a common scheme or plan by 
defendant to terrorize, threaten, control or intimidate the 
victim, demonstrated by the subject evidence, and relevant to 
whether defendant was acting within that common scheme when he 
put a gun to Stephanie's head on December 25. Such evidence is 
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admissible at trial, subject to a jury 
use to these proper purposes. 
truction limiting its 
8. THE DEFENDANT HAS FORFEITED ANY OBJECTION TO THE SUBJECT 
EVIDENCE BY MAKING THE DEFENDANT UNAVAILABLE AS A WITNESS. 
I.R.E. 804(5) provides that where a defendant causes a 
witness to be unavailable by wrong doing intended to make that 
witness unavailable, hearsay evidence from that witness is 
admissible. 
preponderance. 
The burden of proof upon the government is a 
See, _Imwinkelreid, Courtroom Criminal Evidence, 
rd Ed., 1998, Sec. 1315 at P. 469 citing the Advisory 
Committee under the federal rules; "The usual Rule 104 (a) 
preponderance of the evidence standard has been adopted." 
This misconduct need not be specifically directed toward 
testimony regarding the event for which the defendant is on 
t al. Imwinkelreid, Id., citing United States v. Mil r, 116 
F.3d 641, 667 (2d Cir. 1997) and United States v. 186 
F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999). But may include a pattern of 
misconduct by a defendant intended to prevent or deter a witness 
from speaking about defendant's misconduct generally or that a 
reasonable person would likely know would cause the object 
person not to so speak. 
In this case the pattern of menacing, threatening, 'psycho' 
conduct by the defendant can be well established. Due to the 
circumstances of it there is little question this conduct had 
two interrelated goals; to keep Stephanie from leaving 
defendant, and to keep Stephanie from telling others about 
,defendant's treatment of Stephanie. 
Defendant's motive in keeping St e quiet, under 
control and with the defendant is exactly the motive alleged by 
the State to have caused her death; Stephanie wanted to leave, 
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they argued, the defendant pointed a gun at her head to 
terrorize her again, and the gun discharged. 
This is exactly the kind of circumstance for which 8 0 4 ( 5) 
was adopted. It is contrary to a fundamental concept of 
fairness or justice that a defendant could make violent threats, 
menace, and abuse a person, to keep her quiet and under his 
control, then shoot her in the head, claim it was an accident, 
and use the rules of evidence to finally silence the victim 
forever about the very course of conduct which precipitated 
putting the gun to her head. 
The interests of justice and I .R.E. 804 (5) do not allow 
such. The defendant engaged in a pattern of threatening conduct 
intended to silence Stephanie Comack. Perhaps his last threat 
did silence her. He cannot now fairly object to what Stephanie 
said about that pattern of threatening conduct in the last month 
of her life. The jury rightly should consider what she said 
when it considers, as it certainly will, what the defendant said 
about their relationship and his intent. 
The defendant forfeited any objections to the hearsay of 
declarant Stephanie Comack. 
9. THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUBSTANIALLY 
OUTWEIGHTED BY THE DANGER OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE. 
I.R. E. 403 provides that evidence may be excluded if 
" ... probative value is substantiall outwei 
unfair prejudice. 
by the danger of 
Unfair prejudice is " ... the danger of jury misuse of 
evidence." United States v. Brown, 490 Fed.2d 758,764(D.C. Cir. 
1973). "It should be emphasized that in the great majority of 
cases the limiting instruction is probably sufficient to so 
minimize the dangers of jury misuse as to prevent most serious 
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prejudice. ago it was decided that such state of mind 
evidence should generally be admissible for a limited purpose." 
Brown, Id., at 764. 
The Brown case goes on to discuss cases where "courts have 
expressly recognized that the limiting instruction is inadequate 
where the prejudicial dangers far outweigh a tenuous relevance 
to the issues presented in the case. Id., at 765. 
Such is not the case here. There is not an issue of 
identification of the actor in this case. The defendant 
admittedly shot Stephanie Camack. The question is why did the 
defendant point a gun at Stephanie; accidently or intentionally. 
The permitted purposes of 403(3), 404(b) and the subject 
evidence at issue are all focused on this issue. The jury 
should and will use the evidence for its permissible purpose-in 
deciding the defendant's motive and intent in manipulating the 
gun. 
The only logically possible juror misuse of the evidence is 
using it for propensity purposes, i.e., the defendant had a 
propensity for pointing a gun at Stephanie, therefore defendant 
did so again. 
This is not a risk in this case because we already know, as 
will the jury, that the defendant did point a gun at Stephanie. 
The only issue is; what was his motive and intent in doing so-
the determination of which is exact the permitted purpose. 
Juror misuse being logically impossible there is no risk of 
"unfair prejudice" within the meaning of I.R.E. 403. 
Certainly the evidence is prejudicial-that is because is 
so relevant. Evidence is not inadmissible because it is highly 
relevant, but exactly the opposite. The question is one of 
relative relevance. See, Brown Id. at 764. Here the evidence is 
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extreme relevant to motive, intent and absence of accident. 
1 of these are permissible purposes. There being no potential 
for misuse of the evidence at all on the facts of this case the 
evidence of defendant's prior bad acts and victim's fear of him 
is admissible under I.R.E. 403. 
10. CONCLUSION. 
The hearsay statements of Stephanie Comack and other 
evidence bearing on her relationship with the defendant are 
admissible, whether as non-hearsay, hearsay bearing on her 
mental state, as evidence of common scheme, intent, motive and 
absence of mistake or accident, under the catch-all exceptions, 
because defendant has forfeited any objection thereto, and 
because it is not unfairly 
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the other hand, Mr. Wentworth in his testimony denied that he had engaged in any homosexual acts with John. In this :;ituation I think it wa,; permissible for government counsel, on cross examina-tion of Tlfr. Wentworth, to put questions that reflected or followed the pattern of the specific and detailed allegations made by John. Since John had testified that he and Mr. Wentworth had engaged in certain specific types of homosexual acts it was reasonable for government counsel to ask Mr. Wentworth whether he had engaged in such activity with anyone. 
(2) In a security hearing for a man holding a Secret clearance* and boast-ing of his homosexuality I cannot say that the information disclosed about Mr. Wentworth was irrelevant or that the effort to develop the facts on cross ex-amination was an unreasonable or un-warranted encroachment on Mr. Went-worth's privacy. Since homosexuality was relevant to eligibility for clearance, it was important to determine the exact meaning of the term homosexual as Mr. Wentworth applied it to himself. Were his homosexual activities carried on dis-creetly in private, limited to one part-ner, or were they open, promiscuous and aggressive? Were they infrequent and sporadic, or otherwise? In short, what kind of a homosexual was he? He could not foreclose interrogation on this issue by stipulating in general terms that he was a homosexual. 
I agree that some of the questions put to Mr. Wentworth were unpleasant and indelicate. They would not have been acceptable in a drawing room, but hav-ing announced to the world that he was proud to be a homosexual Mr. Went-worth should not have been offended or ohocked by questions seeking to deter-mine precisely what he meant by his de-scription of himself. And as I have said, similar questions had been put to the witness John by Mr. Wentworth's counsel. 
I would reverse all three judgments. 
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Roland W. BROWN, Appellant. 
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Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Aubrey E. Robin-:;on, J ., of first-degree murder and carrying a dangerous weapon, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Mac-Kinnon, Circuit Judge, held that where the defense presented no claim of self-defense, suicide, accidental death or any other possible issue that would justify an inquiry into the victim's state of mind, the court committed prejudicial error in allowing the victim's wife to testify that he was frightened that he might be killed by defendant; it further held, however, that where the charge of carrying- a dangerous weapon was ade-quately proved by other evidence, the ad-mission of the victim's wife's testimony did not require reversal of the convic-tion on that count. 
Murder conviction reversed; convic-tion for carrying dangerous weapon af-firmed. 
1. Criminal Law e=,573 
Where there were no long stretches of docket inactivity between defendant's arrest for first-degree murder and carrying dangerous weapon and his con-viction on those charges, most delay that could be attributed to Government was only three or four weeks due to unusual circumstances, and there was no sub-stantial prejudice to defendant caused by lapse of time, defendant was not de-nied speedy trial by fact that he was 
• Mr. Gayer aud J\Ir. Ulrich also held clearances for access to secret material. 
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C'ite ns ·l1lil F.2d 75S (197:l) 
tried six and one-half months after ar- 6. Criminal Law <S:=>4
19(1) 
rest. Where state of 
mind testimony is 
2. Criminal Law (l:::,625 
Where three psychiatrists testifying 
as government experts unanimously 
agreed that defendant was mentally re-
sponsible, one of defense experts testi-
fied defendant was sexual deviate but 
did not relate this to crime, other testi-
fied that defendant had been psychotic 
but did not express any opinion as to his 
condition at time of crime, and third de-
fense expert only said that defendant 
was "schizoid" at that time, jury could 
conclude that defendant was not suffer-
ing from any mental disease or defect at 
time of trial. 
3. Homicide e=>294(1) 
In prosecution for first-degree mur-
der and carrying dangerous weapon, 
jury instruction on sanity which stated 
that defendant would be immediately 
committed for mental examina tion,,_after 
which there would be another judicial 
determination as to ,vhether he was suf-
fering from mental illness at that time 
and whether he was dangerous to him-
self and others, and that if defendant 
was found to be suffering from mental 
illness but was not dangerous to himself 
or others he would be released from hos-
pital, was proper. 
4. Criminal Law e:::,419(1) 
State of mind exception to hearsay 
rule allows admission of extrajudicial 
statements to show state of mind of de-
clarant at that time if that is at issue in 
case or· to show future intent of declar-
ant to perform act if occurrence of that 
act is at issue, and statement may either 
consist of direct or circumstantial evi-
dence . 
5. Criminal Law <&=>673(2) 
Where hearsay statement circum-
stantially probative of declarant's state 
of mind involves extraneous factual ele-
ments, limiting instruction must always 
accompany its introduction into issue to 
insure that such factual matters are con-
sidered solely on issue of declarant's 
mental state and not for truth of mat-
ters contained therein. 
sought to be used in attempt to demon-
strate truth of underlying facts rather 
than solely to show state of mind, evi-
dence must be excluded. 
7. Criminal Law e,::>338(7) 
Some evidence, while bearing some 
logical relevance to case, may in discre-
tion of judge nevertheless be excluded 
where its probative value is substantial-
ly outweighed by danger of unfair prej-
udice, confusion or delay. 
8. Criminal Law G=ll69.I(9) 
In judging degree of prejudice re-
sulting from introduction of hearsay tes-
timony to show state of mind of declar-
ant, single most important consideration 
may be whether statement, if used by 
jury for improper purpose, is virtually 
dispositive of case and extremely damag-
ing to position taken by opponent of ad-
mission of evidence. 
9. Criminal Law e,::>,U5(1) 
Victim's extraj udicial declarations 
of fear of defendant are admissible un-
der state of mind exception to hearsay 
rule ·with limiting instruction only if 
there is manifest need of such evidence, 
i. e., if it is relevant to material issue in 
case, and where there is substantial like-
lihood of prejudice to defendant's case 
in admission of such testimony, it is in-
admissible if it bears only remote or ar-
tificial relationship to legal or factual 
issues raised in case. West's Ann.Cal. 
Evid.Code, §§ 1200, 1250, 1252. 
10. Criminal Law e=>415(1) 
In order for extrajudicial hearsay 
declarations to be relevant and therefore 
admissible to show state of mind of vic-
tim, victim's state of mind must be rele-
vant to some material issue in case such 
as that of self-defense, suicide or acci-
dental death and statement itself must 
be probative on that question of victim's 
state of mind. 
11. Criminal Law e=,415(1) 
In determining whether hearsay ev-
idence of victim's state of mind should 
be excluded as being too prejudicial to 
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defendant's case, factors to be consid-
ered include whether statements in ques-
tion recount past acts of defendant, 
whether statements bear proximately on 
vital issues of case, whether statements 
are otherwise corroborated by evidence, 
and whether statements are so inflam-
matory as to create substantial danger 
of undue prejudice. 
12. Homicide <.§;::::>169(8), 338(2) 
Where, in prosecution of defendant 
for first-degree murder and carrying 
dangerous weapon, there was no claim of 
self-defense, suicide, accidental death or 
any other plausible issue that would jus-
tify inquiry into victim's state of mind, 
court committed prejudicial error in ad-
mitting testimony by victim's wife that 
victim was frightened that he might be 
killed by defendant. 
13. Criminal Law e=ous6.1 
Where case against defendant on 
charges of carrying dangerous weapon 
was sufficiently proved by other inde-
pendent evidence, fact that defendant's 
conviction in same trial on charges of 
first-degree murder was reversed be-
cause of error in trial court in admitting 
testimony by victim's \Vife that Yictim 
was afraid of being killed by defendant 
did not require reversal of conviction on 
weapons charge. b.C.C.E. § 22-3204. 
Walter R. Choroszej, Washington, D. 
C. (appointed by this court) for appel-
lant. 
John C. Lenahan, Asst. U. S. Atty., 
with whom Harold H. Titus, Jr., U. S. 
Atty., John A. Terry, Theodore Wiese-
man, and John F. Evans, Asst. U. S. 
Attys., were on the brief, for appellee. 
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and 
WRIGHT and MacKINNON, Circuit 
Judges. 
MacKINNON, Circuit Judge : 
Appellant was charged in a four-count 
indictment on September 9, l %9, with 
I . I>yson (who u<lmitte<I he hnrl ree
cntl.1• in-
jectc,1 hitnRclf with nnrcotiex) testified
 that 
he hcurd appellant arguing with the v
it-tim, 
first degree murder and with carrying a 
dangerous weapon . On October 6 and 9, 
1969, the trial court heard and denied 
appellant's motion to dismiss the indict-
ment for lack of a speedy trial. There-
after, on October 13, a jury trial com-
menced, and on October 24 appellant was 
found guilty of ( 1) second-degree mur-
der and (2) carrying a dangerous weap-
on (D.C.Code § 22-3204). On November 
12 the trial court granted appellant's 
motion for a mental examination, and on 
November 14 it ordered appellant's com-
mitment to Saint Elizabeths Hospital. 
On May 25, 1971, the court ordered a 
separate trial to determine appellant's 
mental responsibility for the crimes 
committed. Following a jury trial on 
September 14-22, appellant was found to 
be mentally. responsible for both offens-
es. On December 14, 1971, the court 
heard and denied appellant's motion for 
judgment of acquittal notwithstanding 
the verdict or, in the alternative, for a 
n~w trial; and on the same date appel-
lant was sentenced to (1) ten years to 
life imprisonment on the murder count 
and (2) two to ten years' imprisonment 
for carrying a dangerous weapon, the 
sentences to run concurrently. This ap-
peal followed. 
Under the Government's theory of the 
case, the victim, Parks, was a link in ap-
pellant's drug distribution network, ped-
dling his merchandise on consignment 
from appellant. Upon falling into ar-
rears in turning over to the appellant 
the money ree:ei 1·ed from the drug sales, 
Parks was "disciplined" in traditional 
gangland fashion . 
The case for the prosecution consisted 
principally of the testimony of another 
of appellant Brown's "outlets," one Dy-
son, who placed Brown at the scene of 
the crime and related a number of 
highly inctiminating surrounding cir-
cumstances. 1 Other witnesses corrob-
then hear<! a shot, xaw l'nrks' hody
 fall 
down lhe stairn and x11lixe,1uently saw 
uppel· 
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orated the basic pattern of Brown's nar- the issues argued by appellant since 
cotics operations and "disciplinary" these alleged errors would be obviated 
methods as well as chronicling a variety by a new trial. However, since the 
of threa ts uttered by appellant against speedy trial claim and the alleged de-
Parks and others. fects in the separate trial on menta l re-
The defense sought to impeach Dy- sponsibility would recur in a new trial, 
son's credibility and also placed in issue we deal with them only very briefly here 
the identity of the murderer by raising since we find these claims to be without 
an alibi defense. The government ap- merit. There simply was no substantial 
parently was successful in rebutting the prejudicial delay attributable to the gov-
alibi since the jury found Brown guilty ernment in this case, and we agree with 
of second-degree murder.2 the trial jedge's ruling in this regard. 
[1-3 ] Appellant raises a wide array 
of issues. One issue, which we discuss 
at some length, is an evidentiary issue 
involving the improper admission of cer-
tain highly prejudicial hearsay testimo-
ny. Since we reverse on this narrow 
ground alone, we do not reach most of 
what "looked like a .45 auto-
matic·." Tr. 175-76; Brief for Appellee at 
6-7. 
2. Thereafter appellant was determined men-
tally responsible for his crimes in a su bse-
quent trial on this is~ue. Appellant raises 
certain objections as to this insanity trial 
with which we briefly deal, n. 4 infra. 
3. Appellant was arres ted on March 25, 1969, 
an,] his trial began on October 13, 1969, 61h 
months later. Until July 31, the case pro-
ceeded through the routine initial stages of a 
prosecution, including a preliminary hearing 
on May 12, the filing of a n original indict-
ment on :\fay 19, autl arraignment on Ma.v 
29. On July 31 appella nt's counsel and the 
prosecutor then assigued to the case agreed 
to a trial date of September 1G (Tr. ] 2-13) . 
In the interim, however, the original prose-
cutor resigned from the United States At-
torney's Office, and this case was trans-
ferred to a new prosecutor who, after appel-
lant was reindicted on September 9 (due to 
an error in the first indictment), requested 
the court on September 11 to continue the 
trial to September 29 to give him an oppor-
tunit.v to prepare (October 9, 1969, Tr. 13, 
17, 2G). On September 16 a11pe!lant was ar-
raigned on the new indictment, and on Sep-
tember 29 the court sua s pontc continnctl 
the trial to October 13 because of a poten-
tial confliet with a spcdal calendar cull the 
following week during which time the Dis-
trict Court in executive session J,nd or,lerctl 
that no trials woulcl he hcl,l. 
It is obvious that these facts do not raise 
a s11eedy trial issue. There were 110 Joni: 
stretches of docket inactivity and the most 
delay that could he attributed to the Gove rn-
490 F.2 d- 4Bl/2 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 
2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 Wl72) _:i As to the 
separate trial on mental responsibility, 
there is no question that this was con-
ducted without prejudicial error and 
that the verdict is amply supported by 
the evidence.4 
mcnt was only 3 or 4 weeks due to unusual 
circumstances. Moreover we perceive no 
substantial 11rejud ice to the appellant caused 
by the lapse of time from arrest to trial. 
4. .~ppellant r:outeml~ that the eYitlence was 
insufficient to establish that he was in fact 
not suffering from any mental disease or de-
fect at the time of the trial. However, 
three psychiatrists, testifying as Government 
experts, unanimously agreed he was mentally 
responsible. Of the defense experts, one 
testified he was a sexual deviate but did not 
relate this to the crime. One testified that 
in 1970 he was psychotic but did not express 
an,· opinion as to the time of the crime, and 
only one sa id he "·as "schizoid" at that time. 
On thi s ev id ence a jury could rightly decide 
he ll'as responsible. 
The instru ction on in~ani ty was al so ques-
tioned because the judge stated that 31Jpel-
lnnt would be immedia tely committed for a 
mental examination, a fter which there would 
be another judicial determination as to 
whether he was suffering from a mental ill -
ness at that time and whether he was dan-
gerous to himself or others. The Court 
acltled that if he was found to be suffering 
from a mental illness but was not dangerous 
to himself or others he would he release,! 
from the hos11ital. Tr. 803. '!'his is an en-
tirely ac,·nrate statement of the law at the 
time of the trial. Bolton v. Harris, 130 U. 
:-;.App.D.C. l, 3!lfi l!'.2,J (H2 (HJGS). There 
is no violation of Lyles v. United States, 103 
U.:--.App.D.C. 22, 2ri,1 F .2d 725 (1957), cert. 
denied, a;;G tJ.S. !lGl, 78 S.Ct. D97, 2 L .Ed.2d 
lOG'i (1!Jil8) , ns mo,lifie,l hy Uolto11. Under 
these drcnnistanccs appellant's contention in 
this regard is without merit. 
·- ~---------·----·----· _._,. __ ........_ _________ __ ··-
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The evidentiary question upon which 
we focus our attention involves certain 
testimony elicited by the prosecution 
from the victim's wife. The government 
made a proffer that l\frs. Parks would 
testify to the effect that Mr. Parks had 
told her prior to his death that he was 
frightened that he would be murdered 
by appellant, Roland Brown. Defense 
counsel objected to this as hearsay, and 
the prosecution sought to justify it un-
der the state of mind exception to the 
hearsay rule as somehow explaining the 
deceased's actions around the time of 
death.5 The government realized that 
the testimony could not be considered as 
probati\-e of the fact that Brown was 
the killer and even offered to delete the 
reference to Brown, leaving only the 
statement that Parks was afraid of 
being killed by someone. The trial 
court, however, refused to allow the 
deletion, being under the impression 
that this would have been improper.6 
The trial cour't also denied defense coun-
sel's request for a limiting instruction at 
the time of the testimony 7 but did give 
the requested instruction at the close of 
the trial along with all the other 
charges. 
The testimony that was finally elicit-
ed, and objected to, not only included the 
name of the defendant but dramatically 
emphasized it: 
Q: You mentioned, Mrs. Parks, 
that he was frightened. What was he 
frightened of? 
A: Frightened that he may be 
killed. 
Q: And who did he say he was 
frightened was going to kill him? 
A: Mr. Roland Brown. 
MR. HOUCK: No further questions. 
Tr. 451 
5. Tr. 327-28 (Set out at length at n. 83 in-
fra). 
6. Tr. 333-34. See notes 72, W-80, 84 infra 
& accompuuying text. 
7. A limiting inst ruction at the time of th e 
testimo11.Y wonl<I lmve hecn 1ircfcrable. Sec 
text accomp::inying notes 7G-78 infra. 
Ultimately at the end of the trial, the 
judge did give an instruction on the per-
missible scope of the jury's considera-
tion of the above testimony: 
You have heard testimony in the 
course of this trial from Mrs. Thelma 
Parks that her husband, the deceased, 
Ricardo Parks, was afraid that he was 
going to be killed by Roland W. 
Brown. You ladies and gentlemen of 
the jury are instructed that this testi-
mony is to be considered by you in 
connection with evaluating the state 
of mind of Ricardo Parks and its ef-
fect, if any, on his, Ricardo Parks' 
subsequent conduct. 
You are not to consider this testi-
mony to evaluate the state of mind or 
the conduct of the defendant, Roland 
W. Brown, nor infer nor conclude that 
the defendant inflicted injuries upon 
Ricardo Parks from which he died 
solely from this testimony.s 
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
[ 4-6] Briefly stated, the state of 
mind exception to the hearsay rule al-
lows the admission of extrajudicial 
statementg to show the state of mind of 
the declarant at that time if that is at 
issue in the case. See Proposed Rules of 
Evidence for the United States Courts, 
Rule 803(3) (1973); note 55 infra. It 
also allows such statements to show a 
future intent of the declarant to per-
form an act if the occurrence of that act 
is at issue. l\iutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill-
mon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L. 
Ed. 706 (1892). In showing the declar-
ant's state of mind the statements may 
either consist of direct or circumstantial 
evidence. Thus the statement "X is no 
good" circumstantially indicates the de-
clarant's state of mind toward X and, 
8. 'l'r. 1174- 75. The instruction is correct in 
all respects except one. The wor<I "solely" 
in the last line implies that the evidence can 
ue <:ollsi<lered as somewhat reflecting on 
Hrown's guilt. This is in conflict with the 
firRt part of this paragraph in the instruc· 
tion allll is, as will he further explained in· 
fra, erroneous to the extent that it allows 
sui,h inference. 
he trial, the 
on the per-
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where that mental state is a material is- it operates in this manner: A statem
ent 
· sue in the case, such statement would be wh ich would be pure hearsay as to
 the 
admissible with a limiting instruction. truth of the matters alleged is not m
ade 
Technically it is not even hearsay since inadmissible thereby if introd11ced so
lely 
it is not being admitted for the truth of to show the declarant 's state of m
ind 
the matter alleged. We do not care and if accompanied by a limiting 
in-
whether X is in fact "no good" but only struction. This represents a basic pol
icy 
,vhether the declarant disliked him. judgment that the possibility of mis
use 
However direct statements are also ad- of the evidence for the impermissi
ble 
mitted. Thus the statement "I hate X" purpose, when min imized by a limit
ing 
is direct evidence of the declarant's instruction, is a risk worth chanc
ing 
state of mind and, since it is being in- when compared to the harms that wo
uld 
troduced for the truth of the matter al- likely result from the total exclusion
 of 
leged, must be within some exception to valuable relevant evidence. Yet recog
ni-
the hearsay rule in order to be admissi- tion of the limited effectiveness of 
the 
ble. Since the state of mind exception special instruction has produced mar
ked 
does permit just such testimony, the dis- inroads on the rule of multiple admi
ssi-
tinction is not very important.9 How- bility where great prejudice inheres
 in 
ever, where the statement is of th_e form- the statement in question.
12 
er type ( circumstantially probative of the 
declarant's state of mind), it invariably 
involves certain extraneous factual ele-
ments. In these situations a limiting in-
struction is always necessary to ensure 
that such factual matters are to be con-
sidered solely on the issue of the declar-
ant's mental state and not for the truth 
of the matters contained therein.10 
This is, of course, the familiar rule of 
multiple admissibility.11 In this context 
9. VI '\Yigrnore on Eddence §§ 1715, 1730 (;{ll 
ed. 1940). Sec a/No Benwell v. Dean, 240 
Cal.App.2d 345, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394, 309 
(1967). 
I 0. A limiting instruction is generally requirer! 
with direct state of mind testimony as well. 
In cases like this involving statements of 
fear, clearly such statements always curry 
the implication that there is a justification 
for such fear. Just because the underlying 
facts providing the basis for the fear arc 
not explicitly set forth should not be any ba-
sis for distinction. A limiting instruction is 
necessary to confine the jury's consideration 
of the statement to whatever probative value 
it has on the issue of the declarant's state 
of mind rather than to allow the jury to 
draw any inferences as to the truthfulness 
of the statement's allegations, explicit or im-
plied. 
In general, where state of mind tes timony 
is sought to be used in an attem]lt to dem-
onstrate the truth of the underlying fa<:ts 
rather tl,nn solely to show state of mincl , the 
evidence must be excludctl. Buckeye 1·•owdcr 
Co. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder 
Co., 248 U.S. 55, 65, 39 S.Ct. 38, 63 L.Ed. 
1:!3 (1918) ; Herman Schwabe, Jue. v. Unit-
[7] These principles must be applied 
with due deference to another fundamen-
tal concept in the law of evidence-that 
of relevance. It is well established that 
some evidence, while bearing some logi-
cal relevance to the case, may in the dis-
cretion of the judge nevertheless be ex-
cluded where its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion or delay.
13 
eel Shoe J\Ia<:hinery Corp., 297 F.2cl 906, 014 
(2d Cir. 1962) ; Superior Engraving Co. v. 
:'\LRB, 183 F.2tl 7.''<3. 792 (7th Cir. 1950). 
11. I \\'igmore Oil Ed.Jenee § 1:J (3d et!. 
1040) ; see, e. g., Dunham v. Pannell, 263 
F.2,1 7:!5, 72fl-730 (;jrh Cir. Hl50) ; SJ>rinkle 
v. Davis, 111 F.2d 925, 931 ( 4th Cir. 1940). 
12. See text accompanying notes 18-21 infra. 
13. See generally McCormick on Evidence § 
185 (2d ed. 1972) (" [A) leeway of discre· 
tion is generally recognized." Id. at 440) ; I 
Wigmore on Evidence § 29a (3d ed. 1940) ; 
Proposed Hules of Evidence for the United 
States Courts, Rule 403 (1973) : 
Huie ·103. 
J~XCLUSlO)I OF RELEVA:'\T EVIDENCE 
OX GROuND8 OF PRE.JCDICE, CON-
1:<'USIO.'.'\, on \L\S'rE OF Tll\:IE 
Although relevant, evitlew:e may i>e ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantial-
ly outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by consillerations o[ 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
ll.R.5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Committee 
Print (June 28, 1973) . 
~~ -··----. ....._. ________________ _ ----~ ..... 
f ·~ •. 
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This concept of "relative relevance," a 
rule of extrinsic policy, 14 allows the court 
to balance the need for such evidence 
against its probable dangers. 
II. RELEVANCE BALANCING OF 
ST ATE OF MIND TESTIMONY 
A. Prejudice 
[8] In order to examine this balanc-
ing process in this context, we must be-
gin by asking what exactly is the "prej-
udice" with which we are concerned 
here. Since such statements invariably 
contain two components-the circum-
stantial facts themselves and the infer-
ence to be drawn from such facts as to 
the declarant's state of mind-the preju-
dice lies in the danger of jury misuse of 
the evidence. Despite a limiting in-
struction to the effect that the evidence 
is to be considered solely on the issue of 
the declarant's state of mind (the proper 
purpose), there is the ever-present dan-
ger that the jury will be unwilling or 
unable to so confine itselr. In cases like 
this, then, involving statements proba-
tive of the declarant's state of mind, the 
rule of multiple admissibility must be 
read in conjunction with the balancing 
rule of relevance. That is, where the 
14. I Wigmore on Evidence § 12 (3d ed. 
1940) . 
15. "The rule [of multiple admissibility] is 
one of necessity and the risk of misuse 
should not be incurred if the evidence is not 
directed to a disputed issue in the case." 
People v. Spencer, 140 Cal.App.2d 97, 294 
P.2d 997, 1002 (1956). . 
16. See notes 5~ infra & accompanying 
text. 
17. This interrelation of the rules of multiple 
admissibility and relevance in the state of 
mind context is · well summarized by Mc-
Cormick: 
Declarations such as those involved here 
frequently include assertions other than as 
to state of mind, as, for example, asser-
tions that the defendant's acts causecl the 
state of mind. The truth of those asser-
tions may coincide with other issues in the 
case, such as whether the defendant's acts 
did in fact cause the state of mind. When 
this is so, the normal practice is to admit 
the declaration and direct the jury to con-
sider it only in proof of the state of mind 
PORTER, 2d SERIES 
limiting instruction is likely to be inef-
fective in its purpose, the possible ensu-
ing prejudice must be weighed against 
the statement's probative value.15 While 
the degree of prejudice depends on a 
number of factors, 16 perhaps the single 
most important consideration may be 
whether the statement, if used by the 
jury for its improper purpose, is virtual-
ly dispositive of the case and extremely 
damaging to the position taken by the 
opponent of the admission of the evi-
dence (the defendant) 17• 
It should be emphasized that in the 
great majority of cases the limiting in-
struction is probably sufficient to so 
minimize the dangers of jury misuse as 
to prevent most serious prejudice. Long 
ago it was decided that such state of 
mind evidence should generally be ad-
missible for a limited purpose.18 In civil 
cases, such evidence is perhaps some-
what more freely admitted than in crim-
inal actions since the prejudice often 
seems less pronounced. Yet even in civil 
cases, the limited utility of the special 
instruction with regard to such state-
ments has been recognized. E. g., Ad-
kins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 193 P. 251, 
254 (1920).19 In criminal cases in gener-
and to disregard it as evidence of the oth-
er issues. Compliance with these instruc-
tions is probably beyond the jury's ability 
and almost certainly beyond their willing-
ness. \Vhere there is adequate evidence 
on the other issues, this probably does lit-
tle harm. But in a case where the mental 
state is provable by other available evi-
dence and the danger of harm from im-
proper use by the jury of the offered dec-
larations is substantial, the judge's discre, 
tion to exclude the declarations has been 
recognized. 
McCormick on Evidence § 294 at 696 (2d ed. 
1972) . McCormick is here assuming some 
direct relevance to the case. Yet neverthe-
less is it recognized that there are times 
when the evidence must be excluded. Where 
no such relevance is demonstrated, admission 
is improper a fortiori. 
18. Nee, e. ff., the early opinion by Judge 
Holmes, Elmer v. Fessenden, 151 Mass. 359, 
24 ~.E. 208 (1889). 
19. See also Warner Construction Corp. v. 
Los Angeles, 2 Cal.3d 285, 85 Cal.Rptr. 444, 
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al there has been a significantly greater where it is simply unrealistic to believe 
acknowledgment of the weaknesses of that the refined di_stinctions demanded 
the limiting instruction.20 And specifi- by the limiting instruction can be faith-
cally in the context of state of mind tes- fully maintained by any jury.21 
timony in criminal homicide cases like 
the one sub judice, courts have expressly 
recognized that the limiting instruction 
is inadequate where the prejudicial dan-
gers far outweigh a tenuous relevance to 
the issues presented in the case and 
452, 466 P.2d 996 (1970) ; Coleman v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 141 Cal.App.2d 121, 
296 P.2d 386, 394 (1956) ; McCormick on 
Evidence § 294 at 696 (2d ed. 1972). 
20. Bruton v. United States, 391 l:.S. 123, 
132-133 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1626, 20 L.Ed. 
2d 476 (1968) : 
Judge Hand addressed the subject several 
times. The limiting instruction, he said, is 
a "recommendation to the jury of a men-
tal gymnastic which is beyond, not only 
their powers, but anybody's else," ~ash 
v. United States, [2 Cir.] 54 F.2d 1006, 
1007; "Nobody can indeed fa11 to doubt 
whether the caution is effective, or wheth-
er usually the practical result is not to Jet 
in hearsay," United States v. Gottfried, 
[2 Cir.] 165 F.2d 360, 367: "it is intleed 
very hard to believe that a jury will, or 
for that matter can, in practice observe 
the admonition," Delli Paoli v. United 
States, [2 Cir.] 229 F.2d 319, 321. Judge 
Hand referred to the instruction as a 
"placebo," medically defined as "a medici-
nal lie." Judge Jerome Frank suggested 
that its legal equivalent "is a kind of 'ju-
dicial lie': It undermines a moral relation-
ship between the courts, the jurorn, an,! 
the public; like any other judicial decep-
tion, it damages the decent judicial wlrnin-
istration of justice." United States v. 
Grunewald, [2 Cir.] 233 F .2d 556, 574. 
See also 8 Wigmore, supra, n. 3, § 2272, 
at 416. 
But see id. at 138-144, 88 S.Ct., 1620 
(White, .T., dissenting). While the case at 
hand obviously 1loes not present a Bruton 
problem, some of the same policy considera-
tions are present. See also People v. 
Simms, 10 Cal.App.3d 299, 89 Cal.Rptr. 1, !) 
(1970) ; People v. Sweeney, 55 Cal.2,1 27, 9 
Cal.Rptr. 793, 357 P.2d 1049 (1961). 
21. People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal.2d 881 , J::l 
Cal.Rptr. 649, 362 P.2d 473 (1961) : 
It is difficult to · believe that even the 
trained mind of a 1isychoanalyst could thus 
,lepnrtmentalize itself sufficiently to obey 
the mandate o( ihe limiting instructiou. 
Certainly a lay mind could not do so. 
13 Cal.Rptr. at 657, 362 P.2d at 481. Si:e 
also Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 
Quite a number of courts have con-
fronted facts similar to those here in-
volving hearsay statements made by the 
victim of a homicide which inferentially 
implicate the defendant.22 Such state-
54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933) ; People v. 
Lew, 68 Cal.2d 774, 69 Cal.Rptr. 102, 441 
P.2d 942 (1968). 
22. Many of the cases dealing with this pre-
cise question come from California and the 
·western states. This opinion is not overly 
preoccupied with the course of California 
state jurisprudence, but since many of its 
eases are instructive on the present ques-
tion, they are analyzed in detail. Califor~ia 
has codified the rule on the state of mmd 
exception to provide that under certain cir-
cumstances such testimony should· be admit· 
ted if there is no indication that it lacks 
trustworthiness. People v. Spencer, 71 Cat 
2d 933, 80 Cal.Rptr. 99, 458 P.2d 43, 51, 53 
(1969). The statutes provide: 
Section 1200: "(a) 'Hearsay evidence' is 
evidence of a statement that was made 
other than by a witness while testifying at 
the hearing and that is offered to prove 
the truth of the matter stated. 
(b) Except as provided by law, hearsay ev-
idence is inadmissible." 
Section 1250: "(a) Subject to Section 
1252, evidence of a statement of the de-
clarant's then existing state of mind, emo-
tion, or physical sensation (including a 
statement of intent, plan, motive, design, 
mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is 
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule 
when: 
(1) The evidence is offered to prove the 
declarant's state of mind, emotion, or 
physical sensation at that time or at any 
other time when it is itself an issue in the 
action; or 
(2) The evidence is offered to prove or 
explain acts or conduct of the declarant. 
(b) This section does not make admissible 
evidence of a statement of memory or be· 
lief to prove the fact remembered or be-
licve,1." 
Section 1252: "Evidence of a statement 
is inndmissible under this article if the 
statement was made under circumstances 
such as to indicate its lack of trustworthi-
nef:is.'" 
Cul.Evid.C'ode §§ 1200, 1250, 1252 (West. 
1966). 
--~-~-----....-_......._.---....~~----~-.....-... -· -~-·""- ....... - . - ·----
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ments by the victims often include pre-
vious threats made by the defendant to-
wards the victim, narrations of past in-
cidents of violence on the part of the de-
fendant or general verbalizations of fear 
of the defendant. While such state-
cents are admittedly of some value in 
presenting to the jury a complete pic-
ture of all the facts and circumstances 
sunounding the homicide,23 it is gener-
ally agreed that their admissibility must 
be determined by a careful balancing of 
their probative value against their prej-
udicial effect.24 Courts have recognized 
that such statements are fraught with 
inherent dangers and require the impo-
sition of rigid limitations.25 The princi-
pal danger is that the jury will consider 
the victim's statement of fear as some-
how reflecting on defendant's state of 
mind rather than the victim's-i. e., as a 
true indication of defendant's intentions, 
actions, or culpability.26 Such inferences 
are highly improper and where there is 
a strong likelihood that they wm be 
drawn by the jury the danger of inju-
rious prejudice is particularly evident. 
The quantum of prejudice, as stated 
above, is highest when the circumstan-
tial facts in the statement are intimately 
23. "Generally the basis for n,·rcpting su,:h 
testimony is thut the behavior of both tl1<.> 
ddim nnd tlie defrntlant nn• part of tl11• 
mosaic of the <Timinal C\'l.'nt, nn<l l,encc. in -
sofar as their- dcelurations bear upon either 
the quality of their nets or a relernnt stat,• 
of miml, they must be nccrpte,l as part :111d 
parcel of the eritieal secne." State \". Dahl · 
win, 47 ~ .J. 379, 221 A.2d 199, 207 (]fl()()). 
24. People v. Purvis, 56 Cul.2d 93, 13 Cal. 
Hptr. 801, 3()2 P.2d 713, 717 (1961) ; People 
v. Hamilton, note 21 supra; Pcovle v. Swcc-
ue.v, note 20 sup.-a, 357 P.2cl at 1058; Pco-
J•le v. Find1, 213 Cal.App.2<1 7G2. 2fJ Cal. 
R1,t.r. 420, 430 (W63); Stnte \·. Wright. GO-! 
l'.211 106:5. 1066-1067 (Or.ApJ>.1!>73); State 
v. Bartolon, S Or.App. 538, 495 P.2d 772 
( l!J72). 
25. People v. Hamilton, note 21 supr11 ("·Jl111 
there arc arnl sl,oul<I be rigid li111itations Oil 
the admission of sueh testimony.") ; People 
v. Dalton. 201 Cal.App.2d 39G, 20 Cul.Rpt r. 
G1, 57 (19()2) ; People v. l<'ineh, note 2-1 sll-
/>ra. 
~rlw minimum requirc111ent is~ of ,·ouri-;P. 
lhc limiti111s i11structio11. Co111m1,nwcalth \". 
related to the issue to be proved. In the 
context of homicide cases such as this, it 
is clear that where the improper purpose 
for which the jury might consider the 
e\·idence bears closely on the central 
question of defendant's guilt or inno-
cence there is less likelihood that the 
jury will confine the statement to its 
proper realm. Here the functional utili-
ty of the limiting instruction becomes 
most doubtful. This is the lesson of the 
famous case Shepard v. United States, 
290 D.S. 96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 
< 1!133 ). There the state of mind testi-
mony which direct!:-- accused the defend-
ant was so dispositive of his guilt 2 • that 
the limiting instruction undoubtedly 
would have been entirely fu tile.2~ In re 
oft repeated words of Justice Cardozo: 
It will not do to say that the jury 
might accept the declarations for any 
light that they cast upon the existence 
of a vital urge, and reject them to the 
extent that they charged the death to 
some one else. Discrimination so sub-
tle is a feat beyond the compass of or-
dinary minds. The reverberating 
cbng of those accusatory words would 
drown all weaker sounds. It is for or-
dinary minds, and not for psychoana-
])el\'a lle. 3:il :\Jnss. 48fl. 2:.'1 '.\.E.2d 922, 
!1:.'-l --!l:.';i (lf)(;(;)_ y ,.t Prrn with snr-11 an in-
stnwtion it is often doubt fu l that sud, state-
111<·11ts should !"• admiHed if highly prejuui-
1:i;1l. Id. S t·r· alsr, t1~xt infn1 nt 22-23. 
(··Ex,·lnsion Enn \\"here ltclevant") . Del-
1·a11e nlso holds that threats preceding a 
<·rime~ "an Jffopcrl.\· c·<nrie only frolll one who 
heanl or witnessed them. 221 X.E.2d at 
D2G. 
26. .. It may be that an inference as to the 
1·il'tim's eornlnct can he drawn from the vic-
tim's state of mind, bnt certainly no permis-
sible infcren('e ,·an he ,lrawn therefrom as to 
defendant's eliaral'tcr or a<:tions." People v. 
l'u rvis, note '.!4 su1ira, ] 3 Cal.Rptr. at 804, 
3G:.! l '.'.!cl at 7J6. See a/w State v_ Mc-
Cunle.r, 8 Or.A]lp. :i71, 404 l'.2d 438, 442-
.;..J:~ ( 1H72) : Stntc v. Kump, 7G Wyo. 273, 
:;o1 1'.2,1808. 812 (1(1;,(;) _ 
27. ··J >r. Shc]lard ))oisoned me." 290 U.S. at 
!J,';, G-! S.Ct. 22. 
28. ,\ 11d note, in Sh~JHzrd the dcr:eascd's state 
of mini! was l,igl,Jy relevant on the issue of 
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lysts, that our rules of evidence are fication for the killing.32 When such a 
framed. They have thei r source very defense is asserted, a defendant's asser-
often in considerations of administra- tion that the deceased first attacked him 
tive convenience, of practical expe- may be rebu tted by the extrajudicial 
diency, and not in rules of logic. declarations of the victim that he feared 
When the risk of confusion is so great the defendant, thus rendering it unlikely 
as to upset the balance of advantage, that the deceased was in fact the agres-
the evidence goes out. sor in the f irst instance. Second, where 
Id. at 104, 54 S.Ct. at 25. See also Peo- defendant seeks to defend on the ground 
pie v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 245 P. that the deceased committed suicide, evi-
2d 633, 645 (1952) ;29 People v. Hamil- dence that the \·ictim had made state-
ton, 55 Cal.2d 881, 13 Cal.Rptr. 649, 362 ments inconsistent with a suicidal bent 
P.2d 473 (1961).30 are highly relevant.33 A third situation 
B. Relevance 
The threshold requirement of admissi-
bility of such hearsay statements of fear 
of defendant in homicide cases is some 
substantial degree of relevance to a ma-
terial issue in the case. While there are 
undoubtedly a number of possible situa-
tions in which such statements may be 
relevant,31 the courts have developed 
three rather well-defined categories in 
which the need for such statements 
overcomes almost any possible prejudice. 
The most common of these involves de-
fendant's claim of self-defense as justi-
29. "Everything said in the Shepard ease is 
here applicable. Here was a ·,·oke from the 
grave charging appellant with past acts of 
brutality and cruelty and charging tlint he 
hact made threa ts against his wife's life. 
How could the jury possibly disen tangl e the 
charges in · that letter and treat the le tter 
only as evidence of state of ruind, and forget 
about the substance of the charges? How 
could the defendant meet such a situation? 
He coukl not cross-examine the deceased. 
Iler lips were scaled. It will 
not do to say that it was arlmitted for the 
limited purpose of showing btate of mind of 
the deceased, and, even if erroneously admit-
ted, could not be 1,rejudicial." 245 P.2d at 
645. 
30. "It will not do to say, as does the attor-
ney general, that the jury was toltl that 
these clcclarations were not to be eonsi<icre1l 
for their truthfulness but merely as vcrhal 
nets ,·asting light u1>on [the victim'sl state 
of rnin,l. It is difficult to believe tlwt even 
the trained mind of a psychoanalyst coul<l 
thus departmentalize itself sufficiently to 
obey tlic mandate of the limiting inst rn<:tio11. 
Certainly u lay mind could not do so." 13 
Cal.H pt r. at G:i7, 3(]:! !'.2d n t 481. 
31. An example is where u specific mens rc:1 
is nt bsuc. Peor,lc v. Ham ilton, note ~1 s u-
involves a claim of accidental death, 
where, for example, defendant 's version 
of the facts is that the victim picked up 
defendant's gun and was accidentally 
killed while toying with it.34 In such 
cases the deceased's statements of fear 
as to guns or of defendant himself 
(showing he would never go near de-
fendant under any circumstances) are 
·- relevant in that they tend to rebut this 
defense. Of course, even in these cases, 
where the evidence is of a highly preju-
dicial nature, it has been held that it 
must be excluded in spite of a signifi-
cant degree of relevance.3'' 
pra (premeditated murder versus second de-
gree murder) . Of eonrsc, sta te of mind tes-
timony may be relcrnnt in all types of cases, 
criminal and civil. The most C'.ommon situa-
tion in <:i di cases used to be 111 actions for 
alieuntion of affe<·tions. E. g., Adkins v. 
Brett, 1S-! Cal. 25:!, ]!):; P. 251 (l!l20). 
Jn eriminal eases sud , statements may also 
well be exculpatory. E. g., People v. Dal-
ton, note 2G supra .. 
32. See cases <lisc-ussed at 7G8-7G9, infra 
("Self-Defense Cases" ). 
33. Commonwealth ,·. DelValle, note 25 supra. 
'I'be Shepard case is to the same effect, al-
though there the statements were excluded 
as too prejudicial c,·en though relevant to 
the issue of possible suicide. 
34 . l'eo1,le v. Lew, note 21 supra; State v. 
Hartolon, note 2-1 supra (statement of fear 
of guns standing alone wonl,I have been ad-
missible, but snC'.h stntcmcnt was inseparable 
from statement of past nets 111ul therefore 
cxclurled) ; People v. Cooley, 211 Cal.App.2d 
173. :!7 Cal.llptr. ri-13. !',G,-rir;,g (1963). 
35 . !-iheparrl v. United Stutes, 290 U.S. 96, 54 
~.Ct. 22, 78 L.Erl. l!lG (1933) ; People v. 
Jiarnilton, 11ote 21 supra; l'eoplc v. Lew, 
flOfl~ '.21_ StlJlf(l , 
------~--~ -~ --.,_ ... ,.___.... .. ______ ,_.,. __ -·---4-----~·-- -·-- .. 
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III. SURVEY OF PERTINENT 
AUTHORITY 
An extensive examination of the rele-
vant authorities on this subject reveals 
an unsatisfactory state of the law. 
There may be few other evidentiary 
questions as to which the courts are so 
confused or the cases so irreconcilable 
( even within the same jurisdiction) . 
Some courts simply use it as a pretext 
for allowing in virtually any hearsay ev-
idence, while others summarily exclude 
it without analysis or discussion. To 
add to the difficulties, only the relative-
ly recent cases (within the last 20-30 
years) are of any real help in analyzing 
the problem intelligently because the 
vague and inscrutable "res gestae" doc-
trine invariably clouded the opinions of 
the older cases. Quite a few of these 
earlier cases did exclude such statements 
under the "res gestae" analysis but are 
of little aid to this discussion.36 
A. Self-Defense Cases 
Perhaps the most appealing and con-
sistent decisions are those inrnlving the 
claim of self-defense. Here the cases 
are largely in agreement in allowing 
such testimony where self-defense is in 
issue and excluding it ,vhere it is not. 
Some discussion of these decisions is 
helpful in understanding the proper ap-
proach in such cases. 
In People v. Schindler, 273 Cal.App.2d 
624, 78 Cal.Rptr. 633 ( 1969) , a prosecu-
tion witness was permitted to testify 
that the deceased had stated in a tele-
phone conversation that "the gun was 
missing from the closet and she was 
afraid her husband was going to kill 
her." The court recognized that to de-
termine whether the evidence was prop-
erly admitted, it must examine the is-
sues. It found that since self-defense 
was raised, the deceased's fear of the de-
fendant was relevant to . the "likelihood 
of her having taken aggressive action 
against appellant. If June [the victim] 
36. '·The phrase ' res gestnc' has long been 
not only entirely uscle~s, bnt even positi vely 
harmful." VI Wigmore on I~vidcucc § 17G7 
nt 182 (3d ed. 1940) . A survey of n number 
were afraid of appellant and fearful that 
he might kill her, then an inference 
could be drawn that it was unlikely she 
would do anything to provoke him and 
unlikely that she would produce a loaded 
firearm at a time when appellant was 
angry and had just quarreled with her. 
Because of the defense of self-defense 
June's state of mind became 
relevant and the evidence became admis-
sible on the issue . " 78 Cal. 
Rptr. at 640-641. 
Another homicide case, People v. 
Atchley, 53 Cal.2d 160, 346 P.2d 764 
(1959), cert. dismissed, 366 U.S. 207, 81 
S.Ct. 1051, 6 L.Ed.2d 233 (1961), in-
volved a claim by the defendant that the 
victim (his wife ) had previously threat-
ened to kill him and had been the initial 
aggressor in the fight which led to her 
death. The defendant claimed the gun 
went off accidentally in the struggle. To 
rebut this the prosecution introduced a 
letter of the wife purportedly written to 
a judge two days before her death to the 
effect that defendant had threatened her 
and that she was afraid of him. The 
court ruled this evidence to have been 
correctly admitted, stating: "It tended 
to prove her fear of defendant, which 
was relevant to defendant's claim that 
she was the aggressor in a struggle for 
the gun. Since the claim of self-defense 
was raised as part of the defendant's 
case, the letter was admissible in rebut-
tal. " 346 P.2d at 770. 
Similarly in People v. Finch, 213 Cal. 
App.2d 752, 29 Cal.Rptr. 420 (1963), an-
other case of uxoricide, the defendant 
also claimed that in attempting to dis-
arm his wife the gun went off and killed 
her accidentally. Again, in rebuttal, the 
prosecution introduced evidence of the 
wife's statements of fear for her life 
and her declarations of specific threats 
and past assaults by her husband. The 
court held the statements admissible 
since they bore directly on the question 
of the probability that she would assault 
of the older cases excludiug this type of evi-
<lc11 c:c under the rcx gestue analysis nppenrs 
iu ~tatc Y. Kurn)l, note 26 s11pra, 301 P.2d 
nt 812-814. 
. . . . . .· . 




,e him and 
ice a loaded 
pellant was 




." 78 Cal. 
People v. 
3 P.2d 764 
J.S. 207, 81 
(1961), in-
ant that the 
,usly threat-
n the initial 
1 led to her 
1ed the gun 
truggle. To 
ntroduced a 
y written to 
death to the 
_·eatened her 
' him. The 
J have been 
"It tended 
dant, which 









iff and killed 
rebuttal, the 
lence of the 






his type of evi-
ualysis appears 
upra, 301 P .2d 
UNITED STATES v. BROWN 
Cite us 490 1·' .2d ,5S (1973) 
769 
her husband with the gun in the first 
instance.37 
And in People v. Livingston, 271 Cal. 
App.2d 628, 77 Cal.Rptr. 53, 54- 55, 58 
(1969), a witness testified in a case 
tried to the court that the deceased had 
said "he [the defendant] was arguing 
and talking about shooting me and 
stuff," and had requested the witness to 
pull the shades and lock the door and not 
to let anyone in without inquiring as to 
his identity. The court held these state-
ments admissible under the state of 
mind exception to show her fear of the 
defendant solely because the defendant 
had raised an issue of self-defense. 
"Defendant had claimed that she was 
the aggressor and that the gun went off 
accidentally while defendant was trying 
to wrest it from her. The state of [the 
victim's] mind was therefore an issue 
which was circumstantially relevant 
11 Cal.Rptr. at 58. See also 
People v. Spencer, 71 Cal.2d 933, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 99, 458 P.2d 43 (1969); People v. 
Yuhas, 222 Cal.App.2d 61, 34 Cal.Rptr. 
698 (1963). 
Conversely, where self-defense is not 
at issue, such evidence has been exclud-
ed. For example, in People v. Ireland, 
70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 
580 (1969), the prosecution offered to 
show that the deceased had said prior to 
her death, "I know he's going to kill me. 
I wish he would hurry up and get it 
over with. He'll never let me leave." 
The prosecution urged that this was ad-
missible as bearing on the victim's state 
of mind which was relevant to "show the 
probabilities of the decedent's conduct 
that she would not have done 
anything to provoke him." The defense 
argued that the deceased's state of mind 
was not relevant to any issue in the 
case. The California Supreme Court 
agreed, holding that the "acts or conduct 
of the declarant at the time 
of the homicide were simply not in dis-
37. t:ndcr the view cx11ressed in Jl amil/011 , 
the statement in this case should 11robably 
hu,·e been excluded since it contnincil numcr· 
ous references to past conduct on the part 
490 F.2d--49 
pute." There was no defense of self-de-
fense raised in the case. "In such cir-
cumstances it must be concluded that the 
hearsay statement was im-
properly admitted into evidence." 75 
Cal.Rptr. at 193. 
Similarly, in State v. Kump, 76 Wyo. 
273, 301 P .2d 808 (1956), the prosecu-
tion introduced certain statements of the 
deceased relating various threats made 
by the defendant and the victim's gener-
al state of fear. In spite of a limiting 
instruction to the effect that the jury 
was to consider the testimony solely as 
"tending to show the attitude of mind of 
the deceased towards the defendant at 
the time of [the victim's] death," the 
Wyoming Supreme Court held it to have 
been error to admit such statements: 
The attitude of the mind of de-
ceased toward the defendant as evi-
denced by outward manifestations, 
such as declarations, is at times rele-
vant when the defendant pleads self-
defense. [citations] In such case the 
attitude of mind is to show the hostile 
attitude of the deceased which would 
justify self-defense or perhaps reduce 
the degree of the crime, or the severi-
ty of the sentence. That is not the 
situation in the case at bar. The im-
portant fact here is the attitude of 
mind of the defendant, not that of de-
ceased. The attitude of mind of the 
deceased toward the defendant was 
immaterial. (emphasis in original) 
301 P.2d at 812. See also People v. 
Purvis, 56 Cal.2d 93, 13 Cal.Rptr. 801, 
362 P.2d 713 (1961). 
B. Exclusion Even Where Relevant 
Other cases have excluded testimony 
of this kind even where the victim's 
state of mind was in issue and where a 
limiting instruction had been given. 
This result is reached where the risk of 
prejudice of an . exceptionally damning 
nature is so high that even a substantial 
of the 11cc118Cd aud as such was highly 11rcju-
1licial. l'coplc v. Hamilton, supra note 21; 
sec ,Ii8ctission at 775 infra ("Statements re-
couuliug pas t nets of the defendant") . 
.__,__,, _____ . ..._ __ ,._ ______ ,._~_ . . - ... -----------
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amount of relevance is outweighed- es-
pecially in light of the strong possibility 
that the limiting instruction in such sit-
uations would be futile. For example, 
in People v. Lew, 68 Cal.2d 774, 69 Cal. 
Rptr.102, 441 P.2d 942 (1968), the trial 
court's admission of a variety of hearsay 
statements of the victim, including a 
number of alleged threats made by the 
defendant, was held to be error by the 
California Supreme Court. The court 
first analyzed the issues to see if the 
statements were relevant to any inquiry 
necessary to the case. It found that 
they were relevant to defendant's claim 
that the victim had been handling the 
gun when it went off accidentally and 
killed her in that it rebutted the likeli-
hood that she would do so because of her 
fear of guns and of the defendant. 
Nevertheless, the court held that it was 
error to have admitted the testimony 
since it implied past misconduct on the 
part of the defendant and ... was also es-
sentially unreliable. The court stated 
that "such testimony is not admissible 
because to try to separate 
state of mind from the truth of the 
charges is an almost impossible task." 
69 Cal.Rptr. at 105, 441 P.2d at 945. 
The Lew case relied principally on 
People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal.2d 881, 13 
Cal.Rptr. 649, 362 P.2d 473 (1961), an 
important case in California decided by 
a 4 to 3 vote and often cited on this is-
sue. In Hamilton the only question ·was 
whether the defendant had committed 
first-degree or second-degree murder. 
He admitted killing the deceased, but 
claimed it had been done without pre-
meditation and deliberation and that he 
had gone to his wife's (the victim) 
house at her invitation. In rebuttal the 
prosecution introduced over objection 
statements made by the wife to witness-
es that she was afraid of the defendant, 
that he had beaten her and that he had 
threatened to kill her. The jury was 
carefully instructed not to consider these 
38. :-;ote 30 supra. 
39. 'l'he California cases are otherwise rea-
sonably consistent. 
statements as true as to the beatings, 
but only as state of mind evidence. The 
California Supreme Court nevertheless 
held it error to admit such testimony 
since the state of mind was necessarily 
dependent on some past acts of the de-
fendant that were very prejudicial to his 
case and that it was beyond the jury's 
power to distinguish the purposes for 
which the evidence was adrnitted.38 
Such cases as Lew and Hamilton are 
illustrative of precisely the type of bal-
ancing that must take place as to each 
particular statement that seeks admis-
sion under the state of mind exception 
in light of all the facts and circum-
stances of each case. In these cases it 
was determined that a certain degree of 
relevance was insufficient to outweigh 
the inevitably damaging prejudice inher-
ent in the statement. And certainly 
where no convincing need for the evi-
dence can be demonstrated or where no 
limiting instruction is given, exclusion 
of the evidence is mandatory, a fortiori. 
C. Anomalous Decisions 
Let there be no mistake about the uni-
formity of the cases dealing with this is-
sue-there are many that are irreconcil-
able. Even in jurisdictions where a 
seemingly consistent rule obtains, there 
are decisions which are conflicting and 
unexplainable. The M erkouris case in 
California is such a case-it has caused 
.. 
a good deal of difficulty in that state.39 "' 
People v. Merkouris, 52 Cal.2d 672, 344 
P.2d 1 (1959). Here the court found ··· 1 
that declarations of homicide victims as 
~ 
to their fear of the defendant caused by ,j 
his threats on their lives40 were correct- ,.J 
ly admitted into evidence. However, the ··, 
court ruled that the purpose for which j 
such evidence could be used included in- · ,~ 
dicating the probable identity of the kill- ., 
er, i. e., defendant: 1 
Where, as here, the identification of :j 
defendant as the killer is in issue, the 1_'. 
fact that the victims feared defendant .I 
40. There was also testimony that oue of the 
victims got a gnu to protect himself hecause 
the defendant was bothcriug him ugain. 344 
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is relevant because it is some evidence 
that they had reason to fear him, that 
is, that there is a probability that the 
fear had been aroused by the victims' 
knowledge of the conduct of defendant 
indicating his intent to harm them 
rather than, e.g., that the victims' 
fear was paranoid. (Karnes v. Com-
monwealth, 125 Va. 758, 99 S.E. 562, 
564[ 4] et seq., 4 A.L.R. 1509; Lowrey 
v. State, 87 Oki.Cr. 313, 197 P.2d 637. 
651[14, 15]; State v. Bauers, 25 
Wash.2d 825, 172 P .2d 279, 286-
287 [ 8 ]-[9]. 41 
People v. Merkouris, supra, 344 P.2d at 
6. Such an approach viola tes the funda-
mental safeguards necessary to the use 
of such testimony (see note 26 supra). 
Through a circuitous series of infer-
ences, the court reverses the effect of 
the statement so as to . reflect on defend-
ant's intent and actions rather than t11e 
state of mind of the declarant (victim). 
4 I. Some mention should be made about the 
three cases cited as authority iu this quota-
tion from .Jlerkouris. These opinions are 
essentially conclusory in nature and notably 
lacking insight or analysis. 
In Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 
99 S.E. 562 (1919), the court held that 
s tatemen ts of fear were admissible as inili-
cating the probable identity of the killer and 
that it was error for the tri al court to have 
excluded them. The evidence was exculpato-
ry of the defendaut and tended to indicate 
that ano ther · person committed the crime. 
The decision relies somewha t cryptically on 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 
285, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706 (1892). as 
well as some sort of res gestae analysis. 
The case has been briefly but effectively 
criticized in Payne, The IIillmon Case Revis-
ited, 41 Va.L.Rev. 1011, 1035-36 (1955). 
State v. Bauers , 25 Wash.2d 825, 172 P .2d 
279 (1946), is a case often eited by courts 
seeking to admit such evidence. 'l'he opinion 
is obscure. It first analyzes the statement 
of fear as an "opinion" and then pro1:eeds 
with what appears to be a res ges tae analy-
sis. Id. nt 287. Finally, it a lso nsscrtx thnl 
the evidence is admissible under the general 
rule that the statements were made in the 
presence of the ar:cused, were of an acrnsa-
tory 11aturc and were uot denied by him at 
the time (an "ndoptive n1lmission"). The 
opinion never addrc,;ses the relevan('e issue 
and it is clear that the deceased's state of 
mind was not relevant. Moreover, it nlso 
. 
This is the very result that it is hoped 
the limiting instruction will prevent.42 
Second, it is probably in conflict with 
the Supreme Court's Sh epard doctrine. 
That is, the hearsay statement is being 
used to indicate past conduct on the part 
of the defendant of an extremely incul-
patory nature- to be precise, that it 
tends to support the conclusion that he 
in fact was the killer. In allowing this 
inference the court is permitting the 
same type of "accusatory words [ which] 
would drown all weaker sounds." And 
here the court is offering this as a prop-
er use of such testimony where the cor-
· rect approach is concerned with wheth-
er juries can avoid drawing such infer-
ences even with the help of the admoni-
tions of the limiting instruction. Due to 
substantial disapproval of this case, it 
appears questionable as to whether a 
California court presented with the Mer-
kouris facts at this time would continue 
to abide by its holding.43 
appears to allow the multiple inference to be 
drawn that the s tatement could reflect 011 
the guilt of the defendan t. .-\.s such it seems 
to dolatc Shepard v. United Stutes, 290 U.S. 
96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933), and 
has been criticized on those grounds. Com-
ment, 22 v;ash.L.Rev. 145 (1947). 
Lowrey v. State, 87 Oki.Cr. 313, 1D7 P.2d 
637 (1948), at leas t recognized such testimo-
ny should he limited to sho,dng the state of 
mind of the deceased aud should uot have 
heen trned as proof of the alleged facts stat-
e•!. \'everrheless, it rlid not reverse the trial 
court for allowing in the e\'idence since it 
felt that any error that might have occurred 
was not prejudicial. The court seemed to 
rely on the fact that there was corroborative 
e,·idence of the deceased 's statement of fear. 
,,ce rlis1·ussion of the p·roper role of corrobo-
ration, notes 60-66 infra & accompanying 
text. 
42. This was also the very result feared by 
t he commentators as a logical extension of 
the mneh critif'i r.ed Hillman <'nsc. Seligman, 
.\n Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 2G 
Tlarv.I,.Itcv. 146 (1012); Payne, The Hill-
mon Case Hevisitcd, 41 Va.L.Rev. 1011, 103G 
( l!l:i:i) . 
43. While the ,1/ crkouri.~ tledsion was followed 
in People v. Fcasby, 178 Cal.App.2d 723, 3 
Cnl.Hptr. 230 (]!)60), this decision is distin -
guishable in that it involved reul issues as to 
the victim's state of mind, e. g., self-defense, 
wh ich made the testimony relevant. In 
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There are a number of other cases 
which have allowed in testimony of this 
type on the basis of various errors in 
reasoning or simple lack of concern. 
One of the principal problems which 
brings this about is a court's under-
standable eagerness to find an "easy" 
rule, simple in operation. This leads to 
a tendency to adopt a mechanistic ap-
proach devoid of analysis. For example, 
in State v. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727, 
471 P.2d 582 (1970), the Idaho Supreme 
Court, dealing with a hearsay declara-
tion of fear on the part of the deceased 
victim,44 simply identified the statement 
as probative on the issue of the state of 
mind of the declarant, referred to . the 
fact that a limiting instruction had been 
given and then pronounced it admissible 
in a conclusory and offhanded manner.45 
Such a simplistic approach sidesteps any 
preliminary determination of relevance 
and does not begin to weigh the possible 
prejudice contained in such statements. 
Another group of cases seems to con-
sider such hearsay admissible if there 
Purvis, note 24 s·upra., a case excluding such 
evidence, even the dissenting judge disap-
pro ,·e<l JI erkouris in these words: 
[The testimony in question] went far be-
yond that necessary to show a relevant 
state of mind of the victim. People v. 
1\Ierkouris should not be ex-
tended (and People v. Feas by (1960) , 178 
Cal.App.2d 723, 733- 734 [14- li]. 3 Cal. 
Rptr. 230, should not be construed) to 
permit the introduction in evidence, with-
out discrimination, of all sorts of accusa-
tions against a defendant by the victim of 
a homicide, upon the theory that the vic-
tim's state of mind is relevant. 
362 P.2d at 719-720. 
In People v. Lewis, 217 Cal.A1>1i.2,I 246, 31 
Cal.Rptr. 817 (1963), a California i,ourt 
faced with similar facts rcluetantly followe,I 
.llerkouris only be"ause it felt constrainccl hy 
stare dccisis to do so. "'Vhile a 11ersuasive 
argument c:an be made that dcdarations of 
the nature herein involved should be iua<I· 
missible, this court is not free to depart. 
from the reasoning of the i-iuJ)reme Court in 
the Merkonris <":t se." 31 Cal.Rptr. at 82-l. 
All(] in still a later case. the ,llcrkou,·is ,li.s-
sent was eite<l by the Californi:i ~UJ)remc 
Court with npproval. People v. Lew, 110k 
:!l s111,rn, 4-!1 P.2<1 at !1-l-!. 8l!hsecinently tl11, 
California Law Revision Commission drafte1l 
a proposal for overruling the Merkouris case 
are circumstantial indications of its reli-
ability or some type of corroborative ev-
idence. For example, in State v. Shir-
ley, 7 Or.App. 166, 488 P.2d 1401 
(1971), the court found the declaration 
of fear to ha\'e been made in a manner 
" 'perfectly natural' under the circum-
stances." 488 P.2d at 1403. Also in 
People v. Pinn, 17 Cal.App.3d 99, 94 
Cal.Rptr. 741 (1971), the court referred 
to the California statute on state of 
mind testimony and remarked: "the ap-
pellant has not directed our attention to 
anything in the record indicating that 
[the victim] made the statement 
in other than a natural man-
ner. [I] t was therefore ad-
missible under section 1250." 94 Cal. 
Rptr. at 745-746.46 
Similarly, in State v. Gause, 107 Ariz. 
491, 489 P.2d 830 (1971), the Arizona 
Supreme Court, apparently attempting 
to adopt a "progressive" approach, laid 
down a rule that such expressions of 
fear are admissible as long as they have 
sufficient reliability.47 While an at-
by legislation. The proposal sought to limit 
the use of such testimony to modify or de-
scribe only the aets of the declarant. See 
C'ommonwe:1Ith ,·. De!Valle, note 25 supra, 
221 ::-.:.E.2d nt 925. 
44 . "I'm scared to death of him , not so bad 
when he's ,!rinking beer, but when he's 
dr inking whiskey he's crazier than a tick." 
-l,1 P.2<1 at 5S3 n. 9. 
45. "Thus sinc:e the first statement was pro-
bative of the attitudes and feelings (fear) of 
the victim towards Radabaugh, it was prop-
erly admitted." 471 P.2d at 586 (no citation 
of authorit)·) . 
46. This is an improper use of corroboration . 
ed,lcnce. .\s to the proper role of such evi-
<IPn<"r. .srr note (.i(j infra. & accompanying 
text. For the Cnlifornia statutes, see note 
~:.! supra.. 
47. '· Let us meet the problem head-011, brush 
a~ide the sophistr.r, and say that expressions 
of fear h.r n munlcr vidim, though they 
rnacle he hearsay, are relevant, have proba· 
th·e value 011 the issue of i,Ientity, and, when 
in l1111na11 experience they have sufficient re· 
liahilit,· thH sho11l<l he admitted in evidence." 
.J.<.;f) ,,::.!d :;t .':::J-1. In this c·ase there was 
in f:wt a goo,! ucal of corroboration: 
A bnld expression of fear by a murder 
\'ictim standing alone does not have suffi-
,ns of its reli-
·oborati ve ev-
;tate v. Shir-
P .2d . i401 
ie declaration 
in a manner 
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03. Also in 
pp.3d 99, 94 
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tempt to break out of the confines of 
some of the archaic niceties of the 
hearsay exceptions in favor of a rule of 
admissibility dependent only on the pres-
ence of special guarantees of reliability 
has something to commend it, this only 
answers half the question. That is, the 
Gause court (and the other courts which 
place so much reliance on such indica-
tions of special trustworthiness ) failed 
to move on to the second question-that 
of relevance which also has something to 
commend it. The court's rule simplified 
the question of whether certain testimo-
ny falls within the state of mind excep-
tion to the hearsay rule but entirely ig-
nored the relevance balancing process 
which seeks to avoid undue and unneces-
sary prejudice and confusion.48 
The undesirable results of the applica-
tion of such a single-step approach be-
come apparent in those cases in whkh 
courts allow the admission of such 
hearsay declarations of fear in spite of 
the fact that the state of mind of the de-
clarant simply bears too tenuous a rela-
tionship to the issues in the ca:;e. For 
example, in State v. Shirley, 7 Or.App. 
166, 488 P.2d 1401 (1971), the court, on 
cient reliability to be admitted. In fact, if 
the victim were a live to testif,·. a fonnda-
tion would be required before her expres-
sion of fea r would be admissible. There 
is considerable testimon~· in the record 
here to sho1\· thut the l"ictim ha,! a rnli,I 
basis for fearing her husband. Domestic 
problems, the filing of a divorce action, 
the necessity for a restraining order, the 
removal of the victim to a hotel un ti! the 
husband vacatetl the house, an<l the 
threats to kill voicetl by the defendant 
husband in the presence of others, all ac-
cord a special reliability. 
Id. 
48. The statement in the opinion italicized be-
low is particularly flagrant in its disregarrl 
of a valid and accepted policy eonsi,leration 
in its headlong breathless charge to "brush 
nsitle the sophistry." · 
"\Ye note that in the eases on this mul re-
lated points the courts often resort to 
strained logic lo attain 1hr <l esirc<l result. 
In <letermining the irlcnti ty of the person 
l'ommitting n murder, the fact that the 
victim hncl reason to fear the rlcfenclnnt 
!urn some prohatiYC \·alnr. 'rite in<liC'iu of 
reliability of the hearsay stutcmenfs urc 
facts strikingly similar to those at hand 
here,49 fe lt that the evidence should be 
admitted on the rather flimsy ground 
that "[t]he state had a right to show 
the state of mind of the victim at the 
time of and shortly prior to the homi-
cide and for that purpose to show what 
circumstances as expressed by the victim 
contributed thereto." 488 P.2d at 1403. 
See also People v. Pinn, 17 Cal.App.3d 
99, 94 Cal.Rptr. 741 (1971); 50 Lowrey 
v. State, 87 Oki.Cr. 313, 197 P.2d 637 
(1948). Here aga in there is an undesir-
able failure to address the relevance is-
su e. The court cons idered its task at an 
end merely by identifying the statement 
as bearing on the victim's state of mind, 
neglecting to undertake the vital step of 
balancing the necessity for the evidence 
and its probative value against the 
strong likelihood of extremely damaging 
prejudicial effects. 
IV. SYNTHESIS OF THE APPLI-
CABLE PRINCIPLES 
[9] The rule then to be distilled 
from the better reasoned decisions is 
that a victim's extra-judicial declara-
tions of fear of the defendant are admis-
as ecrtninly present on the question of 
itlenrir.,· ns they are on the issue of ncei-
Llent or suicide. 1\7 e fail also Ir, grasp the 
atte,,11,ted distinction regarding when fire 
stale of niind of the 1: icti·m is or -is 1101 i11 
;.,sue. \\'e arr n"t irn prcssed with pi,Jns 
ins truct ions to the ju1·y which tell them to 
consider the sta temeuts of the victim only 
for the purpose of uetermining the vic-
tim's state of mind. 
48fl P.2,J nt 833 (emphasis uutled). 
49. Also iuvolving a drug pusher's "disciplin-
ing" of one of his colleagues. 
50. Evidence of the victim's sta tement indi<:at· 
ing her fear of appellant uo t only provirlc,I 
n basis for reasonable inferences contra-
di.-tory of appdlant's version of the rclc-
rnut 1·Yr11f:.;, inelndiug I the victim's] ar,-
tio11s, but it also proviucrl n basis for tl,e 
rl'as,rnahle in ference that I the victim I 
prohabl.Y repelled his sexual a,lvanccs :i nd 
that it was this :l<'tion 011 her part wl,i<-1, 
,·,111s('r! :tJllH!ll:1111 lo alf ar:k her :uul infl i<:t 
upon her the w<Hlll<ls whieh c,111scd her 
,lent It . 
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sible under the state of mind exception 
to the hearsay rule with a limiting in-
struction only if there is a manifest 
need for such evidence, i. e., if it is rele-
vant to a material issue in the case. 
Where there is a substantial likelihood 
of prejudice to the defendant's case in 
the admission of such testimony, it is in-
admissible if it bears only a remote or 
artificial relationship to the legal or fac-
tual issues raised in the case. Even 
where there is substantial relevance, the 
additional factual matters in the state-
ment may simply be too explosive to be 
contained by the limiting instruction, in 
which case exclusion of the testimony is 
also necessitated. 
The trial judge must undertake the 
familiar balancing process in which the 
relative degrees of relevance and preju-
dice are weighed and det~ . .rmined. But 
what is really meant by the conclusory 
and often abused terms "relevance" and 
"prejudice"? 
A. Relevance 
[10) Close examination reveals that 
there are in fact two "relevances" which 
must coexist. First, the victim's state 
of mind must be relevant to some mate-
rial issue in the case as, for example, 
where an issue of self-defense, suicide, 
or accidental death is raised by defend-
ant. Second, the extrajudicial statement 
51. There is no lacking of this second element 
of relernnce in the case at hanrf. That is, 
the statement is certainly probative on the 
declarant's state of mind if that were rel e-
vant to the case. 
52. The evidence of threats did not show a 
state of mind in<:'onsis tcnt with the Jiossi-
bili ty of suid<le. At best it demonstrated 
only a state of fear on the part of the de-
ceased. It neither rcbntte<l nor reinforce<] 
the tlicory of suir·ick Conceivably fear 
eonld ha1·e 1lrivcn the ,Jeeeasecl to self-de-
struction. Conversely it might not have. 
On this point there is a hlnnk reconl. 
Thus, evidence of the threats intro,ltwe,I 
solel.r to show the ,Jeclarnnt's state of 
mind was immaterial. l•'urthcrmorc, the 
admission of such evidence served to ex-
press the intent ancl suhseqnent action of 
the rlcfrwlnnts, i . c., they wanted to kill 
itself must be probative on that question 
of the victim's state of mind once it is 
conceded that this is a valid and relevant 
inquiry.51 
An illustration of a fatal deficiency in 
this latter element of relevance is the 
She-pard case itself. In Shepard it was 
clear that the state of mind of the de-
ceased was relevant to a material issue 
in the case-the defense of suicide. 
However, the statement "Dr. Shepard 
poisoned me" is of extremely slight pro-
bative value on the deceased's will to live 
( or in Justice Cardozo's words "the exis-
tence of a Yital urge") and is at the 
same time, of course, immeasurably 
prejudicial. Similarly, in Common-
wealth v. DelValle, 351 Mass. 489, 221 
N.E.2d 922 (1966), the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court was presented with a 
prosecution argument that statements of 
fear based on defendant's prior threats 
were relevant in rebutting the defense 
of possible suicide. However, the court, 
after surveying most of the relevant au-
thorities, found the declaration to be of 
insufficient probative value to justify 
its admission in the face of the substan-
tial prejudicial dangers involved in the 
jury's inferring the defendant's guilt 
from such statements in spite of a limit-
ing instruction.52 Cf. Benwell v. Dean, 
249 Cal.App.Zd 345, 57 Cal.Rptr. 394 
( 1967) _5:i 
the deceased, they so state, and they did 
kill him. 
221 :\'.E.2d at 924. 
53_ In Benwell v. Dean, n wrongful death ac-
tion, the court found the decedent's state of 
mind to be relevant to the iRsues in the case 
{ on the mensu re of damages) but found the 
sta tement itself to be insufficiently probative 
on that sta te of mind when compared to the 
severe damage that woul<l result to the de-
fcn,lant.'s ,·ase were the jury to misuse it. 
Since there was a strong likelihooil that the 
jnr.v woulcl he nnahlc to <,ompl.v with the 
limiting instru<"tion, the ,·onrt upheld the ·ex-
•·lusion of the testimony. "In the present 
<·ase the true cvi,lentiar; hearing of the sub-
ji,<:t <lec·larn1io11s was at hcst slight and re-
mote, )'l't of a nature us 10 mnke them very 
prcjndi,·iul against plaintiff." G7 CaJ.Rptr. 
nt 401. 
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B. Prejudice 
Prejudice is, of course, just another 
way of saying "harm to defendant's 
case." The crucial inquiry is how much 
harm will ensue 54 and how likely it is 
to occur. This in turn is weighed 
against the need for the evidence as dic-
tated by the two "relevances" described 
above. The likelihood of the harm re-
sulting can in turn be translated essen-
tially into the question of the probabili-
ty of jury misuse of the testimony as 
measured by the probable efficacy of the 
limiting instruction. We do not mean to 
infer that prejudice should be presumed 
in most cases to outweigh need, for some 
prejudice is bound to occur. What is 
called for is a fair judicial balancing of 
the factors. 
[11] A number of factors should be 
considered in making these determina-
tions. An illustrative few: 
1. Statements recounting past acts of 
the defendant 
One of the principal concerns voiced 
in the cases revokes around state of 
mind testimony that is inextricably 
bound up with the relation of past 
events or conduct on the part of the ac-
cused. Rarely does the testimony stop 
at the point "I am afraid of D [defend-
ant]". More often it is expressed: "I 
am afraid of D because he beat me and 
threatened to kill me." l\Iost courts are 
rightly teary of such testimony since it 
54. .\"ote that in determining the extent of the 
possible harm there is some inevitable over-
lap with the logically distinct question as to 
whether, once it is determined that error 
has been committed in the balancing vrocess 
and the testimony wrongly admitted, tlte er-
ror is so prejndicinl as to mandate a rever-
sal. 
55. See, e. fl., People v. Hamilton, note 21 s1t-
wa, 3G:! l'.2,1 at 481: Proposed Rnle,i of 




JTY /JI<' DECLAHAXT L\IMATEIUAL 
'.l'he following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
.renches closely upon the Shepard doc-
trine. Shepard v. United States, 290 U. 
S. 9G, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933). 
After Shepard, it has been unquestiona-
bly accepted that to allow hearsay state-
ments which relate past events on memo-
ry or belief under the state of mind ex-
ception would in effect swallow the 
hearsay rule.55 Therefore no court 
would admit such testimony for the pur-
pose of proving the truth of the matter 
alleged, yet many will accept it if intro-
duced solely on the state of mind issue 
with a limiting instruction. But, as in 
Shepard, when such statements bear 
close proximity to the issue of guilt or 
innocence it is equally clear that the lim-
iting instruction may be of dubious util-
ity at best. Thus the more narration of 
past acts or conduct of the defendant 
contained in the statement, the greater 
the danger of jury misuse. People v. 
Lew, 68 Cal.2d 774, 69 Cal.Rptr. 102, 441 
P.2d 942 (1968); People v. Hamilton, 
55 Cal.2d 881, 13 Cal.Rptr. 649, 362 P.2d 
473 (1961). 
2. Proximity to the vital issues in 
the case 
As stated above, statements which 
contain descriptions of past acts of the 
accused become insuperably prejudicial 
when the recital of such acts bears on 
the central issue of guilt or innocence. 
For example, in a trial for criminal as-
sault, the statement "I am afraid of D 
[defendant]" made by the victim might 
* * * 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or 
physical condition. A statement of the de-
clarant's then existing state of mind, emo-
tion, sensation, or physical condition (such 
as intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, 1min, and bodily ltealtlt), but not 
including a statement of memory or bel-ief 
lo vrore the fact remembe,·ed or believed 
unless it relates to the execution, revoca-
tion, identification, or t erms of dedarant's 
will. (emphasis added). 
Xo chnnges were recommende<l in this provi-
sion by the Subcommittee on Criminal Jus-
tice of the House .Judiciary Committee. II. 
It. G4G3, !l3d Cong., 1st Sess., Committee 
Print (June 28, 1973) . 
__ ,..,_.__ .. _,.....,......,.~---------~-----·· - - ---
i; 
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be very relevant on the issue of self-de-
fense. However, the statement "I am 
afraid of D-he beat me last week" is so 
close to the ultimate issue at hand that 
there is a greater danger that the jury 
will misuse the statement and assume 
some truth to the allegation of past con-
duct on the part of D.56 
Even where past conduct of the de-
fendant is not explicitly related, the 
proximity of the statement to the cen-
tral issues is a key factor in determin-
ing the degree of prejudice. For exam-
ple, the simple statement "I am afraid" 
contains no extraneous factual matters; 
and, if the declarant's state of mind is 
at all relevant, there is very little con-
ceivable prejudice to the defendant. 
However, the statement "I am afraid of 
D [defendant]" is more dangerous. It 
gives rise to the natural inference that 
there has been some past conduct on the 
part of defendant to justify sue~ a fear, 
e. g., past beatings or threats, or even 
that the statement accurately reflects on 
defendant's state of mind and 
intentions.5• For example, where the 
trial is for murder by stabbing, the 
statement "I am afraid that D is going 
to knife me" is much further along on 
the spectrum of possible prejudice.ss If 
descriptions of past conduct are also 
added in, the prejudicial dangers are 
even greater, e. g., "I am afraid that D 
56. Since su<'h statements conic! he considered 
too prejudicial to be admitted even where 
the victim's state of mind is quite relevant, 
they would certainly be inadmissible where 
there is only a peripheral relevance to the 
case. 
57. See note 26 Rupra. The prejudice in such 
a statement could well be outweighed of 
eourse, if, for exam11le, self-defense were at 
issue in the trial. 
58. Once again, while it could conceivably be 
outweighed by a strong nce<l for the evi · 
,Jenee, here it is for more likely that the 
prejudice would preclude such admissibility. 
59. The prejudice iu sneh a statement is very 
high. 
60. B. r,., Rtnte v. Cause, 107 Ariz. 4!Jl, 48!1 
I'.:!d s:io (l!l71) ; 8tate v. Shirley, 7 Or. 
App. 166, 488 P .2d 1401 (1971). The Cali-
will knife me-he has attacked me with 
a butcher knife twice last week." s9 
3. Corroboration 
A number of cases discuss corrobora-
tion by other testimony of the matters 
related in the deceased's statement. Yet 
it is unclear what the proper effect of 
corroboration should be. Some cases as-
sert that the hearsay description of past 
conduct is made acceptable if supported 
by additional evidence indicating the re-
liability of the statement, i . e., indicat-
ing that the past events did in fact 
take place as described.60 Others seem 
more willing to admit statements of fear 
if there is external corroboration of the 
fact that the declarant was truly afraid, 
e. g., outward non-verbal manifestations 
of fear by the declarant 61 or by others 
at the time of the statement.62 There is 
also substantial confusion as to whether 
such corroboration evidence should be a 
necessary prerequisite to admissibility,63 
or whether the statement should be pri-
ma facie admissible unless there appears 
to be external indications of non-
truthfulness.64 
It seems, however, that such inquiries 
are unprofitable. If the circumstantial 
facts contained in the statement can be 
proven by other independent testimony 
there seems even less need for the 
hearsay statement.65 If they cannot, 
fornia statute speaks to this requirement of 
trustworthiness. See note 22 s upra. 
61. E. g., People v. Finch, note 24 supra (de-
clarant had installed chains on lier doors, 
kept a weapon by her bed, etc. ; witnesses 
tcstific,] she was "very, ,·ery nervous, ex-
tremely upset, was losing weight and could 
not eat"). 
62. Lowrey v. State, note 41 .,upra (declar· 
ant's father). 
63. People v. Hamilton, note 21 supra; Peo· 
pie v. Lew, note 21 supra; People v. Ire-
land, 70 Cal.2cl (\22, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 
1 • .2<1 r.so < l!lG!l > . 
64. l'co]lle v. Livingston, 271 Cal.App.2d 628, 
77 Cal.Hptr. 53 (1069) ; People v. Spencer, 
71 Cal.2cl 933, 80 Cal.Hptr. !J!J, 458 P .2d 43 
(]!)(39). 
65. <:f. note 17 su11ra. 
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then the testimony has greater impact 
and higher unreliability-factors that 
certainly in no way militate in favor of 
admissibility. The proper role for cor-
roboration should probably be in deter-
mining whether error, if committed, was 
reversible error.66 Thus if there was 
substantial corroborative evidence of the 
circumstantial facts and the trial judge 
inadvisedly allowed in the hearsay, it 
could well be argued that such testimo-
ny, while undesirable, was harmless er-
ror since it did not so distort the validi-
ty of the trial as to require reversal. 
4. Inflammatory statements 
Where the external facts in the state-
ment are so inflammatory, as to unduly 
arouse the jury's emotions of prejudice 
or hostility, any evidence, whether or 
not involving state· of mind issues, must 
be excluded where its probative vahte is 
substantially outweighed by its unduly 
dramatic or emotional impact so as to 
create a substantial danger of undue 
prejudice.67 The application of this rule 
requires that the trial judge be allowed 
to exercise a broad discretion.Gs 
C. Prophylactic Measures for Mini-
mizing Prejudicial Dangers 
l. The limiting instruction 
Good limiting instructions are vital 
where the possibility exists that the jury 
will consider the testimony for an im-
proper purpose. The careful and repeat-
ed admonitions of the trial judge go far 
to sustain his judgment on appeal. 
However, in extreme cases, where the 
66. Nee pp. 7Sl-7H2 infra. 
67. Mr:Cormick on Evidence ~ ].'35, at 438-3!) 
(2d ed. 1972) ; Uniform Hules of Evidcnec, 
Rule 45; Proposed Federal Ilulcs of Evi-
1lcnec § 403. The application of this rule to 
dire<ct evidence has hccn 11ucstione<l: 
It is sometimes said that the process of 
baluncing probative vnlue against prcjmli1·e 
applies to circumstantial evidence only, 
Bunten v. Davis, 82 X.II. 304, 133 At!. l6, 
4!) A.L.H. 140!) (l!l26); State v. Whiten -
er, 228 S.C. 244, 8!J 8.E.2,l 701 (l!l55) . 
The value of direct evidence is not easily 
over-balanced, but the rc<'Ggnizcd power of 
the court to prevent exeessive eumulntion 
of witnesses shows that the general rul 1•, 
490 F.2d-49l/, 
relevance balance is clearly to be struck 
against the admission of the testimony, 
the limited utility of the special instruc-
tion has been repeatedly recognized by 
the courts.69 
Ultimately the amount of reliance one 
is willing to place on the limiting in-
struction must necessarily depend on the 
degree of respect one holds for the 
jury's ability to make and maintain such 
fine distinctions. Certainly a compel-
ling argument can be made for the 
jury's capacity to deal \\·ith such prob-
lems. Compare the argument of the dis-
senting justice in ·People v. Hamilton, 
note 21 supra, 13 Cal.Rptr. at 663, 362 
P.2d at 487 (White J., dissenting): 
To me it seems a sad commentary 
upon the intelligence of jurors, in the 
light of the court's constant, painstak-
ing and specific admonitions, to say 
that they were unable to follow them 
or that in violation of their sworn ob-
ligations as jurors they cast aside 
such admonitions. 1 cannot indulge in 
either of those assumptions 
with the majority's statement: 
It is difficult to believe that even the 
trained mind of a psychoanalyst could 
thus departmentalize itself sufficiently 
to obey the mandate of the limiting in-
struction. Certainly a lay mind could 
not do so. 
Id. 13 Cal.Rptr. at 657, 362 P.2d at 481. 
While to a certain extent this is a pol-
icy question and a matter of opinion, the 
United States Supreme Court in such 
cases as Shepard and Bruton•0 has clear-
at lenst in some of its aspcets, is applica-
ble to direct as well as to <:ircumstantial 
1>roof. Cases nrc collN·te<I in tl,c annota -
tions on limitation of witnesses in 5 A.L. 
lL:i,1 16!J, 328. 
l\lcCormi1·k, s1111rf/ at 4:3!J 11. :.lO. 
68. l\fr('ormiek, note (i7 ~upra, § ]Si'i, at 440 
II. 3G. 
69. See 11otcs lH-21 .rnprn & accompauyiug 
text. In both l'co1>lc "· Hamilton, note 21 
supra, and l'cople \' . Lew, note 21 supra, re-
peated an<! earcful i11struetions were insuffi. 
cicnt to 1>revc11t prejudidnl and reversible 
cr.ror. 
70. Xotcs 20, 28 , 111//·a. 
l 
l ! 
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ly indicated it believes that there are 
sharp limits to the capabilities of the 
jury to comply with special instructions 
as to highly incriminating evidence of 
this type.71 Therefore in extreme cases 
such evidence must be excluded in spite 
of the limiting instruction. 
2. Deletion of Objectionable Testi-
mony 
It has been recognized that an effi-
cient method of avoiding unnecessary 
prejudice where the declara·nt's state of 
mind is otherwise relevant is to delete 
the offensive portions of the statement. 
Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 193 P. 
251, 254 (1920) (cited with approval in 
McCormick on Evidence § 294, at 696-97 
n. 67 (2d ed. 1972). Presumably if the 
statement could not be so altered with-
out completely losing its sense it must 
be excluded in toto. Cf. Bruton v. Unit-
ed States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 n. IO, 88 S. 
Ct. i620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).72 
As with most evidentiary questions, 
especially those involving "balancing," 
substantial deference to the trial judge's 
discretion must necessarily be afforded.73 
This opinion is designed to aid in 
such determinations and to suggest some 
standards in the hope of achieving more 
71. This is due in some degree to the attitude 
of our juries toward our judges. It has 
been my observation that judges in England 
go further in their instructions than wc do, 
they expect their juries to abide by the in-
structions they are given and that their ex-
pectations are carried out to a greater de-
gree than is true generally in this country. 
Some of the difficulty may lie with the 
courts themselves. Professor Morgan may 
have come close to the cause when lie com-
mented that American courts in the use of 
limiting instructions exhibit an inconsistent 
attitude toward juries by "treating them at 
times as a group of low-graile morons anrl 
at other times as men endowed with a su-
perlmman abilit.v to control their emotions 
and intellects." K !\Jorgan, Some Problems 
of Proof Unrler the Anglo-American System 
of Litigation ]O;j (1956) , referrccl to in Bru-
ton v. United StateR, 3!)1 U.S. 123, 133 11. 8, 
88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2<1 476 (1068) . 
72. '.l'he referre,1 footuote states in part: 
Some courts have reqnirc,l deletion of 
reforeuces to codef endan ts where practicn-
uniformity in an area where the deci-
sions are in a dismaying state of dis-
array. 
V. THE INST ANT CASE 
[12] Applying the above principles 
to the facts of this case, we first inves-
tigate the potential prejudice and then 
any counten·ailing relevance. 
A. Prefudice 
The prejudicial dangers in the state-
ment in question are substantial but not 
overwhelming. It is true that the state-
ment is not as incriminating as if it had 
specifically alleged past acts or past 
threats. But clearly a palpable danger 
exists that the jury will infer from the 
statement of Thelma Parks, testified to 
on October 16th, that Parks stated "I 
am afraid I will be killed by Roland 
Brown"74 that Roland Brown was a 
man capable of murder, that he had 
done things in the past to Parks to jus-
tify this fear, or that Brown had explic-
itly threatened Parks' life in the past. 
Any or all of the above conclusions are 
inevitably present in the jury's collective 
mind. Yet all such inferences insofar as 
they may reflect on defendant's inten-
tions o,r past conduct would be improper-
ly drawn. :.\Ioreover, the statement is 
ble. See. e. g., Oliver v. United States, 
[118 U.8.App.D.C. 302] 335 F.2d 724; 
People \". Yitagliano, 15 :\'.Y.2il 360, [258 
:\.Y.S.2J S39] 206 ::>.'.E.2rl 864; People v. 
La Belle. 18 :\.Y.2d 40;;, [27G N.Y.S.2d 
105] 222 :\.E.2il 727. For criticisms sug-
gesting that deletions ( redaction) from 
the <:onfession are ineffective, see, e. g., 
Xote, 72 IIar\'.L.Rev. 920, 990 (1959) : 
Comment, 24 U.Chi.L.Rev. 710, 713 
(1957) ; Xote, 74 Yale L.J. 553, 564 
(1965). 
See note~ 79-80, 84 infra & accompanying 
text, as to the trial r·ourt's refusal to delete 
the offcnsin references in this case. 
73. People v. Sweeney, note 20 supra, 357 P. 
2d nt JOGS ("it is for the trial court in the 
exercise of its judicial discretion to deter-
mine whether its fthe evidence] probative 
value is outweighed by its possible 11rejudi-
cial effect and to admit or exclude it accord-
iugly") ; People v. Finch, note 24 supra, 29 
Cnl.Uptr. nt 430. 
74. A pnrnphrase of the testimony elicited. 
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extremely closely related to the issues at ference was ,·ery probably drawn and 
hand. The defendant here directly most likely served to color the jury's 
placed his identity in issue, and the cha!- consideration of all subsequent testimo-
lenged testimony expressly names him as ny, through the arguments of counsel 
the probable murderer. To the jury it and until the instruction was finally giv-
must have been as simple as this: en by the court on October 23rd. But 
Parks feared being killed by Roland more importantly, the close proximity of 
Brown, and sure enough Parks was the improper inference to the question 
killed. Therefore, odds are good that of guilt or innocence makes it highly un-
it was done by Roland Brown. Thus likely that the jury sufficiently compart-
the danger that the statement in ques- mentalized its consideration of the testi-
tion would be misused by the jury on mony in abeyance to the limiting in-
the disputed issue of identity is extreme- struction ultimately given.78 
]y high. 
In order to attempt to minimize this 
danger, the trial judge was requested to 
give an immediate limiting instruction.75 
This he refused to do, preferring to in-
clude his instruction on this bit of evi-
dence among all the instructions given 
at the end of the trial.76 In the circum-
stances of this case this in itself may be 
erroneous procedure, 77 because it cer-
tainly is not calculated to minimize the 
prejudicial impact of the testimony. 
Without the benefit of an immediate 
guiding instruction, the jury was free 
throughout the seven remaining days of 
the trial, until the instruction was given, 
to assume that the statement would in 
fact be probative on the issue as to 
whether Roland Brown actually killed 
Parks. Realistically the prohibited in-
75. Tr. 445. 
76. MR. CHOROSZEJ: Your honor, for the 
record, the defense will note the objection 
to the Court's ruling. 
I also request that the Court give in-
structions to the jury as to the limitation 
THE COURT: I have already told you 
about instructions, counsel. Any instruc-
tions you want me to give that are spedal 
specify the instruction and the authority 
for it. We will discuss instructions at the 
end of the ease if it goes to the jury. 
MR. CHOROSZE.T: Yes, I was aware at 
the end of the case, hut perhaps a <·an-
tionary instruction to the jury as to the 
relevance of the testimons-
'.rIIE COUit'l' : Xo, I will not give that. 
I do not think I am required in the course 
of the trial to give any special instructions 
with respect to this evidence. It is mlmi1-
ted, in the Court's judgment, as an cxecp-
Furthermore, the trial court refused 
to excise the reference to the defendant. 
While this simple step could well have 
minimized the possibility that the jury 
would conclude that Brown had threat-
ened Parks' life in the past and the pos-
sibility that the jury would apply the 
statement on the issue of identity to 
conclude that Brown was the actual 
murderer, the court assumed that dele-
tion of Brown's name was an improper 
technique.79 .:.\Ioreowr the court's re-
fusal came in spite of the fact that 
the prosecuting attorney himself, un-
doubtedly aware of the prejudicial dan-
gers inherent in such testimony, explic-
itly offered to elicit the statement from 
the witness without reference to the 
defendant.80 
tion to t he !,earsa.,· rule, and it is relevant 
under the Government's theory of its case. 
'l'r. 445-46. 
77. Lowther v. United States, 455 F.2tl 657, 
66.5 (10th Cir. 1972) ( where the court gave 
clarifying instructions with respeet to cer-
tain testimony during the trial there was no 
need to limit it through a general instruction 
at the cntl of the trial) ; Fountain Y. United 
States, 384 F.2,1 024, 632 n. !) (5th Cir. 
19U7); Fnited States v. Thomas, G2 F .Supp. 
r.71 (KD.Wash.1!)43); rf. United States v. 
I<,end1, J;,:.! C.S.App.D.C. 325, 332, 470 l~.2<1 
1234, 1241 (1972). 
78. Moreo\·cr the instrnctiou was not com-
pletely ,·orrer-t in that it ohli11ucly irnplicd 
that the testimony con!,! he considered as 
having some hearlng on Browu's activities 
awl i,leutity. Sec note 8 supra. 
79. Nee notes 7:.,_73 supra & accompanyi11~ 
text. 
80. l\l J{. II O I TK : I Tlw Assist:rnt lJ .S. A 11or-
11ey J 
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B. Relevance 
On the other side of the scale we per-
ceive an overwhelming deficiency in rel-
evance. Here there is no claim of self-
defense, suicide, accidental death81 or 
any other plausible issue that would jus-
tify an inquiry into the victim's state of 
mind. The prosecution seemed to be 
aware of this need to find some issue 
which would provide a shred of justifi-
cation for the admission of the damag-
ing testimony. It was urged that with-
out this statement, the jury would get 
the case "with a hole in it, with a piece 
missing."82 As the transcript indicates, 
the prosecuting attorney argued for ad-
missibility on the ground that the state-
ment in some cryptic way indicated the 
victim's movements around the time of 
the killing.83 In its brief on appeal the 
Government now argues : 
Thus the government's proof that 
Parks was afraid to leave his home 
.\:ow, we urge upon the Court that the 
Court can rule within its discretion, and 
certainly within the Jaw, that we excise 
the portion of the reference to Roland \\'. 
Brown; bnt at least say that he [Parks ] 
was scared of losing his life. 
That seems to compromise the positions 
well within the law and still avoid the 
prejudice to Mr. Brown. 
'l'HE COURT: You do not compromise 
in that fashion, counselor. Either the tes-
timony is admissible or inadmissible. 
l\IR. HOCCK: The Gm·ernment snhmits 
that in its totality the evidence is admissi-
ble. 
THE COURT: It is either in totality or 
it is not. 
Tr. 333-34. 
8 I. During the course of the trial there was 
testimony that "Parks was shot accidental-
ly" (Tr. 372, 975) but the type of "accident" 
there referred to is not the type of "acci-
dental <leath" discusse<l above at note 34 & 
accom1ianying text. ::\"adine Frazier, appel -
lant's "girl friend," testified that prior to 
the trial she went to Lorton Reformatory at 
his request, all(! that ap1iellant said: 
A Ile said J,e was there [ when Parks 
was killed] and that it was an accident 
the way it l1appene<l; and also that Boot-
nose wns I here. 
Tr. 372. 
Q l\Iiss Frazier, when Roland W. Browu 
was talking to you about the killing of Ri -
cardo l'arks, what conversatiou did he tell 
and was fearful in the 
week preceding his death was relevant 
and probative with respect to whether 
Parks went to the scene of the murder 
voluntarily or under duress. Thus 
Parks' intention not to leave his home 
was a relevant factor to be considered 
in the jury's determination of whether 
appellant was guilty of premeditated 
and deliberate murder. 
Brief for Appellee at 25. The Gov-
ernment thus claims that the evidence 
showed that the deceased would not vol-
untarily have left his house and there-
fore was probably farced to be at the lo-
cation at which he was eventually found 
dead. Such conclusion, however, even if 
it had support in the factual context of 
this case, is too remote from the issues 
at hand and is too speculative to be ac-
cepted. This is not a kidnapping case 
and there is no point in rebutting some 
nonexistent defense claim that he went 
you, what talking, did he say took place 
before Hkal't],:, Parks was kill ed at the 
place where he ,ms killed? 
A He didn't say who it was but that 
someone was playing with Ricardo Parks 
with a pistol and said, why don't you pay 
me the money that you owe me; and that 
Par ks was shot accidentally. 
Tr. 375. Appellant took the stand and spe-
ci fically denied making the latter statement 
after it was read to him by his own counsel: 
Do you den~· that yon ever said that to 
her'! 
A Yes, sir. I <lo deny I saitl that to Xa-
dine Frazier. 
Tr. 9'i5 . This rlen ial makes it plain that 
there is no d airn by appellant that the 
shooting was a~eiclental. His defense was 
an alibi. Likewise the Government does not 
claim that the shooting was accidental. 
82. Tr. 328. 
83. MR. HOUCK: The Court 
held that it was perfectly proper to intro-
<lnee it witl, a limiting instruction, which 
we urge upon the Court, that this testi-
mony is relernnt to how Parks got to 
wl,erc he was found dead. 
It is not relernnt to who killed him. But 
the fact that t,e wonl<l go across tpwn to 
he with this man Howlancl \V. Brown is an 
incredible fad. looked at in the context of 
his fcnr arnl of his fear of Holancl Brown, 
unless something Jess than vohrntary ac· 
tion were taken on his r,urt. 
. . - . ~ - . . .. 
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voluntarily to meet with defendant. 
One does not "consent" to be murdered. 
There thus appears to be no legally rele-
vant purpose for the introduction of this 
evidence other than for the clearly im-
proper inference it supports as to the 
probable identity of the murderer. 
The prejudice from the introduction 
of the full statement was manifest and 
when compared with the tenuous rela-
tionship to the issues advanced by the 
prosecution, the results of the relevance 
balancing appear obvious. In these cir-
cumstances exclusion was clearly 
required.Bl Moreover, e\·en if Brown's 
name is deleted we consider on the facts 
of this case that evidence of the victim's 
state of mind, without more, is inadmis-
sible to prove the state of mind of the 
accused. Accordingly, no part of the 
statement should be admitted on a re-
trial of Brown. 
Turning to the question of whether 
the error constituted reversible error, 
we have no difficulty whatever in con-
cluding that it did . In the words of 
Justice Sullivan of the California Su-
preme Court in the Ireland case: 
The error was prejudicial. The 
statement in question not only refl ect-
ed Ann's [victim] state of mind at the 
time of utterance; it also constituted 
an opinion on her part as to conduct 
which defendant would undertake at a 
future time . On the basis of this 
hearsay opinion the jury might rea-
sonably have inferred that Ann sever-
al hours before the homicide had con'-
cluded that defendant had then 
formed the intention to kill her. The 
next logical inference, to wit, that 
'.l'hat type of argument and that type of 
testimony is really the only way that the 
jnry c:an evaluate his presence on the 
scene, all(] because of the fact that this is 
the only way that this kind of testimony 
<·nn get in, since he is <learl anrl cannot 
say: I wouldn't have goi1e there in a mil-
lion years; the man I was biding from 
wns this man . 
'.l'his is the only way that that ki11<l of 
thing enu get before tlie jury nnd the only 
wny that the jury can know it. 
Ann's assessment of defendant's then 
intention was accurate and d~fendant 
had in fact formed an intention to kill 
several hours before the homicide 
strikes directly at the heart 
of the defense. The judgment must, 
there/ ore, be reversed. ( emphasis 
added) 
People Y. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 
Cal.Rptr. 188, 193-194, 450 P .2d 580, 
585 (1969). S ee also People v. Hamil-
ton, note 21 supra, 362 P.2d at 484 ; 
People \'. Lew, note 21 supi-a, 441 P.2d 
at 945-946; State v. Bartolon, note 
24 supra, 495 P .2d at 776; People v. 
Purvis, note 24 supra, 362 P.2d at 716-
717. 
The statement presented all the classic 
hearsay dangers and abuses. Here was 
that voice from the grave casting an in-
criminating shadow on the defendant. 
On what grounds did the victim base his 
fear of appellant? Was the fear a ra-
tionai one? Even if justified in fear-
ing someone, was appellant the proper 
focu s of that fear? These questions 
cry out to be voiced as part of defense 
counsel's cross-examination. Yet there 
is no one to cross-examine or confront. 
The damaging evidence stands impreg-
nable- irretrievably lodged in the ju-
rors' minds. We find that the erro-
neously admitted evidence here is equal-
ly as crucial as that in Ireland, supra-
that it "strikes at the heart of the de-
fense." 
The defendant contended that he was 
not the person who killed Parks. The 
point at issue was thus the identity of 
Parks' killer. The Government's evi-
dence at its fullest put three men, 
\\'e feel that it is u most relevant fact. 
Unless the jury gets that fact the Govern-
ment's ca~c is being 11resented with a hole, 
with a piece missing. 
Tr. 327-28. 
84. " \\'hen th<, declarations arc of sud, a na-
ture :ts to be ohl'ionsly prejudicial, and where 
any possil1le proper benefit to the prosecn: 
tion is far ontweighed hy its pr('jndicial ef-
fec t to the accused, such evidence should ht, 
excluded." People v. Hamilton, note 21 su-
pra, 13 Cul.Hptr. at 656, 362 P.2d nt 480. 
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Brown, Austin and Ferguson,85 on the 
second floor of the building, with at 
least two with guns,86 at or about the 
moment Parks was killed.87 In such fac-
tual setting, the admission of the 
hearsay statement that Parks feared he 
would be killed by Brown is grossly 
prejudicial to Brown. The judgment of 
conviction of the lesser offense included 
within count one of the indictment is ac-
cordingly reversed and a new trial is or-
dered on the charge of second degree 
murder.ss 
VI. THE CONVICTION OF CAR-
RYING A DANGEROUS 
WEAPON 
[13] However, we are of opinion 
that the erroneous admission of the 
state of mind testimony did not in any 
way improperly influence the verdict 
with respect to the charge of carrying a 
dangerous weapon, a pistol, in violatisn 
of D.C.Code § 22-3204.89 When the ev-
idence adduced with respect to this of-
fense is fairly appraised it must be con-
cluded that appellant's alibi claim was 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to 
have been a fabrication. This conclu-
sion flows from the letter in his own 
handwriting90 to his girl friend, Na-
dine Frazier, 01 by his statements to her 
suggesting the fabrication of an alibi,92 
85. Browu, Austin (Bearer) and Ferguson 
(Tr. 166-176) . 
86. Brown, u AG caliber automatic (Tr. 175-
176) . Austin, a .25 caliber automatic (Tr. 
168). 
87. Xote 81 .rnpra. 
88. Cf. Pri<,e v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 90 S. 
Ct. 1757, 26 L.E<l.2d 300 (1070) ; Green v. 
UHitetl States, 3G5 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 
L.Ecl.2,l J!)f) (1957). 
89. 'l'l,e ~tntntc provides: 
;{o person !Shall within the J)istri,·t of 
Columbia 1·11rr.v t,ither openly or c:oncealcd 
011 or nhonl his person, except in liis 
dwelJini.; hons<! or pla,,c of lmsi11ess or on 
other Jan,! possrsscrf h,v him , n pistol, 
without a license therefor issued as hcre-
innftn provi1]1\1l, or any ,lca<llr or 1l:1nger-
ous wenpon 1·ap11hle of being so eoneenled.' 
D.C.Co<lc § 22-3204 (1973). 
The iwJict1n,, nt 1'11urg1:d : 
by his admission to Nadine Frazier that 
he was present when Parks was killed,93 
and by the testimony of one Baylor, who 
had no prior personal involvement with 
appellant, that at about the time of the 
killing he saw him walk away from the 
house where Parks was killed.94 
The elements of the substantive of-
fense were also proved by strong .evi-
dence. Eyewitness testimony permitted 
the jury to conclude that appellant was 
seen carrying a .45 caliber automatic 
within moments following the killing.os 
Under the circumstances testified as ex-
isting at that time, where the victim's 
body had just rolled down the stairs and 
into view of those on the first floor, 
closely following by appellant carrying 
the gun, it was also permissible for the 
jury to conclude that his purpose in 
carrying the weapon at that time was to 
use it as a weapon if necessary.96 In 
fact, any other conclusion would belie 
the evidence. Thus, the jury's verdict 
on this count is wholly supported by 
substantial testimony, exclusive of the 
erroneously admitted state of mind testi-
mony. The state of mind testimony was 
circumstantial and went to the murder 
charge, whereas the charge of carrying 
a dangerous weapon was supported com-
pletely by direct testimony uninfluenced 
by the state of mind testimony. Under 
THIRD cou:--.:T: 
On or nbo11t October 4, 1968, within the 
District of Columbia, Roland W. Brown 
did carry, openly and concealed on or 
about his person, a dangerous weapon, ca-
pable of being so concealed, that is, a pis-
tol, without a license therefor issued as 
provided by law. 
90. C:ovt. Ex. Hi. 
91. 'I'r. 371, 378. 
92. Id. 3fJ5, ;n1, 37G. 
93. Id. 372, 37G. 
94. /,l, 233-23ti, 23!.I, 254, 263. 
95. Id. 175-17G. 
96. I<'nll v. Esso Stan<lar<I Oil Company, 297 
F .2,l 411, 414 (rith Cir. H>Gl); Eagleston v. 
Fnitc,I ::,;tatcs, 172 I<'.2<1 104, 1!)9, 12 Alaska 
:ml (!Jth Cir.), ,·ert. clcnicd, 33G U.S. 952, 69 
S.Ct. 882. !l3 L.Ed. 1107 (1949) ; Tatum v. 
United :States, 71 App.D.C. 3!l3, 110 F.2d 
fiGG (l!l40) ; Lcftwitl'h v. United States, 251 
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Cite us 400 F.2d 783 (19H) 
such circumstances appellant's conviction 1. Health and Environment e:::>25.5 
on the second count was not prejudiced Fact that all of evidence considered 
by the court's error. We accordingly af- by Federal Power Commission was ac-
firm the conviction and sentence for tually developed in another case did not 
carrying a dangerous weapon. deprive petitioner of any legally recog-
Judgment accordingly. nized right or constitute a deprivation 
of fundamental fairness, where petition-
er was a party to other proceedings, of-
fered evidence and had full opportunity 
to participate in the hearings. Natural 
Gas Act, § 7(c, e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f(c, 
e); National Environmental Policy Act 
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COM· of 1969, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 
PANY, Petitioner, 4332(2) (C). 
v. 
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, 
Respondent, 
The People of the State of Califor-
nia et al., Intervenors. 
No. 72-1636. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit . 
Argued April 25, 1973. 
Decided Jan. 2, 1974. 
Proceeding was brought to review 
order of Federal Power Commission. 
The Court of Appeals, 483 F.2d 1275, re-
manded with instructions. On reconsid-
eration subsequent to remand, the Court 
of Appeals held that fact that all of evi-
dence considered by Federal Power Com-
mission was actually developed in anoth-
er case did not deprive petitioner of any 
legally recognized right or constitute a 
deprivation of fundamental fairness, 
where petitioner was a party to other 
proceedings, offered evidence and had 
full opportunity to participate in the 
hearings, and that Federal Power Com-
mission adequately established by com-
petent evidence that an environmental 
impact statement was not legally re-
quired on denial of application for cer-
tificate of public convenience and neces-
sity authorizing transportation of gas 
and construction of additional facilities. 
Decree accordingly. 
Wilbur K. Miller, Senior Circuit 
Judge, did not participate in opinion, 
2. Health and Environment G:=>25.10 
Federal Power Commission ade-
quately established by competent evi-
dence that an environmental impact 
statement was not legally required on 
denial of application for certificate of 
public convenience and necessity author-
izing transportation of gas and construc-
tion of additional facilities. 
John T. Miller, Jr., Washington, D. C., 
for petitioner. 
William M. Sawyer, Atty., F. P. C., 
with whom Leo E. Forquer, Gen. Coun-
sel, George W. McHenry, Jr., Acting Sol. 
F. P. C., were on the brief for respon-
dent. 
Lawrence Q. Garcia, San Francisco, 
Cal., with whom J. Calvin Simpson, San 
Francisco, Cal., was on the brief for in-
tervenors People of the State of Cal. and 
the Public Utilities Commission of the 
State of Cal. Sheldon Rosenthal, San 
Francisco, Cal., also entered an appear-
ance for intervenors State of Cal. and 
the Public Utilities Commission of the 
State of Cal. 
Frederick T. Searls, Malcolm H. Fur-
bush and Daniel E. Gibson, San Francis-
co, Cal., were on the brief for intervenor 
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. 
C. Hayden Ames and Donald J. Rich-
ardson, Jr., San Francisco, Cal., were 
on the brief for intervenor San Diego 
Gas and Electric Co. 
Thomas F . Brosnan, Washington, D. 
C., entered an appearance for intervenor 
Tucson Gas and Electric Co. 
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245-2564 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CRll-2053 
FIRST AMENDMENT TO 
STATE'S WITNESS L ST 
In addition to the other witnesses disclosed in the State's 
Witness List dated June 13, 2012, the State also intends to call 
Jennifer Hickson, 320 1st Street, St. Maries, Idaho, and Roger 
Hossfeld, 306 8th Street, 







FIRST AMENDMENT TO STATE'S WITNESS LIST, Page - 1 
I hereby that on the 21 
day of , 2012, a true 
and corr ct copy of the foregoing 
was delivered/mailed, postage prepaid to: 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Maries, Idaho 
FIRST AMENDMENT TO STATE'S WITNESS IST, 
State vs. Joseph Duane Herrera 3B-COU RTROOM 1 
Time Speaker Note 
8:28:18 AM 107/13/2012 !Case No. CR2011-2053, State vs. Joseph Duane Herrera. 
!District Judge Fred M. Gibler presiding ; Julie Farland, Court 
!Reporter; Carol Ryan , Deputy Clerk. Douglas Paul Payne, 
!Prosecuting Attorney; William Butler, Defense Attorney. 
!Hearing: Pre-Trial Motions: State's Motions in Limine and 
/Defense Motion to change Venue and Motions to Suppress. 
1 :09:50 PM f Judge icalls case. Defendant appears in custody of numerous 
: jjailers and Sheriff Kirts . 
1:10:18 PM i,_: !Motion to admit evidence of prior acts, admission of 
!statements made by S Camack to 3rd parties, Defense 
!Motion to Change Venue and Motion to Suppress. 
[Requests_ sit at counsel table with them. 
1: 12: 14 PM i DA J Move to exclude any witnesses and advise not to discuss. 
1:12:29 PM f PA !No objection. 
1: 12:34 PM jJudge I Directs anyone subpoenaed as witness to leave and 
l !admonishes not to discuss. 
1:13:02 PM !PA !Issue on that James Camack, Jack Camack, Kaytlin 
'Camack and Susie Camack, family of victim and entitled .. 
1:13:41 PM /DA /Object. 
1:13:44 PM /Judge ioverruled, but admonishes not to discuss. 
1:14:36 PM iDirect exam iPA calls Eunice McEwen. 
1: 14:41 PM j Eunice McEwen / Duly sworn by clerk. Friend of Stephanie Camack since 5th 
: \grade. Was told of relationship of stephanie with Joe 
l Herrera in September/October. 
1:16:22 PM IDA !Objection to allowing hearsay evidence. Will be continuing 
, !objection. 
1 :16:32 PM fJudge !overruled. Purpose of hearing is to determine admissibility. 
: ; 
i ; 
1: 16:52 PM ,.:_1McEwen /In December Stephanie told her she broke up withJoe· ··········· ··· 
/because he choked her out and hit her head against the 
I shifter, and said if she didn't shut up he would shoot her. 
1 :20:42 PM J !Stephanie made her promise not to tell anyone. I told her 
!not to talk to him again , or I wouldn't talk to her. She said 
/"no". I then told her mom and she wouldn't talk to me . 
................................ · .............................................................. ,,,;······ .. •······ ···· .......... .................................................................................................................................................................. ....... . 
1:22:26 PM /Cross exam , 
1 :22:32 PM I McEwen iThey could have been dating prior to September. After the 
l :breakup, Stephanie went back with Joe. Broke off contact 
l !with Stephanie for a week after conversation in December. 
l :Texted her, but her phone didn't work. Encouragde 
l !Stephanie to break up with Joe on multiple occasions. 
I ! 
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PM1 _ if f ~?~~~:;~~!~~~!~~~?~~~~;~~~~~:I!~~~~~y~~=e-
1 :31 :53 PM: /Didn't hear from Stephanie for about a week, then received 
/text while heading to the hospital Christmas morning. One 
!time was talking to her, heard Joe in the background, and 
!the phone went dead. 
:;:~!:~-1~~!9:s··comack······ -i:~~es:o~~c~;:!,k.·················· ······ - : : : : :::: :: 
1 :34:00 PM f Direct exam jFather of Stephanie Comack. Daughter started dating Joe 
/ /Herrera in September. Thought something was amiss a 
/ /couple of weeks before she was murdered. After she broke 
i /up with him, he would text her. She used my phone since 
........................................... : ................................................................ the .. broke .. hers ..... Texts .. would .. say .. he .. would .. kill .. hi.mself ......................... . 
... 1.:36.:41 ... PM .. l ......... .. ............................................... ..JEncou_raged ... her .. to .. get .. out .. of. relationship ................................................................ . 
... 1.:37_:1_9 .. PM .. !Judge ........................................ ...JAdmonishes .. witness.to .. behave .. in .. the_.courtroom_. ...................................... .. 
1 :37:34 PM /James Comack /She said dad didn't understand. That he, Joe, was psycho. 
/ /Was about 23rd or 24th, day before Christmas. She said he 
l jbroke phone twice about a month before. On 24th, she 
l jasked if he could come over for Christmas. Witness said 
/ )es . 
....... ., .. , ......................... ... ...... . 1
41
1 
HM I_ - - - ,~~~~:'.~~:i:~~i?:s~~?~-:~==~t"!~!c}~~~i:h it t:isti:: 
1 :42:00 PM jCross exam jWill Butler 
1:42:03 PM /James Comack /Psycho statements several times. Mr. Comack had said for 
i /her to get back, as he was a low life s.o.b. 
1 :45:47 PM f j First met Joe Herrera in 2010. Doesn't remember exact 
! /date or month. Spoke to him a couple of times then, but 
/ /never since. He never came into the house . ................................................. . 
1 :48:09 PM /judge /Witness excused. 
1:48:35 PM jsusan Comack iDuly sworn by clerk. 2120 West Idaho Avenue, St. Maries. 
i /When Stephanie started dating Joe Herrera, she didn't want 
! i her dad to know. After started dating, Joe was controlling 
l iher. She would have to check with Joe. In December, she 
i /was breaking up with him all of the time and then would go 
i !back. Stephanie said he might kill himself, but never her. 
i [Joe would threaten suicide in texts on Suzan's phone. 
l !When Susan threatened to talk to Joe's parents, Stephanie 
l jsaid no. 
I I 
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1:54:28 PM ! !On Christmas Eve, Stephanie wanted to go shopping, but 
/couldn't go. Susan bought her a new phone. Stephanie 
)ook the phone on Christmas Eve and said she would see 
!them the next day. Stephanie said Joe broke the phone 
/because he was mad and didn't want her texting other 
!people. Stephanie said she couldn't get away from him 
jbecause he was psycho. 
1 :58:39 PM icross exam iwill Butler ................................... .. .. ... .... ............................... .................... .. 
1 :58:46 PM isusan Camack istephanie wanted to borrow Susan's car, because Joe was 
! !threatening to kill himself. Saw broken phone. Suzan took 
1 !card out of it and put it in knew phone. Stephanie wanted to 
!go with Susan when sister was in labor, but couldn't go 
!because of Joe. Joe arrived and Stephanie left with Joe. 
!Stephanie stayed with Joe, coming home for showers and 
!clean clothes. 
2:05:52 PM tJudge iwitness excused. .. ................................................................. .. .............................................................. .. 
2 :06:16 PM fJack Camack - I Duly sworn by clerk. Brotoher of Stephanie Camack. 
!Direct exam ! 
2:07: 10 PM j iAbout December 16th, Stephanie had bruises on arms while 
/ !at Suzi's apartment. Bruises were on inside under upper 
1 !arm, like someone had grabbed her. When asked if Joe had 
/done it, Stephanie clammed up about it. Texted Stephanie 
!on Christmas Eve. She said she would be there in the 
jmorning. 
2:09:26 PM icross Exam ! ........................................................................ .......... .. .. .. ............. ...... ................................................... .. .. 
2 :11 :24 PM jJudge jWitness excused. 
2: 11:47 PM ! Kaytlin Camack ! Duly sworn by clerk. Stephanie's sister. in fall , contacted 
' !sister once or twice a week or on Facebook. Stephanie 
/wanted to keep relationship a secret. In December, 
!Stephanie said Joe broke her cellphone because he thought 
!she was texting guys . Saw handprint bruises on Stephanie's 
/arms on evening of 16th. Stephanie said Joe was mean to 
!her and broke her cellphone. After Jack asked about the 
!bruises, she got all quiet. Christmas morning , text said 
!Stephanie hated him too much to be scared. 23rd text also 
/apologized for not being there. Stephanie said she couldn't 
rve Wit: Sl:t:r: ::ca::e ~~: :~e~ ~::re s.h: live: -
2:18:28 PM !Cross exam !Found out about relationship when Joe wouldn't let 
!Stephanie come to Kaylin's kid 's birthday party. She knew 
iof Joe from high school. 
2:22:28 PM jJudge /witness excused. · .. 
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2:22:35 PM !Kimberly Smith - )Duly sworn by clerk. Knew both Stephanie and Joe. Dated 
'.
:,,,,_!direct exam .!Joe 2004 - 2005. Joe was jealous. Joe broke her cellphone l 
!twice during arguments. Kimberly finally broke up with Joe. 
2:25: 11 PM !Cross exam !Will Butler 
2:25:22 PM iKimberly Smith iDated for 3 years. Lived together. Split up either summer of 
i J06 or 07. 
2:26:51 PM fJudge !Witness excused. 
2:27:43 PM f Kiani Appell !Duly sworn. Dated Joe Herrera 2 1/2 years, 2008 - 2009. 
1 jNoevember 25, 2009, police were called. Joe took her 
/cellphone to call his mom. Police gave it back. She ended 
iup on the ground. 
2:29:39 PM jcross exam iwill Butler. 
2:30:08 PM /Kiani Appell !Used to visit. Intimate relatonship with Joe 2008 - 2009. 
2:31 : 11 PM f Judge !Witness excused. 
2:31 :28 PM f Bobbie Riddle !Duly sworn by clerk. Knew Stephanie Camack a long time. 
if riend of family. Stephanie came to dad's house. Talked to 
!Bobbie about how they would fight a lot. She would think it 
/was her fault , but then thought it wasn't. He would push her 
........................................... · .............................. .......................... ...... / aroun.d .. and .. threaten .. her ..... Would .. th reaten .. to .. kill .. himself ................. . 
.. 2:35_:03 .. PM_.i C.ross._exam ............ .. ......... ..JWill .. Butler .................................................................................................................................................................... . 
2:35:10 PM /Bobbie Riddle /Would see Stephanie at James Comack's house. Has 
· /never met Joe. Car would pull up and Stephanie would 
jcome in. Stephanie would stop by every two or three days. 
)She was in love with Joe. 
2:37:05 PM fJudge iwitness excused. 
2:37:15 PM ITiffany Reeves /Duly sworn by clerk. Engaged to Jack. Knew Stephanie 8 
· !years. In bathroom Stephanie was getting ready and they 
!saw bruises all over her arms. She didn't deny it was Joe . 
............................................ ..!. ...................................................................................................................................... ............................................................... . 
2:39:55 PM /Butler )Object to conclusion . 
2:40:03 PM !Judge jsustained. 
2:40:10 PM jReeves iBefore getting together with Joe, she was happy. At dad's 
/ !house visiting , could hear Joe driving around the block. She 
/ !could never have a phone, because he kept breaking them. 
i !Joe didn't want her hanging around them . She acted afraid. 
i !That was new behavior. 
; ; 
2:42:29 PM f cross exam /will Butler 
2:42 :35 PM f Reeves !she would leave and come back several times. 
·--~::~·:;~·-:~··! :::~::t·········--·············· ·· ·······-f The·· n·ight · having .. dinner,···stephanie ··1eft .. prem.aturely .······················· ··· 
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2:46:40 PM ,:',,,.'1,,_i·Jennifer Hickson !Duly sworn. Did not know Stephanie Camack, but knew !who she was. About mid-December. Saw occurrence from 
JJennifer's apartment. Talked to Joe and met Stephanie. He 
/started calling her a f------ bitch and stupid. Joe acted 
!paranoid about cop driving by. 
2:50:55 PM j jstephanie was embarrassed. 
2:51 :20 PM !Butler !Objection, calling for conclusion . 
2:51 :31 PM !Judge !Sustained. 
2:51 :36 PM /Butler !Objection, calls for conclusion. 
2:51 :42 PM !Judge !Overruled. 
2:51 :48 PM /Hickson !Didn't know what Joe was blaming her for, but related to 
I /cops going by. 
2:52 :59 PM f cross exam !will Butler 
2:53:06 PM f Hickson l 
2:54:04 PM f Judge !witness excused. 
2:54:15 PM !PA !Prepared affidavit of Rodger Hossfeld as he couldn't be here 
!today. Asks the Court to take judicial notice. Asks for 
!admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
2:55:34 PM f DA jobject to affidavit. Not here and subject to cross i /examination. 
2:55:51 PM !PA JSworn statement of what he would admit to. Had medical l /conflict. 
2:56:29 PM 1Judge jWill admit for limited purposes today. Any other admssions 
!as 3rd party. 
2:57:15 PM rA !Officer stated Mr. Herrera had Ms. Comack's cellphone in 
!his pocket when turned himself in . 4(b) and admissible 
!knowledge. Just cellphone. Piece of evidence on person. 
:Testimony of Kaytlin Camack, she stated she had received 
Jtext messages. We have copies of those messages on her I My Space page. Will be asking those be admitted. 
2:59:45 PM f DA jObject. No proper foundation . Anyone can sit at computer 
........................................... i .............................................. ............ ..... i.or_parents .. can .. enter .. password_· ............... .. ............................................................................. .. 
... 3:0_1 ..: 00 .. PM .. / PA ...... ............. ............................... JO_uestion .. a_re .. they __ objecitonable .. under _404(b ).-............................................ .. 
3:01 : 15 PM /Judge /Will consider for limited purposes if proper foundation can i !belayed. 
3:02:4 7 PM f I ~~eak until 3: 15. Everyone will be wanded if they come back 
3:15:46 PM jJudge .......... /_Back .. on .. the .. record ...................................... .. ................ ................ ............................................................... . 
3:16:13 PM :,,! PA !Seeking admission of only hilighted parts of Plaintiffs Exhibit 
/2 . Kaytlin Camack had emailed that to Margaret 
. ':3 : ..1f:'6g .. P M .. L_ ............ ... .. . ... . ............... ... . . .. I ~::r:::::-bt'46'4'(6Y ni'ofions·:· ............. :.::::::.::: .::: .. ::.:::: .. :::.::::::: .. ::::::::::: ::.::::::::::: ::.: ...:::: 
·3:f7:21 PM !Judge !Motion to Suppress 
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3:17:27 PM !DA :calls Margaret Lehmbecker. Position although Mr. Herrera 
!had been mirandized and told free to leave, Chief and Paul 
!Berger interviewed, then arrested after at police station. 
!During period of arrival and time under arrest. 
3:20:13 PM f Margaret iDuly sworn by clerk. Chief of Police at St. Maries Police 
\ehmbecker !Dept for 2 years. Involved in investigating Stephanie 
i !Comack death. Herrera came to station about 5:25 p.m. on 
! December 25th and was interviewed in Chiefs office. Chief 
lread Miranda Warnings from card, told him he was free to 
peave and door open. SFT Berger, ISP arrived part way into 
!interview. He read from blue card. SGT may have closed 
!door after his entry. After SGT Berger left, Chief 
iLehmberger left and left door open. Officer Robbie Rogers 
!was in outer office. Herrera went into lobby and sat in chair. 
!Then went into Chiefs office with SGT Berger and Mr. 
JHerrera. Door was closed. At end of interview, Mr. Herrera 
iwas arrested. 
3:33:13 PM !PA .............................................. T6&Jecf.5est"evicie·n·ce·: ........................................ .. .. .. ... .. ... .. ... ......... ....................... .............................  
3:33:20 PM !Judge iNo difference as to whether told free to leave before or after 
i !Miranda. 
3:33:49 PM jcross exam jPlaintiffs Exhibit 3 handed to witness. 
3:34:24 PM \ehmbecker !Identifies exhibit as photocopy of Miranda warn ing card 
l !signed by Mr. Herrera. 
· 3:34:47 PM !PA !Move to admit. 
3:34:53 PM f DA !Did you read 2nd page? 
.... . ... ..... ............................. . ,c, ..... ...... . ............................. . ....... .. ............. ,: ........... . ...................... .. ... ........................ ........ . ........................................ ................. ... .. . ........ . . . ..... ...... .... .. ....................... .. . ...... ... . 
3:35:22 PM 1Lehmbecker /Yes. Read outloud to Mr. Herrera. 
·{~::!~ .. :~..f ~~ge ............................................. 1.~~i~~~~~t~:dm.itted ......................................... ................................................................................ ........... . 
rn i~ ~~~~;;ebecker - --i~i~;ri;~;::~:~r;:~::;:~::di:i;rie;ulled all that -
: !have mention of Mr. Herrera in them. 
3:39:49 PM !PA JNo objection. 
3:39:56 PM jJudge !order admit Defendant's A. 
3:40:05 PM JDA /Have St. Maries Gazette Blitz. 
":3:40:17 PM jPA JNo objection. 
3:40:22 PM jJudge !order admit Defendant's B . 
... 3:40:34 PM jDA !Describes subscription numbers. 
3:41 :00 PM j !Reviews each newspaper in Defendant's A. 
3:45:28 PM j /Articles prejudice Mr. Herrera either through publication .. o'i: 
I 10n internet version. Have not looked on Facebook. Would 
i i like to supplement record. 
3:46:06 PM jJudge jwill need to do it quickly. .. ..................... . 
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l No argument. Would just be repeating Brief. 
i Position any statements from Stephanie Camack should be 
/excluded as hearsay. Cites federal cases. Stephanie had 
!motive as family didn't like Joe. Unable to confront witness 
iso prejudicial to client. Probative value does not outwiegh 
!undue prejudice . 
................................ .................... .................. ........................... ..................... ........................ .................................................. ... ...... ...............•. .......... 
! Motion to Suppress. Evidence clear the Defendant was 
JMirandized. Issue becomes whether Miranedized, 
!statements were voluntary and not coercion. Defendant was 
!there voluntarily, broght in by friends. When Officer Berger 
!arrived, he was advised again. Not unduely long, not 
/deprived of food, beverage or sleep. Door was open during 
jbreak. He was free to leave. Door was closed but not 
i locked during interview. Nothing presented about 
!intelligence of Defendant. In court today he has been taking 
l notes and conversing with attorney. No evidence broke his 
jwill. Deny motion to Suppress. Statements were voluntary 
jand not the result of coercion. 
3:57:49 PM~:.,.· istate 404(b) . Allows evidence of other acts not admissible 
!to show criminal propensity. Is allowed for __ . Reads 
l l requirements. 
4:00:23 PM f !Here occurred 404(b) evidence came from witness Kimberly 
l :smith, where she testified at time she was involved with 
!Defendant, he was jealous. She testified he broke her 
!cellphone as result of arguments . Kiani Appell had 
i relationship with Defendant. Evidence was they had a fight, 
!Defendant took her cellphone to use it, police arrived and 
/gave it back to her. 
4:02:11 PM jPA !Eunice McEwen, bad acts, touched on hearsay rule. 
4:02:46 PM jJudge iThat is statements by Stephanie. 
4:02:58 PM i i404(b) issues regarding Kimberly Smith and Kiani Appell, 
7/13/2012 
1 !relevance is limited. Any evidence regarding Kiani Appell, 
jwill not be allowed. RE: Kimberly Smith , jealous will not 
)come in. Relevance to show plan or course of conduct---. 
!Will not be allowed. 
State vs. Joseph Duane Herrera 3B-COURTROOM1 
Time Speaker Note 
4:04:53 PM',,,!, iNext statements testified to by Stephanie Camack. Rule 
!803(3), __ ,804(b)(6), RE: 804(b)(5), rule has never been 
/interpreted by ISC. Giles v. Applies only if designed 
!to prevent witness from testifying. Parker vs. 
/Commonwealth. 7 Handbook of Evidence . Gonzales 
!vs. State. Defendant has to be motivated to prevent 
!witness from testifying at trial. Rule 803(3). Emotion or 
!physical condition. State vs. Radibaugh. State vs. 
!Goodrich. Error to admit such testimony wtihout limiting 
!instruction. Must be relevant to a proceeding and not 
/prejudicial. State vs. Garcia. Reads 4 issues. 
4:12:02 PM i !state vs. Shackleford. Emphasized on admissible to rebutt 
! !defense theory. Will need to hear evidence before making a 
l !ruling. 
4:14:32 PM l !Rule 803-24 and 803(b)(6). Only apply if not covered by 
l !Idaho rules. Appears statements here are covered by 803 
l /(3). If proper defense layed for defense of accident, many of 
! !statements will come in. Eunice McEwen - admissible- if 
! !proper foundation laid. James Camack - show state of mind 
! !of deceased and would come in if proper foundation. Susan 
l /Camack - statetments made by Stephanie would come in if 
i /proper foundation. All with instructions. 
I I 
4:16:56 PM f !Jack Camack. Only statement he noticed bruises on 
I !Stephanie's arms. He asked if Defendant did that and she 
!said no. Would not be allowed . 
........................................... .;. ................................................................. : ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
4: 17:38 PM i i Kaytlin Coma ck - Statements by Stephanie in December 
l /about phone being broken and Defendant psycho. Those 
! !would be allowed. Observance of bruises on arms. No 
! /statements, so that testimony would not be allowed in. 
4:18:33 PM t !Bobbie Riddell - Testimony told her they argued and fought 
! !and he threatened her he would kill himself. Those I 'statements would come in. Balance would not. 
4:19:19 PM j !Tiffany Reeves - No statements by Stephanie. Testimony 
i !would not be allowed in. 
4:20:02 PM f jJennifer Hickson - Relevance to issues here tenuous. 
i /Defendant made derogatory comments. Relevance 
! !outweighed by prejudice. Not allowed. 
4:20:55 PM I !Affidavit of Rodger Hossfeld - Nothing specific that would be I /admissible. Testimony would not be allowed . 
.. 4:21 :23 PM f !statement on Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. If proper foundation can 
j lbe layed, it is relevant to show her mental state or condition. 
! l 
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DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 













Case No. CRll-2053 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR 
DISMISS 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress or Dismiss came on regularly 
to be heard before the Honorable Fred M. Gibler, one the Judges 
of the above entitled Court, on the 13th day of July, 2012; the 
State was represented by Douglas Paul Payne, Prosecuting 
Attorney for Benewah County, State of Idaho; the defendant was 
present and was represented by William Butler, attorney of St. 
Maries. 
WHEREUPON, the Court having heard evidence presented by the 
parties, arguments of counsel and based upon the record herein, 
and good cause appearing, now, therefore, 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION - l -
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Suppress or 
smiss should be and hereby is DENIED. 
DATED this 2 O t'-day of h , 2012. 
ufr?~ 
Fred M. Gibler 
District Judge 
I here'.dcertify that on the olCJ tJ.. 
day of ,,.,,~ , 2012, a true 
and co ~t py of the foregoing 
was delivered/mailed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Maries, Idaho 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Maries, Idaho 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION, Page - 2 
JUL.24.2012 1:30PM 111 DGE GIBLER 
DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
st. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245-2564 
NO. 960 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE fIRST JUDICIAL DISTRIC~ 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No. CRll-2053 
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION 
FOR DETERMINATION OF 
ADMISSABILITY OF EVIDENCE 
P. 1/3 
The State's Motion For Determination of Admissabili ty of 
Evidence came on regularly to be heard before the Honorable Fred 
M. Gibler, one the Judges of the above entitled Court, on the 
13th day of July, 2012; the State was represented by Douglas 
Paul Payne, l?rosecuting Attorney for Benewah County, State of 
Idaho; the defendant was present and was represented by William 
Butler, attorney of St. Maries. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented and the 
record and le herein, the Court determines that the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence and interests of justice require the admission 
or exclusion of certain evidence at trial as follows: 
1. The proffered testimony of Kim Smith, Jack Comack, 
Tiffany Reeves, Jennifer Hickson, Roger Hossfeld and Kianni 
Appell shall be excluded pursuant to I.R.E. 403 and 404(b). 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION, Page - 1 - , 
JUL.24.2012 1:31PM GE GIBLER NO. 960 P. 2/3 
2. The proffered testimony of James Comack, Susan Coroack, 
Katlyn Comack, Bobbie Riddell and Eunice McEwen shall be 
admitted as bearing upon the mental condition of the declarant 
pursuant to LR.E. 803(3) subject to a proper limiting 
instruction and conditioned upon proper foundation. This 
evidence will be admitted if relevant to an issue involved in 
the proceeding as determined by the Court during trial. Not 
included is the testimony by Kaytlin Comackt Jack Comack and 
Susan Coroack that they saw bruises on Stephanie Comack or how 
she responded when asked about them. 
specifically excluded under I.R.E. 403. 
That evidence is 
3. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, containing a paragraph of text 
send by Stephanie Comack to Katlyn Comack shall also be admitted 
pursuant to I.R.E. 803(3) conditioned upon proper foundation. 
IT IS SO ORDERE):._ 
DATED this ?-l <"" day of h----r 2012. 
Fr~d M. Gibler 
District Judge 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION, Page - 2 -
LI?(; 
JUL. 2 4. 2 0 12 1 : 31 PM 1DGE GIBLER 
I here~certify that on the r}__'-/ di. 
day of ~ , 2012, a true 
and co r c~py of the foregoing 
was delivered/mailed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Dou~las Paul Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Maries, Idaho 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mailbox 
St. Maries, Idaho 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION, Page - 3 -




Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Idaho State Bar 4188 
Attorney for Defendant 
' ,~ •, ' :.., ! 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 
Defendant. 










Case No. CR 2011-002053 
SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO 
CHANGE VENUE 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Joseph Duane Herrera, by and 
through his Attorney of Record, William Butler, and hereby 
supplements the record to change the venue of the trial to a 
county other than Benewah because of prejudicial pretrial 
publicity. Exhibit "A". 
Without the relief sought in this Motion, numerous statutory 
and constitutional rights of the Accused will be violated, 
including but not limited to: the right to effective assistance 
of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. 
-1-
MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE 
~' j 
,OE?UT: 
Constitution as well as Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution; the rights of due process of law and equal 
protection, and the protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as 
Article 1, §§ 6, 7, 8, and 17 of the Idaho Constitution; the 
right to confront witnesses guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution; the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution; 
and, the right to compulsory process guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution, and Idaho Code§ 19-1801. 
A hearing is requested at which time evidence, testimony, 
and oral argument may be presented. The Defendant reserves the 
right to present the Court with additional authorities and 
briefing in support of this Motion. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2012. 
-2-
MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Idaho State Bar 4188 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the within Motion to Change Venue was delivered 
to the office of the Benewah County Prosecuting Attorney, by 
placing a copy in his basket in the Clerk's Office, Benewah 
County Courthouse, 701 College, St. Maries, Idaho, by US Mail or 
by facsimile, (208) 245 1915, this date. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2012. 
-3-
MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE 
WILLIAM BUTLER 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245-3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 
Defendant. 











Case No. CR 2011-002053 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
JURY TRIAL 
-----------------
The undersigned attorney for defendant in the above-
entitled cause hereby moves the Court for an Order continuing 
the Jury Trial set for August 14, 2012, at 9:30 o'clock a.m., 
for a period of not less than sixty (60) days. This Motion is 
made on the grounds that the parties need additional time and 
opportunity to investigate the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the charges in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of July, 2012. 





Attorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and 
correct copy of the within Motion to Continue Jury Trial 
delivered to the office of the Benewah County Prosecuting 
Attorney, by placing a copy in his basket in the Clerk's Office, 
Benewah County Courthouse, 701 College, St. Maries, Idaho, by US 
Mail or by facsimile, (208) 245-1915, this date. 
DATED this 26th day of July, 2012. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
JURY TRIAL 
-2 
t ? l~ 
WILLIAM BUTLER 
Attorney for Defendant 
Attorney at Law 
720 West College Avenue 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone (208) 245-2521 
Facsimile (208) 245 3948 
e-mail will@smgazette.com 
JUL.26.2012 3:19PM ' 11 DGE GIBLER NO. 994 P. 1/3 
BY: (:7(( 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




I CASE NO. CR-2011-2053 
I 
I 
I ORDER DENYING MOTION 




Defendant has moved to change venue due to pretrial publicity. The 
motion is based on news articles and letters to the editor in the St. Maries 
Gazette Record newspaper and internet articles from the St. Maries Gazette 
Record Blitz. 
The legal standard for determination of a motion to change venue due to 
pretrial publicity is set forth in State v. Hadden 152 Idaho 371, 271 P.3d 1227 
(Ct.App.2012), review denied (Mar. 21, 2012). A motion to change venue is 
addressed to the discretion of the trial court. The validity of a court's decision to 
try a case in a particular venue is tested by whether, in the totality of existing 
circumstances, juror exposure to pretrial publicity results in a trial that is not 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE -1-
,OEPUT'r 
JUL.26.2012 3:19PM ' 1IDGE GIBLER NO. 994 P. 2/3 
fundamentally fair. Publicity by itself does not require a change of venue. 
However, a defendant's inability to make a detailed and conclusive showing of 
prejudice is not a proper ground for refusing to change venue as prejudice 
seldom can be established or disproved with certainty. Rather, it is sufficient for 
the accused to show there was a reasonable likelihood prejudicial news 
coverage will prevent a fair trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Where such a motion is made before jury selection it must 
be demonstrated that the content of the publicity creates a presumption of 
prejudice. In Hadden the court stated: 
[T]he Court [in Skilling v, United States, _ U.S. ~' 130 S.Ct. 
2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010)] recognized "most cases of 
consequence gamer at least some pretrial publicity." However, a 
"presumption of prejudice/' requiring a change of venue, "attends 
only the extreme case." The test for the "extreme case" remains 
whether the trial atmosphere has been "utterly corrupted by press 
coverage." 
Hadden, 271 P.3d at 1235 quoting Skilling (citations omitted). 
The articles have been reviewed, and it is concluded that the news articles 
are for the most part accurate; they are not inflammatory and do not contain 
inadmissible evidence which would be prejudicial to defendant. The letters to the 
editor center on law enforcement in Benewah County. 
There have been no affidavits submitted showing prejudice from potential 
jurors in Benewah County. 
This is not an extreme case where the trial atmosphere has been utterly 
corrupted by press coverage justifying a change of venue based on a 
presumption of prejudice. It will only be through voir dire that a determination 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE -2-
JUL.26.2012 3:20PM '' 1 DGE GIBLER NO. 994 P. 3/3 
can be made whether prospective jurors have formed an opinion based on 
pretrial publicity. If impartial jurors cannot be found, then venue will be changed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: Defendant's motion to change venue is 
denied. 
~ 
DATED this 2 ~ day of July, 2012. 
FRED M. GIBLER, District Judge 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this o'.2,G.. tt day of July, 2012, to the following: 
William M. Butler, Attorney at Law 
720 W. College Ave. 
St Maries, ID 83861 
Douglas P. Payne 
Benewah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
701 W. College Ave. 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
Michele McDaniel, Clerk of Court 
By: c~%o _, 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE -3-
State vs. Joseph D. Herrera 3B-COURTROOM1 
Time Speaker Note 
1:42:14 PM :',,,1.08/01/2012 !District Judge Fred M. Gibler presiding; Byrl Cinnamon, 
/Court Reporter; Carol Ryan, Deputy Clerk . 
. T42:4i PM ·,.l,,I . .............. . ....... . .. .. . . . . I g~~~1~ip~~2i~;~;~~~~:~~~~i~~-1t~~~i:y~~~I~:::~~~~: 
!Defense Attorney. Hearing: Defense Motion to Continue 
.. .. ............................ i.J ury .r rial ..................................................................................... ............................................................................ .... .. 
... 
2:.1 .. 1.:45 .. PM··'··,,,,,IJduge··············· !Calls case. Defendant is present in custody of jailer, Deputy !Yearout. Set for Motion to Continue Jury Trial. 
.................... , , .. .. ...... ............................................................................................................................................................................... . 
2 12 11PM iDA J~;f~;;!a;; n}f ~~~;;~~=_[;:;;~;t~~~o1~:~tinu: :ot 
2:13:00 PM :,',,,f',,::
1
PA .!Late juncture. Parties notified and subpoenaes issued. 
:Victims want trial to proceed. Significant burdon of showing 
lwhy it justifies a continuance. Oppose continuance. 
2:14:09 PM [Judge !Asks to be more specific. 
2:14:20 PM JDA ilnformation came to light on day I filed motion. Will not 
i !disclose particuality of it. Information has materiality to 
1case. 
2:15:03 PM ',,,,i',,,,.!Judge jUnderstand that the victims are anxious to get the case tried · 
!as am I. Assume it's to everyone's interest to have it tried. 
/Based on representation by Mr. Butler that he has 
!information to pursue before trying case. If proceeded and 
!there was a conviction, if appealed might have to try case all 
!over again. 
2: 16:20 PM t iwith reluctance, based on representations made and 
l !contingent upon Mr. Herrera's waiver of speedy trial. Mr. 
i !Herrera do you waive your right to a speedy trial. Trial is set 
l lin less than 2 weeks. 
·- ~. ; ~. ~ ~ :~ i ~:;::dant _ i :~ 09~:~1 · request and reschedule. How-lo~:: : : : 
2:17:31 PM jPA i1 week, 5 full days. ·········································· 
2:17:37 PM iDA iFine. . . ........................... . 
2: 17:41 PM jJudge !Will get it scheduled as soon as we can. Likely not within 6 
...... ... .......... .......... ... .. J .......... .... .. .. ...... .... ........ ......... ....... Jweeks ................................................................................................................................................................................ . 
2: 18:05 PM 1 /Mr. Butler to prepare the order. . : 
8/1/2012 1 of 1 
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IN THt DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE or IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOS~FH DUANE HERRERA, 
Def enda.nt. 















rhe matter having come before the Court on defendantts 
mo·tion to continue the jury trial and good cause appearing the 
defend.ant's motion is hereby GRANTED. The jury tri.al cu.rrsntly 
scheduled for Augu . .st 14, 2012 is vacated and the Cle.rl<: of the 
"i"e scl..~..ite.J.. '7<)< De c..e. '"''°e.("' 11, ?..01"2. c:l,+ q: 1>0 ,;I.•-· 
Court .is ~.11.:n;;eel- t..o rl!>sch;H~uJ.c the sa:mc 1::lpen thc--G-otttt' s 
IT IS SO OWEREO. !}-
DATED this 7,.- r- dey of August, 2012. 
ORDER TO CONTINUE 
JURY TRIAL 
-:t-




,AUG. 2. 2012~~ 2: 12PM120' .,~GE GIBLER DISTRICT CO ,. NO. 0 8 0 
CER'J:IFICATE OF SEB.VICB: I hereby certify that on thj,s 
~~~ day of August, 2012, J. caused a true and corract copy of 
the foregoing instrument to be served by the method indicated 
and addressed to the following: 
William Butler 
Attorney at Law 
720 W. College Avenue 
St. Ma~ies, Idaho 83861 
Facsimile: (208) 245-3948 
Douglas Paul Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
701 College Avenue, Suite 201 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Facsimile; (208) 24S-3915 
ORDER TO CONTtNOE 
JORY TRIAL 
U.S. Mail 
tL Courthouse Box 
Hand-delivered 
o,rernigh-c Mail 
Facsiro . .:Lle 
U.S. Mail 




Frorn: Si(!b~ Law OfficBs f· ·:x: (208) S82-876f lo: 
SIEBE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
JAtvIES E. SIEBE. ISBN 2362 
608 Nmihwest Blvrd., Ste. l 01 
Coeur d1 Alene, ID 83814 
Phone: (208) 765-8188 
Fax: (208) 882-8769 
rax: +1 (;!UJ;J ,4t-1'd1., 1-"Z..gf:· .£, or 4 I 11.GV/,4.V I,;; 6+', I~ 
Fl D 
Benewah County 
/JC'Jv i;2Q . 20/r;( att'ou AM~ 
Michele Mc Daniel, Clerk 
By __ .c __ . ...&7:_,,_K__,, ___ Otputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENE\VAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH D. HERRERA, 
Defondant. 








) ________ ) 
COMES NO\V the defendant, by and through his attorney of record, and 
respectfuHy requests that the tria1 currently scheduled in the above-entitled matter for 
December 11, 2012 be vacated and reset on the grounds and. for the reasons that 
defense counsd, who recently substituted in to the case was unable to obtain the 
complete file until late October 2012 due to a number of fa.ctors. 
First, counsel experienced some delay in being retained by Defendant's family, 
due to circumstances beyond their control. 
Second, counsel was u.nable to obtain a complete copy of the. me as quickiy as 
he would have liked. Counsel is still in the process of going through materials and 
obtaining expert opinions relative to the case in order to adequately advise his client 
lv10T10N TO CONTINUE 
Fri:m1: Sj.;be Law Ollie- i Fax: (208) 332-8769 To: Fax: +1 (208) 245-1915 Page 3 of 4 11/20/2012 4:HJ 
and family. Counsel has no possible way that he can be prepared for trial in early 
December. 
Defendant has previously waived his right to Speedy Trial. Counsel respectfully 
requests that the Court schedule this in accordanee with a separate letter of available 
dates for dt'fen.se counset since defense counsel has quite a few trials in January, 
February, and early .March. 
Oral argument and leave to adduce testimony is hereby requested if the Court is 
not othe1wise disposed to grant the motion. 
DA TED this :?a_ day of November, 2012. 
SIEBE LA v,..r OFFICES, PLLC 
NO OBJECTION. 
Dated 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
To: Fax: +1 (208) 245-191 S Paga 4 of 4 11/20/2012 4:19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the __ day of November, 2012, I served a trne and con-ect copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated and addressed to the following: 
Honorable Judge Gibler 
700 Bank Slreet 
P.O. Box 527 
Wallace, ID 83873 
MOTION T,. 1 C0NTIN1JE • 3 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile to: (208) 753-3581 
" lGE GIBLER 
SIEBE LA ,v OFFICES, PLLC 
JAMES E. SIEBE; ISBN 2362 
608 Nortlnvest Blvd., Ste. 101 
Coeill' d'Alene~ ID 83814 
Phone: {208) 765-8188 
Fax; (208) 882-8769 
F<>X: +i (208) 75:.l-3SS1 Page S of e NO. 2 4 2 ;z 9;52 p, J 
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I. 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
vs. 
JOSEPH D. HERRERA, 
Defendant. 









THIS MA TIER, having been presented to the Court pursuant to the Motion of 
the Defendant to continue, the prosecution having no objection, the Court having 
considered the premises, the Defendant having waived 1lis Right to Speedy Trial, and 
good cause appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the jury trial, currently scheduled for· 
Tuesday, December 11, 2012 should be and hereby is vacated.and rescheduled for~ 
fl}~ J'l.-t":i" °"""'J... Me..l"'t.k J't ,,.t11.J.. 2.0 1 z.or'l 
__ of , 28+3 at q: o i:s a.m.~ .. 
DATED this :11 day of November, 2012. 
ORDER TO CONTlNlJE 
- , 
I 
:=rom; ;;;;~b., NOV. 21. 2012 <: 10: 3 ::J AM,9 1DGE GIBLER f'?V(I +i (209) 703,,35!'!1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
s.f-
I hereby certify that on the~ day of November, 2012, I served a true and 
con-ect copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated and addressed to the 
following: 
James E. Siebe 
SIEBE LAW OFFICES 
P.O. Box 9045 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Benewah County Prosecutor 
701 College St. 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
(v) Facsimile to (208) 882~8769 
( ) U.S. Mail 
(.,1Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile to: (208) 245-19] 5 
(I_ (I_ ', 0 "'-''.:) C <> ,,.. ,.,_ , '"s,t, o IV eJ<.. 
ORDER TO CONTINUE 
State vs. Joseph Duane Herrera 3B-COURTROOM1 
Time Speaker Note 
8:39:24 AM /02/22/2013 /CR2011-2053, State vs. Joseph Duane Herrera. Douglas Paul 
! 1Payne, Prosecuting Attorney; James E. Siebe, Defense Attorney. 
! !Hearing: Status Conference . 
. Ef46:T1 AM t !District Judge Fred M. Gibler presiding; Byrl Cinniii'm·o·ii .. 'co.urt ...... ...  
........................................... 1 ............ ...................... !.Reporter; .. _Carol .. Ryan, .. _Deputy .. Clerk ........................................ .. .............. ............................................ .. 
9:38:32 AM JJudge !Calls case. Mr. Payne and Mr. Siebe are present. Set for Status 
! (Conference. Scheduled for trial to commence March 12th. Are we 
I !still set for trial? 
9:39:04 AM /PA jYes 
9:39:08 AM iDA iYes. Met with him this morning. 
1 :08:55 PM jJudge jwill arrange to come for change of plea if agreement is reached. 
~ l 
2/22/2013 
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DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE #4789 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Benewah County Courthouse 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Telephone: 208-245-2564 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DUANE HERRERA, 
Case No. CRll-2053 
STATE'S SECOND AMENDED 
WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, DOUGLAS PAUL PAYNE, Prosecuting Attorney for 
Benewah County, State of Idaho, and hereby submits to the Court 
the following witness and exhibit lists: 
WITNESSES: 
1. Dr. Sally Aiken, Spokane County Medical Examiner, 5901 
N. Lidgerwood, suite 24B, Spokane, WA 99208 
2. Trp. Glenn Bakken, I.S.P., Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
3. Derek Barden, 94 Gracie Lane, St. Maries, Idaho 
4. Det. Paul Berger, I.S.P. Investigations, Coeur d'Alene, 
Idaho 
5. Janelle Buell, EMT, 204 14th Str., St. Maries, Idaho 
6. Deputy Scott Castles, B.C.S.O., St. Maries, Idaho 
7. James Comack, 77091 S. Hwy 3, St. Maries, Idaho 
8. Katlyn Comack, 2120 W. Idaho Ave., St. Mar s, Idaho 
9. Susie Comack, 2120 W. Idaho Ave., St. Maries, Idaho 
10. Deputy Rodney B. Dickenson, B.C.S.O., St. Maries, Idaho 
11. Ronnie Dickerson, E.M.T., 30 Ponderosa Ln, St. Maries, 
Idaho 
12. Det. Charles Greear, I.S.P. Investigations, Coeur d' 
Alene, Idaho 
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13. Dr. Clyde Hanson, Benewah Comrnunity Hospital, 
St. Maries, Idaho 
14. Jerilyn Herrera, 319 S. 14th Str., St. Maries, Idaho 
15. Jesse Herrera, 319 S. 14th Str., St. Maries, Idaho 
16. Stuart Jacobsen, I.S.P. Forensic Lab, Coeur d'Alene, 
Idaho 
17. Chief Margaret Lehmbecker, S.M.P.D., St. Maries, ID 
18. Det. Robert W. Loe, S.M.P.D., St. Maries, Idaho 
19. Eunice McEwen, 1041 Woolsey Dr., Coeur d'Alene, ID 
20. Dr. Paul F. Paschall, KMC, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
21. Deputy Michael Richardson, B.C.S.O., St. Maries, ID 
22. Bobbie Riddle, 58 S. Spring Str., Fernwood, ID 
23. Det. Michael Van Leuven, I.S.P. Investigations, 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
24. Dispatcher Karen Pace, B.C.S.O., St. Maries, Idaho 
EXHIBITS: 
The State intends to offer the following exhibits: 
1. A .380 pistol and .380 shell casing. 
2. A .380 magazine found on the floor. 
3. Death Certificate. 
4. A recording of the interview of defendant by Chief 
Lehmbecker. 
5. A recording of the interview of defendant by Det. Paul 
Berger. 
6. Diagrams of the crime scene by Det. Bakken. 
7. A controlled substance analysis report and a firearm 
report by Stuart Jacobsen, I.S.P. Forenic Lab. 
8. Various parapherna ia found in the room, including a 
roach clip, Zig Zag papers, a metal pipe and meth 
waterbong. 
9. Photos of the crime scene taken by Det. Michael 
VanLeuven, I.S.P. Investigations, and photos of the 
crime scene by Officer (now Deputy) Scott Castles, 
S.M.P.D. as follows: 
4238 stairs 
4239 the room with magazine (far) 
4241 the room with magazine (near) 
4243 the mag on floor 
4244 two magazines and drug paraphernalia in drawer 
8583 the house 
8706 the gun cabinet 
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8753 the room 
8763 the room 
8764 to the left, inside the room 
8765 the dresser on left outside the room 
8770 to the right, inside the room 
8772 small dresser at left head of the bed 
8773 blood stain, bed and small furniture left of bed 
8774 furniture at left entry of room 
8777 blood and furniture left of bed 
8778 ceiling over site 
8781 bullet stuck in wall 
8783 bullet stuck in wall close-up 
8817 s e with all furniture and bed 
8822 bullet measured from floor 
8824 bullet being removed 
8825 bullet removed 
8826 .25 cal under bed 
8827 .25 cal under bed 
8829 .25 cal and full magazine 
8830 .25 cal and empty chamber 
8832 .25 cal close-up 
view 
8843 dresser at left entrance with toy cars 
8845 meth pipe under toy cars 
8847 meth pipe with water in it 
8848 hydro bottle, Herrera 
8851 hydro bottle close-up 
8852 marijuana seeds in hydro bottle 
8886 pistol 
8896 casing 
8898 magazine with six rounds and blood 
8899 magazine with six rounds and blood 
8907 evidence envelope with magazine with six rounds 
and blood 
8908 pill bottle wrapped in tape 
8911 pill bottle wrapped in tape opened with marijuana 
8913 metal pipe, papers and roach clip 
8958 glass pipe and water bong (meth) 
8959 glass pipe with water bong (assembled) 
8965 hydocodone bottle-Herrera's, with marijuana seeds 
8966 seeds 
8969 the bullet 
10. Defendant's and victim's personal effects found in the 
room. 
11. A .25 pistol found under mattress. 
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12. A bullet removed from the wall. 
13. Marijuana found under nightstand, and marijuana with 
joints found in pill bottle. 
14. Pill bottle with defendant's name on it with marijuana 
seeds in it. 
15. The Autopsy Report of Dr. Sally Aiken and attached 
toxicology report. 
16. Photos at KMC and at the autopsy by Det. Michael 





5957 victim on gurney at KMC 
5958 victim's wrist bracelet on gurney at KMC 
5961 victim on gurney, face at KMC 
5975 victim's tattoo at KMC 
5988 victim on gurney covered with name at KMC 
5992 victim at autopsy - whole body 
5994 victim's ankle I.D. bracelet 
6000 victim's tattoo 
6001 victim's head wound 
6604 victim's head wound close-up 
6605 victim's head wound close-up 
6008 victim's head wound cleaned showing pattern 
6012 victim's head wound cleaned showing pattern 
6014 very close-up showing powder burn 
6017 wound, farther away, showing scale 
6040 wound closed showing channel 
6045 wound opened showing internal burn 






close-up of tattoo 
exit close-up 
exit wound showing 
rod showing bullet 




video made at the scene by Dep. Rodney B. Dickenson. 
video made at the scene by Dep. Mike chardson. 
recordi.ng of defendant call:1g 911. 
this ~l.v"T"' day of __;z~1a~ ' 2013. 
.: ~·,/4;&1.J \__L' //" 
. , ,· I [.,&1 ~-----·---
Doug las ~11 Payne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
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day of -J0f1:vt.e,'1--, , 2 0 3, a f rue 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
was faxed/delivered/mailed, postage 
prepaid to: 
James E. Siebe 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Blvd #101 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
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